dissent

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IRAN

From the Shah's Dictatorship To Khomeini's Demagogic Theocracy

SHARIF ARANI

* The Street and the Bazaar
* The Role of the Mullahs
* The Collapse of the Middle Class
* Prospect for the Future

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AMONG OUR CONTRIBUTORS

SHLOMO AVINERI, author of *The Social and Political Thought of Marx*, teaches political science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Under Israel's last Labor government, he served as director-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

ELAINE HOFFMAN BARUCH teaches English at York College of the City University of New York. This year she is on leave, doing a study, on an NEH grant, on women in utopia.

ANTAL DEUTSCH, who teaches economics at McGill University, is currently a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University, studying government debt and governmental wealth.

MARTIN GREEN teaches English at Fairleigh Dickinson University and is co-editor of the *Literary Review*, a quartelry of fiction, poetry, and criticism.

JOHN KURT JACOBSEN's writing has appeared in *These Times*, *Studies*, and numerous Irish publications. He holds a visiting appointment in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago.

MARGARET KAHN, a graduate student in political science at the University of California, Berkeley—this year in England, under a traveling fellowship—is writing a dissertation on the British National Union of Mineworkers in the 1960s and '70s.

NICOLAUS MILLS, our movie reviewer, teaches English at Sarah Lawrence College. Among his books are *The New Journalism* (1973) and Busing U.S.A. (1979); he now is finishing a book on crowds in literature.

HARRELL RODGERS teaches political science at the University of Houston. He is the author of, most recently, *Poverty Amid Plenty* (1979), and is at work on a new book, tentatively entitled "Unfinished Democracy."

SANFORD PINSKER teaches in the English Department at Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Pa. His most recent book is *Between Two Worlds: The American Novel in the 1960's*.

JEROME SLATER teaches political science at the State University of New York at Buffalo. Among his books is *Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution* (1970). His book in progress is tentatively entitled "Seven Myths about the War in Vietnam."

DISSENT (ISSN 0012–3846), issued January 1, 1980, is published quarterly, spring, summer, fall, and winter, by the DISSENT Publishing Corporation, 505 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 100017. Subscriptions: $10.00 for one year; $17.00 for two years; $8.00 for students for one year; foreign subscriptions, including Canada, add $2.00 for mailing costs per year (institutional rate $15.00 per year, $25.00 for two years). All payments from foreign countries must be made by United States money orders or checks payable in United States currency. Single copy, $2.50. For special rates on bulk orders from organizations, teachers, etc., write directly to DISSENT. For information on newsstand and bookstore distribution write to: Eastern News Co., 155 West Fifteenth Street, New York, N.Y. 10001.

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

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Jerome Slater

How Much Is Enough?

A Statement from "The Committee on Eternal Danger"

There is an increasingly widespread feeling in Congress, among informed sectors of public opinion and, surprisingly, even among many strategic analysts, that U.S. nuclear forces have grown far beyond any rational purpose, that we have far more than we need for deterrence—that, as it sometimes is vulgarly put, our strategy is one of "overkill." However popular this view may be, it is quite wrong; it reflects a frighteningly unsophisticated assessment of the mutual deterrence relation of the United States and the Soviet Union. The truth is that our security requires far, far more strategic forces than we now have.

The current American strategic posture is one of mutual assured destruction: lately critics have labeled this "MAD." For brevity's sake, I will adopt this acronym here, but certainly without pejorative connotations. MAD is a product of the mid-1960s, particularly of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. McNamara's reasoning was that we should design an American nuclear force capable of deterring any Soviet attack against either the United States or Europe so long as Soviet leaders were even minimally rational. The key assumption of the McNamara analysis was that an American force that would kill at least 25 percent of the Soviet population and destroy 50 percent of its industrial capacity would meet this criterion.

The figures may seem somewhat arbitrary, but they were based in part on the fact that the Soviet Union in World War II "accepted" some 20 million deaths and widespread material devastation, yet survived and recovered to become a superpower in rather short order. Computer analysis demonstrated that some 300 U.S. nuclear warheads impacting on Soviet targets would provide the required "assured destruction." Actually, this was a conservative assessment, since some analyses showed that 300 well-placed warheads would kill *one-third* of the Soviet population and destroy up to 75 percent of its industry. Moreover, this destruction would result only from the immediate effects of nuclear attack—blast, fire, short-term fallout; in reality, of course, there would be a great deal of bonus damage from the longer-range effects of starvation, disease, exposure, radiation poisoning, economic breakdown, social disorganization, and the like. But the MAD strategists rightly ignored these side effects of nuclear war, for in calculating the answer to the central problem of deterrence—how much is enough?—it is better to be conservative, to err on the side of safety.

These calculations, then, underlay the American nuclear-force buildup in the 1960s. Now it might be assumed on the basis of these estimates that a force of 300 strategic nuclear weapons would suffice. Of course, far more were necessary. To begin with, our forces are designed on the assumption, in the main, that they will be used only in retaliation; therefore we had to have a force that even after a surprise attack by the Soviet Union targeted directly on our nuclear forces would still be capable of delivering 300 warheads on Soviet targets. Naturally, in making these calculations it was once again necessary to adopt conservative estimates: that the Soviet strike would work very well, and that large numbers of our forces would be destroyed. To ensure that at least 300 would be left, we had to have a force many times that size. Second, it must be remembered that we do not have just one strategic nuclear force, but at least three and some would say four: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and intercontinental bombers. In addition, we have some 15 aircraft carriers with 100 or so fighter-bombers aboard, and many thousands of shorter-range missiles and aircraft based in Western Europe. Though all these latter forces are capable of delivering nuclear weapons on Soviet territory, most can do so only on one-way missions, and in any case we prefer to think of those forces as tactical rather than strategic—i.e., designed for battlefield use rather than long-range retaliation. Therefore we do not count them as part of our MAD forces. For MAD purposes, we count only

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the ICBMs, the SLBMs, and the bombers, which together form the "Triad." The key point is that *each* component of the Triad must separately be capable of carrying out assured destruction. Again, this is nothing but sound, conservative, and prudent analysis: we need to hedge against the possibility that the Soviets might develop a technology that would enable them to destroy one or even two components of the Triad in a surprise attack. Hence, each arm of our retaliatory force must be capable of riding out an effective Soviet attack and still delivering the 25 to 50 percent assured destruction.

By now, one can see that a force of many *thousands* of nuclear warheads, dispersed in a wide variety of delivery systems, is necessary—not merely 300. And of course the matter doesn't end there. Prudence further requires that we assume that many of our missiles will abort on launch, others will be shot down or malfunction on route, still others will miss their intended targets, and so on. Naturally, this adds many more to the assured-destruction requirement.

By the early 1970s the United States had a force of some 3,000 nuclear warheads, not counting, of course, those on aircraft carriers and European bases. Even at that point there were cries of "overkill." Critics made much of the fact that the U.S. stockpile of strategic and tactical warheads was equivalent in destructive power to over 500,000 of the kind of mini-atomic bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that our submarine forces alone could destroy every single city in the Soviet Union with a population exceeding 150,000, or that a single American B-52 carried more destructive power than all the weapons used in all the wars in human history, including the two atomic bombs dropped in Japan. Why, it was asked, did we need enough destructive power to kill every Russian 20 times over?

Although rhetorically effective, this misses the point. Our purpose, of course, is not to be able to kill every Russian 20 times over, but simply to kill every Russian once (not even *every* one, actually), and to *really make sure*.

Since the early 1970s, two major technological developments have made it possible vastly to expand the American force: multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and, soon to be deployed, cruise missiles. MIRVs, simply put, allow us to put from 3 to 15 separately targeted hydrogen bombs on each ICBM and SLBM. Cruise missiles are vastly updated V-2 German buzzbombs: essentially small, unmanned aircraft, but now—thanks to revolutionary advances in terrain-matching navigation, engine propulsion, electronics, and explosives miniaturization, computer technology, and the like—capable of flying thousands of miles at high speed and very low altitudes and delivering nuclear warheads with amazing accuracy, perhaps soon to within 10 yards of their targets. MIRVs are already deployed by U.S. forces, so that our present force structure consists of some 9,000 strategic nuclear warheads, larger and considerably more accurate than the earlier models, and about 7,000 tactical nuclear warheads (although they of course don't count for MAD purposes, as explained earlier). Cruise missiles are not yet deployed, but by 1980 or 1981 we will begin the first of a planned, 11,000 air-launched, nuclear-armed force.

THESE DEVELOPMENTS, existing and imminent, have revived unsophisticated notions of technology run amok, or weapons built as if for their own sweet sake rather than to serve a rational strategic purpose, of forces far beyond those necessary for MAD purposes no matter how conservatively estimated. Indeed, we do seem to be a long way from McNamara's 300-warhead calculations. But it is precisely this new technology, so deplored by our modern Luddites, that is opening up a rich new menu of strategic options to enhance our security and that, indeed, *may even allow us ultimately to dispense with nuclear weapons altogether.*

To begin with, it is not really true that a force of even 20,000 nuclear weapons is sufficient to deter. The nightmare of our force planners, whose crucial responsibility it is to make "worse-case assumptions," is that because we have never actually fired nuclear-armed missiles under operational conditions, we cannot be certain they will work. Of course, there have been thousands of successful tests of nuclear warheads, and hundreds of test-firings of long-range missiles, but it is a well-known principle of military science that testing under simulated wartime conditions, no matter how realistic one tries to make it, is simply no substitute for the real thing. Our current buildup, then, is a hedge against the contingency—unlikely, to be sure, but prudence requires we guard against it—that our nuclear warheads may not work in time of war. Under this assumption, of course, we have far too little for deterrence, not too much. The hope in the Pentagon is that with the advent of increasingly accurate long-range missiles, we may soon be able to substitute conventional warheads on them and, with sufficient numbers, *still* be able to destroy at least 25 percent of the Soviet population and 50

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percent of its industry. No doubt this will require missiles numbering in the hundreds of thousands rather than tens of thousands, but would not the abolition of nuclear warheads justify the cost?

Still further down the road is an even more revolutionary development: the deterrent force that hedges against the possibility that not even conventional warheads will explode in a retaliatory attack (remember that though conventional explosives have been with us for centuries, none have ever been fired on intercontinental missiles under wartime conditions). Though seemingly fantastic today, such a force may well become a reality before the turn of the century. And it is here that we see the true importance of the current American missile buildup, for it is laying the basis for a wholly new strategy: *assured destruction without any explosions at all*, nuclear or conventional. With a sufficient number of long-range missiles, we can kill 25 percent of the Soviet population and destroy 50 percent of its industry through the sheer weight of falling objects. The elegance of this, of course, is its utter simplicity: we need not rely for our safety on highly complicated technology that conceivably could fail us in the crunch, only on the time-tested law of gravity. We might call this "Slingshot Deterrence."

Of course, the expense of the massive new buildup of long-range missiles necessary for Slingshot Deterrence would be considerable, but not as much as it might first appear. Given the convergence of a range of technologies, for example, cruise missiles will inevitably become smaller, lighter, and more versatile, and will soon benefit from the cost efficiencies of mass production. According to some estimates, by the 1990s cruise missiles may cost as little as a few hundred dollars each, and could be fired from an ordinary artillery piece. At this point, there will be no practical limit on the numbers of cruise missiles that could be produced. A cruise missile force of several million (with no warheads) would be ideal for Slingshot Deterrence.

Now we can see the key to the current U.S. buildup and simultaneously provide a final answer to the classic, heretofore unanswerable question: How Much Is Enough? "Enough" is a sufficient number of missiles to kill at least 50 million Russians and destroy at least 50 percent of Soviet industry even if not a single missile actually explodes. Seen in this light, far from being excessive, far from embodying "overkill," the current U.S. force structure is woefully inadequate, and can be justified only if it is the first step toward strategies and force structures that will truly guarantee our national security. □

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WINTER 1980

3 HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? *by Jerome Slater*

ARTICLES

9 IRAN: FROM THE SHAH'S DICTATORSHIP TO KHOMEINI'S DEMAGOGIC THEOCRACY *by Sharif Arani*

27 LETTER FROM ISRAEL: POLITICAL TRENDS UNDER THE BEGIN REGIME *by Shlomo Avineri*

36 THE FONDA-HAYDEN SHOW *by James Wechsler*

BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE: VI
37 WHY THE WELFARE STATE BREAKS DOWN *by Michael Harrington*

51 WOMEN AND WORK *by Rose Laub Coser*

56 THE POLITICS OF COURTSHIP *by Elaine Hoffman Baruch*

64 MY DOEZHER *by Stephen Roane*

THE NEW NATIONALISM
65 QUEBEC 1980 *by Antal Deutsch*

73 THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND: PERILS OF PRAGMATISM *by John Kurt Jacobsen*

81 DISRUPTION, ORGANIZATION, AND REFORM: A CRITIQUE OF POOR PEOPLES MOVEMENTS *by Timothy G. Massad*

91 THE LABOR THEORY OF VALUE REVISITED *by Robert L. Heilbroner*

NOTEBOOK

100 ERASING THE SIXTIES — OR, WHATEVER HAPPENED TO MARK RUDD? *by Sanford Pinsker*

106 INDIA: TODAY'S POLITICS AND BEYOND *by Pran Chopra*

110 JAYAPRAKASH NARAYAN 1903-1979 *by S.P.*

MOVIES

111 FOOTBALL, PLAY AND OBSESSION *by Nicolaus Mills*

BOOKS

113 REVIEWS *by Murray Hausknecht, Martin Green Margaret Kahn, Henry Pachter, Lewis Coser, Luther Carpenter*

127 **LETTERS**

The Dissent INDEX for Volumes 25 & 26 (1978 & 1979) will appear in our Spring Issue (in April).

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ANDRZEJ WALICKI

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Sharif Arani

IRAN

From the Shah's Dictatorship to Khomeini's Demagogic Theocracy

"Not the 'republic of Iran,' nor the 'democratic republic of Iran,' nor the 'democratic Islamic republic of Iran,' just the 'Islamic Republic of Iran,' the Ayatollah Khomeini told the nation imperiously before the referendum of March 1979. On behalf of the nation, his Prime Minister Bazargan had prostrated himself before Khomeini, the Imam, the Supreme Leader of the Revolution: Islam was not to be denigrated by the adjective "democratic." Late in May '79, prefacing what he considered his most important speech since the February revolution with "O God, witness that I gave your message," Khomeini reaffirmed that Iran was to remain an *Islamic* republic; anyone wishing Iran to be just a republic, or a democratic republic, or a democratic Islamic republic was the enemy of Islam and of God.

Like so much else, the significance of Khomeini's insistence on the categorical exclusion of any reference to democracy was still lost on Iran's timorous middle classes, especially on its illusion-prone intelligentsia, which—as students, bank clerks, government functionaries, and junior army or air force officers—was still heady with the unprecedented freedom of expression and engrossed in a prodigious torrent of discussions. In his first press conference, Dr. Bakhtiar, whose outlook if not his courage is shared by a large section of Iran's educated middle class, would still consider it appropriate to remark that—unlike Lenin, Hitler, Nasser, and Castro—Khomeini did not know where he was leading the nation. This, alas, was but a wishful thought on the part of this representative of the educated middle classes, which by the end of the summer would unmistakably be identified as the losers.

However fantastic his program must have sounded to Westernized ears within or outside Iran, Khomeini knew full well, and had repeatedly said, where he was leading the nation. It was his enemies and erstwhile idolizers who chose not to notice. Both before and after the revolution, he had, with utmost clarity, stated his twin aims: the establishment of an Islamic theocracy, and the *complete eradication* of Occidentalism, or Western cultural influence that, according to him, had ravaged Iran for nearly a century. His educated audience pretended—or needed to pretend—that he was not serious. While the intelligentsia and middle-class liberals wishfully continued to support him, Khomeini, in the consistent pursuit of his twin aims, dealt with them pitilessly and with utmost disdain. The more sycophantically the middle-class political factions idolized him as leader of the

Nationalism

• With this issue, *Dissent* begins a series of articles on a major political-social problem of our time—the rise, or resurgence, of nationalism. You will find several discussions of this subject in the current issue; others will follow in the next few issues. •

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revolution, the more scornfully he pushed them aside. Until August, the National Front, the Leftist Fedayeen, the Islamic Mujahideen, and, finally, the Tudeh (Communist) party, outdoing all others in servility, patiently continued to receive insults according to the degree of their opportunistic miscalculation, their thirst for humiliation, or the magnitude of their dashed hopes.

By the end of August, however, the losing parties' illusions about a unity of purpose with the true victors of the February revolution were finally dispelled. Unnoticed by other groups enraptured in daydreams, teach-ins and sit-ins, Khomeini's traditionalist religious party launched its bid for political domination under the leadership of the Mullahs. Following the assassination of Ayatollah Motahhari in May, the armed Islamic bands, under very loose control of the Texan Islamic modernist Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi,* were replaced by the carefully recruited and untrained, and subsequently disciplined 10,000-strong Guardians of the Revolution under Qum-educated Ayatollah Lahuti. Meanwhile Beheshti and Kani, the other two members of Teheran's turbaned triumvirate, tightened their hold on the reins of power through the Islamic Republican party and the Revolutionary Committees.

In the second half of July, three members of Khomeini's Revolutionary Council were appointed deputy ministers, augmenting the number of turbaned commissars in the high offices of the state. The direct invasion of the debilitated state had begun. By mid-August, the turbaned rulers felt secure enough to attack not only the "godless and atheistic" Fedayeen, but also the God-fearing and Islamic Mujahideen whose Islam, alas, was contaminated by modern radical political ideologies.

Immediately after the effective clamp-down on the press and the National Democratic party, the Fedayeen, the Mujahideen, and the Tudeh party, Khomeini ominously announced that having allowed the opposition six months to show their true faces, the religious party would now break their poisonous pens and crush their conspiracies, together with those of the Kurds. A day later, on August 25, he resumed his fulminations not only against the Kurdish Democratic party, but also against the National Front, secular liberals and intellectuals, "lackeys of the West," and journalists whom he would not allow "to drown the people in corruption and prostitution in the name of freedom."

Following Khomeini's speeches, Public Prosecutor of the Islamic Revolutionary Tribunals Ayatollah Azari Qumi announced the expansion of the Tribunals' jurisdiction to all "counterrevolutionary activities," including those in commerce and industry. August thus came to a close with the consolidation of the clerical hegemony, setting the stage for the attainment, in September, of the destiny Khomeini had chosen for Iran in his *Sovereignty of the Religious Jurists* (as the interpreter of the Sacred Law). In his inaugural message to the "Council of Constitutional Experts" Khomeini told his hand-picked Mullahs that he expected them to create "a 100 percent Islamic constitution." Undoubtedly on Khomeini's orders, the Mullahs broke their alleged prior agreement with Bazargan, for whom he had throughout shown nothing but haughty contempt, and incorporated into the proposed constitution the sovereignty of the Imam as the supreme leader of the community of believers and the supreme religious jurist. According to the clause finally ratified on October 14, 1979, the supreme leader was invested with extensive authority not only over the judiciary but over all branches of the state, thus formally making Iran a theocracy.

Meanwhile, Khomeini himself seized the opportunity offered by Ayatollah Taleqani's death to propagate the good tidings of the instauration of the rule of the clergy on behalf of God: did the people kiss Taleqani's hand because he was a democrat, or because he was a liberal? No! They kissed his hand because he was the deputy of the Holy Imams; because he

*Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi, Khomeini's foreign minister until November '79, was formerly a medical researcher at Baylor University in Texas and the organizer of Islamic associations in the U.S.

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was the deputy of the Prophet.

The consolidation of a theocratic regime in a sizable country fully integrated into the world system appears so astonishing as to make us forget how surprising a phenomenon the revolution was that preceded it, both in its suddenness and in the rapid collapse of the monarchy. Yet it is impossible to understand the one phenomenon without the other. To explain how the call to Islam changed from an idiom of protest to an instrument of clerical domination, we must begin with a look at the revolution of February 1979.

What motivated the tenacious general strike of 1978-79, which lasted some five months and put an end to 25 centuries of monarchic rule in Iran, was a condensation of social and political reality in the "social myth" of "Islamic government." Islamic government was conceived as a utopia modeled after the four-year reign of the first Shi'ite Imam, Ali. But it was not so much this utopia per se as its stark juxtaposition to the Shah's regime that primarily accounted for its effectiveness. The contrast between the monotheistic Islamic order and the Shah's tyrannical regime was buttressed by sharply antithetical shibboleths whose crux was the emotive Koranic term *taqut*, a term denoting tyrannical earthly power arrogating to itself the absolute authority over the lives of men that is God's alone. It was the conspicuous presence of the Shah as the embodiment of impious earthly power, setting itself up against God's majesty, that permitted this unambiguously politicized interpretation of Islam.

The caption *Shah raft, Imam amad* (the Shah went, the Imam came) pithily captures the outcome of the Islamic revolutionary struggle in Iran. It contains the same rigid juxtaposition between absolutist political power and God-ordained religious authority depicted in so many other current slogans: the Pharaoh versus Moses, the Prophet of God; the corrupt and tyrannical Omayyad Caliph Yazid (from the Shi'ite point of view) versus the martyred Imam Husayn, the grandson of Mohammed and the third Shi'ite Imam. Let me cite just one example:

> Oh brave soldier, do not kill
> Moses for the sake of the Pharaoh
> For Yazid's sake, do not kill
> the son of the Prophet; fear God.

In the latter part of the '70s, with the massive influx of foreign civil and paramilitary technicians and the massive avalanche of European and American products, the antithetical opposition between religious authority and impious political power was amplified by Khomeini's personification of Iran's traditional identity as against the Shah's symbolization of the culture of imperialist worldly powers. The dichotomy could be neatly compounded and became doubly effective.

FOUR DISTINCT GROUPS stand out among the religious revolutionaries: (1) the religious elite that quickly assumed leadership of the revolutionary movement; (2) the "Bazaar"—the merchants and artisans who sustained and financed the general strike; (3) the radical Islamic activists among the intelligentsia who advocated the reform of Islam; and (4) the mass of vagrant workers, recent migrants from rural areas (a lumpenproletariat that inhabits the slums and shantytowns around the cities), who, since the revolution, have acquired a specific designation as the "Disinherited."

Many reports on the revolution have correctly emphasized the financial and institutional autonomy of the religious elite. The religious elite was in fact the only notable social group, and the religious institutions were the only important organizational network, to escape the control of the centipedal state. Of equal importance, though not given much emphasis, are the close ties between the religious elite and the traditional sector of the urban economy. It would hardly be an exaggeration to present the history of the social movements in modern Iran as instances of coalition between the religious elite and the merchants and craftsmen of the bazaars.

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In 1978, this coalition against the monarch was reconstituted with fateful consequences. Each group had a set of major grievances. The modernization of the Iranian state under the Pahlavis since the 1920s had entailed a very drastic curtailment of the power of the religious leaders. Not only were the educational and judiciary systems wrenched from their control, but the scope of their purely religious functions was restricted and their cultural influence combated. Once he felt secure on his throne, Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi continued his father's anti-clerical policies, and aggressively attacked the religious institutions. These attacks were intensified in the '70s, and were coupled with attempts to make inroads into the religious sphere proper by creating a "Religion Corps" (modeled after the "Literacy Corps"), and a group of "Propagators of Religion." The religious leaders, especially Khomeini, perceived the creation of these entities as the culmination of government repression.

• Their backs to the wall, and under heavy pressure from their persecuted and politicized theology students, the religious leaders' simmering opposition to the Shah's regime became increasingly vociferous. From January 8, 1978 onward and at 40-day intervals, a number of demonstrations led by Mullahs and theology students, to which university students and irregularly employed bystanders readily flocked, took place in Qum, Tabriz, and Teheran. The Tabriz demonstrations of February 18-19, in which some 40,000 persons took part, were of particular importance as they set the pattern for the violent demonstrations of the following fall with the burning of movie houses and banks. These defiant religious demonstrations, all of which ended in violent clashes with the Shah's army and police, precipitated the crisis of 1978-79. While the religious party had no difficulty in assimilating the tone and rhetoric of revolutionary politics, the scattered, unorganized, and disoriented secular opponents of the Shah were dumbfounded by the suddenness of the crisis. This left the religious leaders alone in command, on the crest of a gigantic wave of popular rage. When the violence of 1977-78 became a nationwide epidemic in September 1978, the Grand Ayatollahs of Qum were the only opposition leaders to emerge as the spokesmen for the nation. They articulated a set of demands, which were immediately met by the Shah's government. But the popular rage did not subside. Thanks to the advantages of a conspicuous exile and his intransigence, and probably to the chagrin of his more moderate colleagues in Qum, Ayatollah Khomeini quickly assumed supreme leadership of the revolutionary movement.

• The traditional sector of Iran's urban economy has long sustained a class of merchants, retailers, and artisans, collectively referred to as the Bazaar. The Bazaar has consistently opposed the monarchy in the postwar period. Though it benefited from the general prosperity created by economic growth in the last two decades, one is hard put to think of any governmental policies designed to further its particular interests. In fact, the government often pursued economic policies that were detrimental to the Bazaar. In 1975, for instance, the Shah launched an "Anti-Profiteering campaign," and in its course over 7,000 merchants were arrested and fined. As one would expect, the Bazaar reaffirmed its coalition with the religious elite in opposition to the Shah, and it gave crucial financial support to those striking in the private sector, especially to the journalists whose strike in October activated the general wave.

• The coalition between the "Bazaar" and the religious establishment could bear fruit only by drawing on undercurrents of popular rage. The human mass of the "Disinherited," created by rapid urbanization and rural exodus, constituted a chief source of *énrages*. These uprooted people knew no sophisticated political ideology, but they knew something about their religion. Some were seriously debating whether or not Khomeini was the Mahdi (savior) or merely his precursor. Many would chant:

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Three were the idol-breakers
Abraham, Mohammed, and Ruhollah [Khomeini].

Thus was the mass of the Disinherited, novices to modern Iran's political society, forging an idiom of political protest from their religious mother tongue.

• Last and by no means least, we have the advocates of "Islamic modernism," a movement for religious reform begun in the early '60s by a group of lay and clerical writers on Islam (including Prime Minister Bazargan), which reached a climax with the work of the late Ali Shari'ati. It sponsored public debates and publications on the social and political aspects of Islam. Its adherents consisted of the religiously inclined intelligentsia—university students, engineers and physicians—whose number greatly increased in the last decades with the opening of educational opportunities to the middle and lower-middle classes of provincial towns. Reacting to the imitative modernity of the upper strata, this largely provincial group with deep traditional attachments sought to interpret the alienating modern world in reassuringly parochial terms, and did so by discovering the relevance of Islam.

The Islamic reform movement gathered momentum in the '70s, and its chief method of communication—regular public gatherings—was soon imitated by a large number of "religious associations," some of them with strictly traditional rather than reformist intent. Thus a whole gamut of associations—serving craftsmen, retail merchants, specific neighborhoods and city quarters—fitted, very loosely, under the movement's umbrella.

The upsurge of the literate public's interest in Islam was reflected in a dramatic rise in the number of religious publications; in 1976-77 these exceeded all secular fields combined. However, by far the most interesting and, as it turned out, momentous feature of Islam's entry into the public sphere during the decade preceding the revolution was the astonishing growth of the "religious associations," which met mostly during the religious months of Muharram and Ramadan but occasionally also at other times. In 1974, there were 12,300 religious associations in Teheran alone, mostly formed after 1965, of which over 1,800 had formal titles. These religious associations and their organizers, together with the Islamic societies of the universities, provided the network and personnel for the mass mobilization of September '78-February '79. Through this network the cassettes and directives of Khomeini and other religious leaders were distributed. The cadre of these religious associations, wearing green armbands, carried out the remarkable feat of organizing the massive marches, and of maintaining discipline during the largest demonstrations.

• Finally, we must mention an additional, important sub-group whose rage fueled the revolutionary movement—who joined the religious party but did not necessarily speak a religious language. In 1977, despite the recent expansion of universities, only 60,000 out of 290,000 applicants were accepted. The rest, awaiting conscription, tended to take to the streets and swell the ranks of the unemployed. They were soon joined by the unemployed high-school graduates of the previous years, and by their friends who had not yet graduated, once the schools went on strike. For this group, all else paled before the craving for (revolutionary) action per se, and all rational justifications of its necessity, Islamic or otherwise, were at best secondary and residual.

This last group should be placed alongside the Disinherited as providing a massive reservoir of discontent set loose by the Islamic party's agitations. Both groups were products of Iran's modernizations: the one created by the expansion of education, the other by industrialization and excessively rapid urbanization against the background of a stagnant and then declining agriculture. The employment prospects and the sense of relative deprivation for the one group and the atrocious living conditions in the shantytowns for the other provided ample grounds for dissatisfaction. The coalition of the Bazaar and the religious establishment and the organizational potential of the nascent

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religious associations would have been impotent, as that coalition had been time and again over the past two decades, had it not been for the discontent of the Disinherited and the young, once that discontent was successfully tapped.

With the religious party's agitation firmly under way, the bourgeoisie and then the workers acquiesced in the demise of the monarchy.

It is true that the renewed political activities of the writers and intellectuals—chiefly in the form of open letters addressed to the Shah and, later, in politicized poetry readings—predated the crisis by at least a year. The relative vigor of these activities, and the relaxation of the repression by the Savak (the Shah's secret police), can be directly traced to Carter's Human Rights pronouncement on Iran early in 1977. The Shah's bowing to the American pressure on the issue of Human Rights and his promises of liberalization did create a good deal of expectation among lawyers, university professors, intellectuals, and artists; but none envisaged an abrupt end to the monarchy. Throughout September and October of 1978, this group contemplated the prospect of making the constitutional monarchy a viable reality. A friend told me how a group of professors at the University of Teheran decided to form a society for freedom of speech in November '78. Within two weeks they realized they were so overtaken by events that they changed the formal purpose of their society to the abolition of the monarchy and establishment of a republic! But such an ex post facto adjustment did not enable Teheran's professors, any more than the liberal or socialist intellectuals in general, to establish a grip on the popular avalanche that had gathered momentum under the direction of the religious party.

Casual observers must have been astounded by the behavior of Iran's sizable middle class, the class that could be expected to assume the nation's political leadership by virtue of its educational and economic resources. How could casual observers comprehend the fact that this unprepared middle class could not think beyond the instant gratification of regicidal vengefulness and could not rise to the most elementary of the long-term political calculations? How could they account for the abject surrender to the Islamic party of one after another of the feeble middle-class based political factions: liberals, nationalists, (Stalinist) Communists, Trotskyists, and Maoists alike?

LET US BEGIN our analysis of the reaction of the middle class to the sudden explosion on the psychological level. The self-deception that is necessary to make a surrender to the religious party psychologically acceptable was concocted overnight by the politicization of cultural identity. Khomeini suddenly was seen as the embodiment of Iranian tradition, totally uncontaminated by that strange condition of cultural alienation that so devastatingly afflicted the Westernized bourgeoisie. During the first massive peaceful demonstration in September, Karim Sanjabi, the leader of the National Front who was soon to discover his "Islamic identity," was moved to remark that during the march "there was no longer an I but only a We." Better still, consider the feminist, in one of the massive December demonstrations, who was chanting, "Death to Shah, Long Live Khomeini!" Tears were streaming down her face because, as she explained to the French reporters covering the event, Khomeini was making her rediscover her "Iranianness." *Nostalgie de la boue*, no doubt. If nothing else, we may safely assume that the feminist lady's nose is by now close enough to the mud for her to be cured of this nostalgia.

Psychological insecurity usually underlies the politics of identity, and Iran's parvenu middle class was no exception. As Durkheim pointed out in his classic study of suicide, "crises of prosperity" generate disorientation and anomie by disturbing the collective order. In the decade preceding the OPEC price rise of 1973, Iran's record of industrialization and economic growth was very respectable, with GNP increasing by 9 to 10 percent annually. The sudden increase in the price of oil

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generated a boom for the following three years while seriously distorting the path of economic development. The axis of the Iranian economy shifted from production to distribution (of the oil revenue), and economically unproductive activities mushroomed. The GNP went up by 30.3 percent in 1973-74 and 42 percent in 1974-75. Then came the economic debacle, despite the massive oil revenue. Severe bottlenecks created by the shortage of skilled manpower and the inadequacy of the infrastructure halted the process of economic growth. In 1976, production remained stagnant or declined in all sectors of the economy except construction. "The J-curve [of continuously rising expectations and sudden frustration]" the curvilinearly minded sociologist of revolution might exclaim. For my part, I prefer to stick with the old-fashioned Durkheim.

It was not so much the sudden frustration as the constant disorientation resulting from a decade of rapid change that finally—after a period in which the bourgeois *nouveaux riches* had sought to allay their insecurity by conspicuous consumption of the gaudiest kind—made the members of the middle class ask themselves the most philosophical of all questions: "who am I?" Furthermore, an important catalyst was at work to put the middle class into this philosophical frame of mind: resident foreigners. The Shah's massive purchases of sophisticated weaponry brought a large number of highly paid American paramilitary technicians to the country, while his capital-intensive growth strategy pulled in a large number of foreign skilled technicians, chiefly Europeans, some of whom received higher salaries than their Iranian counterparts.

In those last years of the Shah's reign, the cultural (religious-national) identity mystique—as a force that could crystallize the middle class's sense of disorientation into a definite political attitude—was at best secondary to the palpable presence of the Shah, even in the remotest corners of his realm. The Imperial personage was the only entity that was giving focus to the anomic malaise and frustration of the middle class, thus integrating its members into an otherwise inchoate political movement. Then their discontent found a specific point of reference with the meteoric emergence of Khomeini as leader of the opposition to the Shah. Thus they readily accepted the religious party's portrayal of the Shah as the "Anti-Christ" and concomitantly took refuge in the comforting discovery of Khomeini as his messianic counterimage (and, we may add, the only available one).

LET US LOOK more closely at the upper layer of the middle class. It is true that the Shah had alienated the industrialists and businessmen by his Anti-Profiteering campaign of 1975, and by his various profit-sharing schemes on behalf of the workers; but the political importance of this point should not be exaggerated. Far more important was the fact that the oil bonanza had played havoc with the mentality of the moneyed middle class. When I was in Iran last July and August, I was astonished at the utter lack of any moral commitment to the Shah's regime among those who had a stake in it: the top civil servants and the well-to-do entrepreneurs. (Remember the massive oil revenue, to be funneled out of the state treasury at the discretion of the former into the pockets of the latter.)

Petrodollars had sapped the last drop of public spirit, which could occasionally be detected in modest measures during the early years of the decade. Both groups were filling their pockets as fast as they could, expecting the whole thing to collapse. A self-fulfilling prophecy, as it turned out. At any rate, it was obvious they would not lift a finger to save the regime when the crunch came; and they did not. Many of them transferred their bank balances and, by the end of 1976, about 20,000 Iranians had bought houses in or near London, not to mention California. A massive flight of capital preceded the Shah's departure in early December. The inglorious haute bourgeoisie followed its money.

More critical for the fate of the monarchy was the withdrawal of support by the middle and lower layers of the middle class, and of the

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workers in the oil industry. For these groups, living mostly on fixed incomes, the massive inflow of oil revenue from 1975 onward meant more inflation than additional income. The rents in the major cities increased by over 100 percent annually. Real estate prices and construction costs soared similarly. The purely economic grounds for dissatisfaction (a more drastic turn of the J curve as our social scientists would have it) were by no means lacking, but these did not automatically generate political action.

In the fall of 1978, the release of political prisoners and a new freedom of the press were among the Shah's first liberalizing measures. Day after day, following the end of censorship, the newspapers came out with harrowing reports of the Savak's torture chambers, related by released political prisoners.

These tales of horror, coming at the wake of the seemingly avoidable Black Friday massacre of September 8, 1978,* only hours after the imposition of martial law, intensified the moral indignation of the middle-class groups against the Shah and his regime, while the weakness shown by the Shah in handling the crisis emboldened them to join his foes. Group after group agitated in harmony with the rhythm set by Khomeini and went excitedly on strike: the journalists and bank clerks in the private sector, the Iran Air employees, engineers and technicians of the power plants, the employees of the National Iranian Oil Company, and employees of the Central Bank in the public sector. Toward the end of October, the oil workers joined the movement by striking and paralyzed the economy. Slowdowns also paralyzed many of the none too vigorous government agencies and ministries. Iran plunged into the anarchy of the closing months of 1978.

AT THIS POINT THE SHAH begged the middle class to inherit the state and the country. Being totally unprepared, they demurred. They must have been very pleased when the Shah brought in the military government of General Azhari, thus giving them a breathing space and allowing them to hide their lack of preparation and complete bankruptcy as regards a political program. But the military government failed to bring a solution to the crisis.

Once again, the Shah begged the representatives of the middle class to take over. Meanwhile, Sanjabi, the leader of the National Front, had capitulated to Khomeini. Once again, fearing the wrath of the populace, they self-deceivingly rationalized their lack of preparation and courage as a heroic refusal to compromise, seeking additional solace in utopian revolutionary faith, and in the wishful thought that they would get the better of the Mullahs after the revolution. When finally Bakhtiar did courageously step forward from their ranks they disowned him, disguising their pusillanimity as a refusal to collaborate with the tyrannical dictator. The person they were talking about bore no resemblance to this description. He was not the megalomaniac of 1975, but the shaken dejected prisoner of Niavaran palace who was only insisting on a respectable exit. Be that as it may, the middle classes took leave of their political senses, wished away their differences with the religious party, and abdicated their crucial political responsibility. They prostrated themselves before the contemptuous Khomeini and passed on the gift the Shah was begging them to inherit to the Grand Ayatollah and his Mullahs.

Though distressing, it is hardly surprising that Iran's middle class proved incapable of concerted political action, and was in no way ready to assume political leadership of the nation. In consistently following his policy of divide and rule, the Shah had succeeded in atomizing the middle classes to a far greater extent than was the case with the Bazaar and the related lower-middle class of retailers. The intellectuals had been kept under close surveillance by the Savak. With the exception

*By contrast to the first of that season's demonstrations, the one of September 4, which the middle class could regard as the inauguration of Iran's Prague Spring, the victims of the massacre largely belonged to the religious party. The troups enforcing martial law fired on religious demonstrators as they were leaving a mosque killing between 200 (the government's figure) and 4,000 (opposition's figure) people.

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of the Bar Association, which had acquired a charter under Mosaddeq (nationalist prime minister of Iran, 1951-53), no significant professional associations and, needless to say, no real political parties were tolerated.

The Shah thus kept the middle class divided and emasculated. Under these circumstances its political immaturity and total lack of responsibility were hardly surprising. Nor were its negative politics: the refusal to go beyond the denunciation of oppressive rule, which had come to an end anyway, and the irresponsible intransigent posturing of the middle-class politicians whose immediate interest appeared to be served not by solving any of the concrete problems but by inflammatory rhetoric palatable to the outraged populace. Let me make it clear that what is said applies equally to a totally disoriented and disorganized array of middle-class-based groups of intellectuals, including the Tudeh party and factionalized, leftist elements. For these groups it was even easier to take flight from the uncongenial aspects of political reality into the naive eschatological glorification of "revolution."

The sad truth of the matter was that because of 25 years of systematic political sterilization, the middle and working classes had produced no notable figures with a sense of political vocation and the requisite political experience. The seedy old politicians of the Mosaddeq era had to be pulled out of the closet. We have already met the senescent Sanjabi who was the first to distinguish himself by his act of prostration at the threshold of the Grand Ayatollah near Versailles. Enter, after the revolution, Dr. Ali Shayegan, another senile politician of the Mosaddeq period, immediately acclaimed as the first prospective president of the Iranian republic. Exit, before the month is out, Shayegan into immediate oblivion, with a frustrated remark that the reactionary Mullahs should stick to their prayer rugs. Exit, in April, Sanjabi from his post as foreign minister after being slighted and humiliated by Khomeini's protégé Ibrahim Yazdi (who then succeded him in that post).

Foruhar, the other National Front man who had turned up in France to pay his homage to Khomeini and had been rewarded with the portfolio of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, had been deprived of his portfolio despite agreeably resigning from the National Front. Nazih, the only member of this group to act with determination and integrity, had been contemptuously dismissed from his post as the director of the National Iranian Oil Company and summoned to trial for daring to criticize Khomeini in the mildest and most respectful terms, and for not displaying the requisite obsequiousness toward the Mullahs. Bazargan, the ablest septuagenerian of the Mosaddeq era, held out the longest, but at the cost of capitulating to the Mullahs.

What about the younger generation? This cream of the religiously minded middle class had valiantly opposed the Shah from abroad and, in the eyes of Bazargan, qualified for co-optation by a decade or so of idle talk on the "progressive spirit of Islam" in their Islamic societies' meetings at American universities. After occupying the highest offices of the state for over six months, these physicians and engineers had not given the slightest indication of self-assertion against the Mullahs; nor could they be credited with a single social or economic reform. Instead, they were busy muffling the domestic press and expelling foreign correspondents to prevent indecent exposures, as they would have their wives cover their legs from the unchaste eyes of the stranger.

The mammoth edifice of the state became hollow. The Shah stated in an interview from exile that he watched the top officials of his state run away like rats. "Rat" seems to be the telling word. During his trial, General Rabi'i, the last Commander of the Imperial Air Force, related his disillusionment when the American General Huyser came to Iran, took the Shah by the tail and threw him into exile like a rat. One may or may not take exception to the language, but the fundamental fact remains that the decisive person to withdraw his commitment to the state was the Shah

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himself. Once the Shah had lost the will to fight, the state crumbled from within and out of its own momentum.

The Shah had painstakingly restructured the state machine around his person. There can be no doubt that the collapse of the man preceded the collapse of the machine. Had it not been for the dejection, bungling, and indecisiveness of the Shah, and for his sheer bad luck, the collapse of the monarchic regime would not have happened so soon. In September 1978, Khomeini still was relatively inconspicuous in his residence in Iraq and, at the Shah's instigation, had not been pushed into the limelight by the Iraqi government. The Bazaar-religious alliance could still have been foiled, the popular discontent stemmed before becoming an avalanche. At the last resort, the army could certainly have been used much more effectively then it was to obtain a lease on life for the monarchy.

Already in June '78, the Shah had disappeared from the public eye. In August came the serious riots of Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, Ahwaz, and Teheran—with banks, restaurants and cinemas being burned. On August 27, Prime Minister Amuzegar resigned after complaining about the existence of "a government within the government," a remark taken to refer to the activities of the Savak's *agents provocateurs* and designed to persuade the Shah to reinstate repression by fanning the unrest. The Shah, however, did not order the Savak to clamp down on the opposition. He appointed Sharif-Emami, whom, however, he apparently did not trust and would allow very little latitude in dealing with the crisis.

IT IS NOW TIME to turn to the most important pillar of the state, the one on which the survival of the regime most crucially depended: the army. "How could he then miscarry, having . . . so many trained soldiers . . . and the diverse magazines of ammunitions in places fortified?" The question Hobbes asked himself about Charles I of England is all the more puzzling as regards the Shah, who had not only a much greater quantity of ammunition and many more soldiers than Charles, but also all the money in the world with which to pay them.

The answer is as follows: the Shah miscarried because he refused to use the army effectively to repress the revolutionary movement—hoping, in vain, to quell the mounting popular rage by the threat or semblance of its use. Unlike the Czar's army in 1917, the Shah's remained intact and loyal until he departed on January 16, 1979. There were instances of desertion, the killing of 12 officers by 3 rebellious soldiers of the Imperial Guard, a mutiny in Tabriz in December, and a number of other minor incidents. But by and large the strain of confrontation with the people, and the opposition's attempts to fraternize with the soldiers, did not affect their morale and discipline until after the Shah's departure. It was only then that the process of disintegration of the army under political pressure set in. Meanwhile, after the Black Friday massacre, the Shah himself muffled the army, to the outrage of the hard-liners among the generals. (This was reflected in the relatively small number of casualties for an upheaval of major proportions. Wild rumors on the number of martyrs and the tremendous echoing effects of the media notwithstanding, I wager that the number of persons killed between October 1, 1978 and January 15, '79—around 1,000—was no larger than the number of persons killed or unaccountably missing during a comparable period in, say, '75-'76.)

The Shah's one fear, that of being taken prisoner by his generals, did not come true. He did obtain the respectable exit he was seeking, after finding an inheritor, Shahpur Bakhtiar.

On November 4, nine students were killed in Teheran in a clash with the army. On November 5, the decisive day of Teheran's worst riot, the army was present in the streets but, on the Shah's orders, did not shoot or otherwise intervene. Teheran burned. The Shah then did the most inept thing he could have done. He incurred the odium of bringing in a military government but installed one headed by an ineffectual parlor general, Azhari, who soon earned himself the rhyming

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sobriquet "the Diarrhea-ridden" and, in December, physically broke down in his conciliatory bendings backward.

Meanwhile, the Shah's chief ally abroad, the United States, was abandoning him. Signals to this effect were transmitted from various quarters in late November and early December. On December 7, Carter stated that he liked the Shah personally but that it was up to the Iranian people to make up their minds about him. Everyone who mattered in Iran knew the Americans were dumping the Shah. Meanwhile, the American government would obligingly continue to rouse the populace to fury by their public statements of support.

In my judgment, with more determination and alertness, or with better luck, the Shah could have survived the crisis of '78-'79. Yet, the demise of his regime was only a matter of time. The political acumen the Shah had shown in the '60s gave way to megalomaniacal daydreams of international prominence and regional superiority. At the same time, he became increasingly reliant on the repressive branches of the state, especially the Savak, while failing to build a solid social power base where he could, notably among the prosperous peasantry. Once the crisis came, he could not veer the unwieldy apparatus of the state in a single direction; nor could he overnight create a constituency among any section of the population.

One could even maintain that in a fundamental way the Shah had been digging his own grave for nearly two decades. The massive migration into the large cities, the integration of villages and small towns into the national economy—and hence into the national political society—all this had repercussions that kept accumulating. Between 1963 and 1971, a total of 62,730 persons served in the Literacy Corps in small towns and villages. Regardless of their efficiency in reducing illiteracy, the political consequences of the penetration of these young graduates into the torpid rural and semi-rural periphery of Iranian society were momentous. Throughout August, September, and October 1978, unrest rocked the hitherto stagnant peripheral towns. On October 29, the Amol Commune sprung up in such a provincial town and lasted for 48 hours, with 16-year-olds forming their own police force. In the unrest in Kerman, 40 persons died. Some 50 provincial towns witnessed similiar insurrections. All this was brought to the immediate attention of the entire nation by the mass media, raising the nation's political temperature to the level of delirium.

Signs of strain in the army came to the surface immediately after the Shah's departure.

In January 1979, when the U.S. sent General Robert Huyser to Iran, his mission was to expedite the Shah's departure and to prevent a coup d'état. While the Shah was still in Iran, Huyser advised the Iranian army commanders to establish a dialogue with Khomeini's representatives. And after the Shah's departure, having accomplished his mission, General Huyser quietly departed. Bani Sadr, a member of the Revolutionary Council who was with Khomeini in France, confirmed that the possibility of a coup d'état was discounted by Khomeini and his entourage after assurances given them by certain Iranian generals in France and confirmed after their return to Iran.

Meanwhile, open support for Khomeini was being shown by the rank and file. During the military parade of February 1, following the Imperial Guards chanting "Long Live the Shah!" were 28 truckloads of riot police with carnations in their rifle muzzles and several truckloads of Air Force personnel carrying photographs of Khomeini and shouting, "Death to the Shah!" The dialogue between Bazargan and Chief of Staff General Qarabaghi continued while scores of retired or purged officers were declaring their willingness to serve under Khomeini. On February 6, the pledge of loyalty to the Shah was omitted from the oath administered to the cadets of Teheran's military academy at their graduation ceremony. The ceremony was rebroadcast by the National Radio and Television Network the next day.

The split within the army became evident

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immediately before the "Three Glorious Days" of the revolution (February 9-11). Significantly, the trouble began with the Air Force cadets, the noncommissioned technicians, and the maintenance workers, many of whom were sympathetic to Islamic modernism as advocated by Bazargan and Shari'ati. Their mutinous demonstrations of support for Khomeini provoked a punitive attack by some 50-200 Imperial Guards. The two guerrilla groups ideologically committed to revolutionary armed struggle, the leftist Fedayeen and the Islamic radical Mujahideen, joined the defenders of the mutinous Air Force barracks. On the night of February 10, 1979, one police station after another fell according to the following pattern: saturation of the surrounding area by the populace and well executed attacks by the guerrilla units.

The uprising of these last days was decidedly spontaneous. The sense of impunity resulting from the split in the armed forces emboldened the populace, releasing its political will and energy without, however, a specific direction. That direction was supplied by the Mujahideen and the Fedayeen. The religious party did not lead the uprising, and the army did not react.*

On the afternoon of February 11, 1979, the Bakhtiar government fell against the massive avalanche, and the slow-motion collapse of the monarchical edifice was complete 26 days after the departure of the monarch. The revolution in the name of God triumphed.

October saw no sequel to the February revolution, for Iran possesses neither strong cadres of would-be Bolsheviks nor a sizable industrial working class. Neither the servile Tudeh (Communist) party nor the persecuted Fedayeen developed or will be allowed to develop the requisite organizational capacity. More fundamentally, neither will have an industrial working class to mobilize: despite an annual industrial growth rate of 15 percent between 1965 and 1975, according to the best available statistics the number of workers in industrial units employing over 10 persons does not exceed 750,000 or about 7 percent of the total active labor force. This number is unlikely to increase in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, most of the large private industrial concerns were abandoned by their owners before, during, or after the revolution, and now have been nationalized. With the huge oil revenue at its disposal, the Islamic government will be at least as successful as was the Shah in quieting the industrial labor force by granting it wages far in excess of its productivity. In fact, by decreeing large wage increases and forbidding the discharge of workers, the Islamic government has succeeded in securing the acquiescence, if not the fervid loyalty, of the workers.

THE SPECTER THAT HAUNTS IRAN and that was to become a reality by October '79 was not communism but fascism, albeit of the populist variety and without the corporate state. The relationship between this populist fascism and the formal instauration of Islamic theocracy with which our exposition began requires clarification. The link between the two is supplied by Khomeini's direct reliance on the masses until the dismantling of numerous modern institutions allows for the creation of a true theocracy. Immediately after the February revolution,the Grand Ayatollah entrusted the paralzyed state to Bazargan and his team, who in the past had shared the general middle-class outlook but had distinguished themselves as good Muslims by discussing Islam rather than decadent Western culture in their clubs while studying abroad. At the same time, Khomeini strengthened a parallel structure of power in the revolutionary tribunals, and in the

*On February 4, 1979, a spokesman for Khomeini had said that the transfer of power could be carried out within the framework of the 1906 constitution. On Saturday, February 10, while condemning the attack on the Air Force barracks as unbearable savagery, Khomeini affirmed that he would still like to finish the matter in a "peaceful and legal [a word rarely encountered in the Grand Ayatollah's vocabulary] way." Early in the afternoon of Sunday, February 11, Ayatollah Mofattah, speaking for Khomeini, reiterated the statement, adding that no order for Holy War but only for preparation had been issued by the Imam. The army generals met in the morning and drafted a declaration of neutrality, which was read out over the radio at 2PM, shortly before the radio station was captured.

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numerous revolutionary committees and local units born in the wake of the revolution, whose apex was the Revolutionary Council.

Despite their control over one of the most lavish and self-replenishing government treasuries in the world, the Islamic modernists who manned Bazargan's team showed the same timorous spirit as their Westernized counterparts during the last year of the Shah's reign, and their plight was exacerbated by inexperience in rule and fear of offending anyone by decisive action. The parallel (clerical) structure of power generated by the revolution and kept in existence side by side with the state showed continuous signs of vigor for the five months following the February revolution, while their amorphousness was somewhat reduced. This "revolutionary" structure, flourishing in contemptuous independence from the structure of the state, was manned by Khomeini's pharisaical enthusiasts and dominated by the Mullahs who, in part through the default of the secular middle-class politicians, unmistakably emerged by mid-August as Iran's turbaned ruling class.

LET US REVISIT Khomeini's supporters six months after the February '79 revolution. First, we see the Islamic parlor modernists he placed in the visible offices of the state as those who absorb the blame and who are by now widely accused in Iran of a variety of delicts ranging from utter incompetence to being CIA agents. Sabbaghian and Chamran are the only two laymen who have shown determination in government. While the latter could be among the Islamic modernists, the former is undoubtedly the most rigid and least "modernistic" in his Islamic outlook.

Second, there are the people who make up the active core of Khomeini's supporters and who dominate the "revolutionary" structure of power, with their younger members active in the armed Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. A sociologist looking at their social background will be alarmed to discover their identity with the social base of the European fascist movements. They are drawn from the lower-middle-class small property-owners and shopkeepers, and from those merchants and craftsmen engaged in the traditional sector of the economy—the Bazaar—which is the sector most threatened by large-scale industrialization. Our sociologist may also be alarmed by both the sheer size of this group and the security of its base. If he can assume that, in the absence of unions and working-class political parties, workers employed in the workshops of the wealthier Bazaar craftsmen (employing less than 10 persons) can remain under patriarchal control of their employers, he arrives at the figure of about 2.5 million for 1977—or about three-and-a-half times the size of the industrial labor force! The Bazaar and the traditional sector of the economy have not suffered much from the postrevolutionary disruptions. Catering to the basic necessities of the recipients of the oil revenue distributed by the state, and benefiting from the ban on luxury imports, they may well be flourishing. No wonder Khomeini's puppet government has not shown the slightest interest in industrialization.

Third, there is the group whose support crucially contributed to the success of the revolutionary movement, the young Islamic radicals: the Mujahideen and other radical followers of the late Shari'ati, whose Islamic modernism is now looked upon with great disapproval by the turbaned "Proofs of Islam." ("Proof of Islam" is a literal translation of *Hujjat al-Islam*, one of the honorific title of Shi'ite clerics.) Though Khomeini's notion of the sovereignty of the religious jurists is almost diametrically opposed to Shari'ati's notion of a clergyless and egalitarian social order, to be born of an Islamic reformation, many Islamic radicals—especially those continuing their studies in such hated imperialist countries as the United States—remain satisifed with the charitable patriarchal measures taken by the Mullahs under Khomeini's orders to improve the social welfare of the Disinherited. Furthermore, if we follow Maxim Rodinson in characterizing the Islamic radical outlook as a

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mixture of social archaism and political radicalism, we may say that our young radicals tend to overlook the Islamic regime's shortcoming as regards political radicalism, and consider themselves completely compensated by the regime's social archaism in the form of rigorous eradication of "corrruption" and puritanical enforcement of the Islamic ethic—execution of adultresses, prostitutes, pornographers, homosexuals, and procurors, the forcible rehabilitation of prostitutes and drug addicts, and the like.

With their moral indignation over the corruption of the sinful modern world satisfied by the atavistic forms of punishment summarily administered by the Mullahs, many of the Islamic radicals tend to collate, indiscriminately, Shari'ati's vision of a reformed Islamic order and the rigidly traditionalist world view of the Shi'ite clergy. Totally oblivious to the fact that, as the champion of Shi'ite traditionalism in the 1940s, Khomeini delivered the most vehement attack on one of their cultural heroes, Shari'at Sangelaji—commentator on the Koran and the precursor of Shari'ati in Islamic modernism—they have chosen to remain loyal to Khomeini and have opted for his version of Islam without contamination by modern ideas. In contrast to this group, however, a number of Islamic radicals, and probably an increasing number since the frontal attack of the Mullahs on the Mujahideen, have been gravitating toward the secular leftists.

Finally, we come to the human mass of Khomeini's less active supporters, the Disinherited. The one discernible economic policy of the Islamic Provisional Government has been to allot a very large proportion of the massive oil revenue to food imports, thus taking care to feed the Disinherited. In return, this latter group has faithfully learned that the problems afflicting Iran have been, are, and will be the result of plots by Imperialists and Zionists who are tirelessly busy sowing the seeds of disunity and corruption in Iran. Beyond that, the group does not speak a political language. Rather, it is fluent in the prepolitical--or suprapolitical, as some would have it—religious idiom of which the Imam is the undisputed oracle. The fact that the idiom is religious rather than specifically political does not mean that Khomeini and the religious party cannot use it to tremendous political advantage. In fact, the Disinherited have repeatedly demonstrated their susceptibility to appeals by the more extremist Mullahs, such as the rabid Proof of Islam Khalkhali, by generating fasces of "Islamic Falangists" to intimidate and silence the seditious enemies of Islam. As a new basis of support for the Islamic regime, these falangist offshoots of the Disinherited more than compensate for the defection of a wing of the Mujahideen.

HAVING REVIEWED the solid social and economic basis of support for Khomeini's regime, we can now look at the way in which he has consistently used this support to achieve the twin aims of the establishment of theocracy and the eradication of Occidentalism. These aims determine the twin policies he has followed since February: the increasing enhancement of clerical domination, and a *Kulturkampf* against the Westernized middle classes. We have already described the new regime's deliberate weakening of the state, especially the army, and the fierce political struggle to weaken and discredit an already disabled opposition—both undertakings aimed to enhance the clerical hegemony. No less significant is Khomeini's *Kulturkampf* against the nontraditional middle and upper-middle classes.

Much of Khomeini's energy since February '79 has gone into his passionate *Kulturkampf* against the Westernized middle classes. He has used every bit of his tremendous influence upon the Disinherited to denigrate the intellectuals, the journalists, writers, and lawyers, as "corrupt" renegades who have betrayed Islam to ape the Westerners' ways of thinking and acting. In speech after speech, Khomeini has denounced the middle-class intellectuals as traitors and followers of Satan, while his Mullahs have been suppressing the press and other media by means

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of which corruption is spread and the cultural enslavement to the West brought about. In the short and the medium run, Khomeini has alienated the disinherited masses from the excommunicated liberal and leftist intellectuals. More insidiously still, and of far greater long-term consequences if they succeed, are the designs to desecularize Iran's judiciary; to demolish the secularized judiciary system that, despite all its imperfections, constitutes arguably the greatest institutional achievement of the generation of Westernized intellectuals of the 1920s and '30s. In due course, the educational system, presently well in the process of being purged at all levels under the supervision of the Revolutionary Council, will also be scheduled for systematic desecularization.

Foreign journalists and domestic daydreamers alike greatly exaggerate the significance of disagreements among the religious leaders. I interviewed some 30 of the high-ranking Mullahs, including four of the Grand Ayatollahs, mostly in the year preceding the revolution, and was startled by the remarkable identity of outlook and staunch traditionalism of these venerable old men. On the basis of my interviews, I feel certain that they are virtually unanimous in their sympathy for Khomeini's *Kulturkampf* against Occidentalism (and here I am supported by the rare public statement issued on the occasion of the referendum for the Islamic Republic by the Grand Ayatollahs Mar'ashi Najafi and Golpayegani). On the extent of clerical involvement in government, not all of them agree with Khomeini's views in detail, but it is hard to envision active opposition to his policies on their part. It is true that just before the consolidation of clerical domination in August, the most liberal of the Grand Ayatollahs, Shari'at-madari, did voice his disagreement with Khomeini. But, personal rivalry aside, it is more plausible to interpret his action as a precaution to assure the continuation of clerical influence in case of a failure of Khomeini's direct take-over of the governing apparatus. And here we must not forget the pressure that can be exerted by the Bazaar, on which the religious establishment is financially dependent. Late in June 1979, a delegation of the Bazaar, worried about a possible rapprochement between Shari'at-madari and the secular opposition, met with him to obtain assurances to the contrary. The Grand Ayatollah was asked to comment on the rumors that groups of deviators from Islam were supporting him. "I have no knowledge of this," was his reply.

I may have exaggerated the element of foresight and design on the part of the leaders of the religious party, and my picture of clerical domination of the polity may be overdrawn in that it leaves out the fairly anarchic state of the country, the persistence of numerous modern institutions and local baronies. Nevertheless, by fall the situation was no longer as fluid as it was in March or July, and the trend I have tried to depict had become unmistakably predominant. (Except for the Ministry of Defense, we had not yet seen the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution in the corridors of the Ministries, enforcing the orders of the turbaned Deputy Ministers; but the need for such measures had not arisen either.)

Will this trend toward increasing clerical hegemony based on Islamic populism continue? The answer depends on the actions of the other social groups, and the capabilities of the Islamic party.

Of these other groups, by far the most important are the ethnic minorities who saw the revolution as the long-awaited opportunity to achieve regional autonomy. Here the reader is immediately reminded of the Kurds, whose unsuccessful rebellion has received extensive coverage, and of the Arab minority in the oil province of Khuzistan. In addition, the Baluchis need to be mentioned. Unrest among the Baluchis, living in the remote corners of Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, all of which are now politically unstable, has been unabated for a number of years and is likely to intensify in view of the discovery of substantial oil reserves in Baluchistan. The scarcity of reliable information makes it extremely difficult to assess the situation in

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any of these provinces. Nevertheless, a few lessons can be drawn from the Kurdish rebellion, which reached its height in the days immediately preceding what may be called the clerical coup d'état of late August, and was suppressed in the early days of September.

It seems very likely that the Kurdish rebellion forced Khomeini to put down his cards and launch an undisguised bid for the creation of a complete Islamic theocracy earlier than he had intended. The Kurds made the same grave error as that committed by the middle-class intelligentsia: they underestimated Khomeini. Furthermore, they similarly displayed a general lack of political acumen, their most serious miscalculation being their hope for support from the late Ayatollah Taleqani, and from the liberal and leftist parties. The liberal and leftist parties were all suppressed at the time of the onslaught on Kurdistan. In his clamp-down on the secular opposition Khomeini masterfully exploited the anti-Kurdish hysteria of his lower-middle-class and Disinherited supporters, unveiling the pattern of mass mobilization, which has become characteristic of his mob-dominated regime.

Nevertheless, in the long run, Khomeini's victory over the Kurds may well turn out to have been a Pyrrhic victory because, to attain it, he was forced to use the army—the army whose disintegration the Mullahs had taken great care to perpetuate. The army *did* act on Khomeini's order to crush the Kurds. In a situation of increasing polarization of the secular and the Islamic groups, the possibility that the army will act on someone else's orders in the future can no longer be discounted with complete confidence. Furthermore, neither Ayatollah Khalkhali's bloody purges nor the unquestionable brutality of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution have succeeded in stemming the tide of unrest and sabotage in Kurdistan, Khuzistan, or Baluchistan. Meanwhile, unrest among the ethnic minorites has required the extensive deployment of the Guardians to these provinces, perhaps making fewer of them available to new Minister of Defense Chamran for terrorizing the officers at army headquarters.

The other social group on whose potential reaction the continuation of clerical domination and totalitarian populism in part depends are the nontraditional middle classes. "We have 800,000 university graduates," Bakhtiar ruefully reminded himself and his audience in the above-mentioned interview. Yes; but so what? True, in sheer numbers and military potential—the guerrillas have hidden arms caches, and the army, though in an advanced state of decomposition, commands a large number of young officers and huge amounts of ammunition—the nontraditional sections of the middle class match Khomeini's activists, if not the combination of his activist core and their support among the Disinherited. But is this diverse middle-class group capable of concerted action? Two years of political turmoil is perhaps too short a time for an atomized class to organize itself. Nevertheless, so far, to paraphrase Marx, the class-in-itself that failed to become a class-for-itself, let alone to assume political leadership of the nation, has been the middle class, including the university graduates referred to by Bakhtiar.

While the Imam lives, the turbaned ruling class may rely on the disinherited masses without fear of competition from the excommunicated left; and so far the apparatus of the state has shown every indication that it will serve its new masters with as much docility and inefficiency as it has served its previous master.

Nevertheless, in their take-over of the state, Khomeini's clerics may well have overextended themselves while having had to agree to appreciable restrictions on their routine interference in affairs of the state. (Last September, Revolutionary Prosecutor General Ayatollah Qoddusi issued an order forbidding the Guardians and the Revolutionary Committees to arrest government functionaries and interfere in government affairs.)

Some of the new programs, such as the desecularization of the judiciary, are likely to meet with obstinate resistance from the relatively vocal lawyers and judges. Above all, ruling a country of 35 million people with

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sizable rebellious ethnic minorities and massive unemployment is no easy task, even with a resplendent government treasury and with 10,000 zealous, armed Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. With greater flexibility than they hitherto have shown, the Mullahs might co-opt the dedicated Islamic radicals; and they could do so all the more easily because the latter, once in power, are more likely to forgo their insistence on political radicalism and settle for the social archaism of the Mullahs. But it is not at all clear that they intend to be flexible. If the clerical regime in Iran is to collapse, its collapse will most probably be a result not of organized opposition but of ineptitude and internal dystrophy—as was, in the last analysis, the collapse of the regime of Shah. □

Postscript

Since these pages were written, the Bazargan government has fallen, and the second clerical coup d'état in the form of the direct take-over of the state by Khomeini's clerically dominated Revolutionary Council has taken place. As in the first clerical coup d'état of August, the second, in November, unfolded amidst mass mobilization and hysteria, both masterfully engineered by Khomeini. The mass mobilization in November was all the more effective because the anti-American resentment, coupled with the cry for vengeance against the dying tyrant, lent itself far better to Khomeini's demagogic manipulation than had the anti-Kurdish sentiment in August. It assured, perfectly in accord with Khomeini's design, the smooth passage of Iran's theocratic constitution in the referendum of December 2-3, which makes him, *de jure*, the ruler of Iran on behalf of the Hidden Imam.*

Shortly before his fall, in a remarkable interview with Oriana Fallaci (*New York Times Magazine*, October 28, 1979), Bazargan stated:

> something unforeseen and unforeseeable happened after the revolution. What happened was that the clergy supplanted us and succeeded in taking over the country. . . . If, instead of being distracted, we had behaved like a party then this mess wouldn't have occurred. . . . In that respect, all the political parties . . . went to sleep after the revolution. And that included the parties of the left, which have never been able to attract the masses in Iran and have always remained on the fringes of reality. Yes, it was the lack of initiative by the laity that permitted the takeover by the clergy.

Nevertheless, Bazargan refused to acknowledge that there had been a premeditated clerical coup d'état in August:

> In fact, it cannot even be said that they had it in mind to monopolize the country. They simply seized the opportunity offered by history to fill the vacuum left by us.

More serious still, Bazargan subscribed to the erronious view that Khomeini's actions were erratic and impulsive, lacking an overall design and a long-term objective.

Khomeini's problem, Bazargan maintained, stemmed from the fact that he had never been a factory manager or a general. Bazargan's naive assessment of Khomeini seems just as mistaken as the earlier one by Bakhtiar. Khomeini knew full well how to place Bazargan and Yazdi in positions where they would unavoidably be "compromised" and used as prime targets of mass discontent—while Khomeini himself would remain immune from all criticism, in self-righteous Olympian aloofness. When he

*The Shi'ites believe that their Twelfth Imam, in "Occultation" since the year 874, is the living (Hidden) Imam of the Age "*Imam-e Zaman*", and will reappear as the Mahdi (Savior) at the End of Time to redeem the world.

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judged he could dispense with their services, Khomeini used the occasion of their handshakes with Brzezinski to get rid of them both. After the occupation of the American embassy and the taking of hostages, Khomeini, more skillfully than any general, placed Bani-sadr and Ghotbzadeh, the most ambitious of the surviving "modernist" laymen in his camp, in the most "compromising" positions in the front line of the battlefield, and so shielded his favored clerics. The latter were thus allowed unrestricted freedom in winning the fervent support of the roused masses with their irresponsible and virulent anti-American rhetoric.

The official establishment of theocracy in those first days of December '79 has sealed the fate of the Iranian revolution, or at least of its first phase. The circumstances surrounding the referendum for the new constitution, however, reveal as much about the true political nature of Khomeini's regime as do the constitutional clauses that formally define it as a theocracy. According to the theocratic constitution, Khomeini's extensive powers as the supreme leader of Iran derive from his competence as the authoritative interpreter of the Sacred Law. In fact, however, Khomeini's massive power rests on his position not as the foremost religious jurist but as Iran's unrivaled demagogue. Whatever the theoretical cogency of the hastily concocted and disseminated arguments of the "Council of Constitutional Experts," Khomeini's juristic authority could not, in practice, be used to revive the flagging zeal of his supporters, or to silence his secular opponents.

In fact, to achieve these ends at the very time of his sanctification as the supreme Shi'ite religious jurist, the Grand Ayatollah recklessly exploited the taking of American hostages in total disregard of the dusty provisions of Sacred Law regarding the immunity of diplomatic envoys. The discrepancy between theory and practice, so tellingly exposed in Khomeini's action at such a crucial time, is equally observable in the case of the lesser clerics and points to the reality of demagogy and clerical fascism behind the facade of theocracy.

The Mullahs' institutional capabilities at present are not such as to make theocracy, however conceived, a viable reality in Iran. Their control of the state and of the remnants of its armed forces remains highly imperfect. So does the clerics' control of the press (they have had to allow some of the newspapers closed down in August to resume publication). The daily functioning of the judiciary still escapes the Mullahs' control almost entirely. Thus, the presumed juristic competence of the turbaned clerics, though making them the privileged stratum of the Islamic theocracy, has so far remained dormant even in the rare cases where its existence could be plausibly suspected. By contrast, the Mullahs' domination over the masses of the Disinherited seems more firmly established than ever before. Though not their legal knowledge, the Mullahs' preaching and oratorical skills have been, and will doubtless continue to be, put to very efficient use in mobilizing the Disinherited to achieve Khomeini's reactionary goals.

With the formal passage of the constitution, Khomeini has succeeded in creating the first Shi'ite theocracy in history during the first month of the fifteenth century of the Islamic era. Meanwhile, his *Kulturkampf* against Occidentalism has totally paralyzed the already weakened middle-class intellectuals. Whether or not the Second Coming of the Shi'ites' Lord of Time, the Hidden Imam, is at hand, the contemplation of Khomeini's demagogic rule on His behalf over a society on the verge of total chaos makes it distressingly clear that, indeed,

"The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity."

December 3, 1979 □

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Shlomo Avineri

Letter from Israel

Political Trends Under the Begin Government

Israel's political and social life is still reeling from the impact of two seemingly contradictory developments unforeseen by even the most knowledgeable pundits: first, the end of 30 years of Labor's hegemony in the 1977 elections, and second, Sadat's visit to Jerusalem leading to the Camp David agreements and the Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt. That the Israeli leader who signed what has been from Israel's point of view a very generous peace treaty vis-a-vis Egypt was none other than Menachem Begin has only added to the dazed incomprehension characterizing the reaction of many Israelis to these developments.

The elections that brought Menachem Begin to power have been such a shock to Labor that the wider implications of this upheaval have sometimes gone unnoticed. For Labor's defeat was not a mere electoral accident. In a country that always had been ruled by Labor-based governments and in which the Labor movement has been the true establishment in more than one sense, merely ephemeral explanations cannot suffice to grasp what has happened. Now any discussion of the future of Israeli society has to take cognizance of structural changes that have slowly eroded Labor's hegemony and have catapulted into power the outcasts of the Israeli political system (for Begin and his Herut party were never anything but outcasts in the Israeli political system, as much as George Wallace in the American system). Rabin's illegal dollar account, the squabbles between Rabin and Peres for the leadership of the Labor party, the emergence of Yadin's (now practically defunct) Democratic Movement for Change—all contributed to Labor's defeat, in which it lost about 30 percent of its vote, most of it to Yadin's new reform party; but the roots of the defeat went much deeper.

The writing had been on the wall for several years: both in the 1960 and the 1973 parliamentary elections, Labor had lost a few percent of its votes and Begin's Likud (or Gahal as it was then called) had steadily gained a few seats in the Knesset. 1977 was the culmination of a secular trend, not a sudden upheaval: its dimensions were dramatic, but its seeds lay in the social and political developments of the country in the last decade.

In a way, much of what happened in 1977 was a delayed reaction to the cataclysmic events of 1967: for the Six-Day War and the developments it introduced have drastically changed the delicate balance of Israel's politics. First of all, the period immediately preceding the June War [the Six-Day War, June 5-11, 1967] had created a crisis of confidence in the ability of the Labor government of Levi Eshkol to lead the country in a crisis: a National Unity government, including Menachem Begin, was formed under public pressure. Now Begin sat for three years as minister without portfolio in both Eshkol's and Golda Meir's cabinets, until his party left the government in the summer of 1970. It could be argued that his influence on government policy was minimal, though, doubtless, his very presence might be held responsible for certain policies that were *not* initiated after the June War.

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Begin gained something much more important than political clout: he and his party achieved respectability and responsibility. For 20 years, ever since the establishment of the State of Israel, Begin and his Herut party were viewed by the mainstream of the Israeli public as rabble-rousing right-wing fanatics, unfit to share power under *any* circumstances. Ben Gurion's dictum about the kaleidoscopic nature of Israeli coalition governments was that any government was possible, except a government that would include the Communists and Herut. This "Without the Communists and Herut" slogan left Begin a perpetual outsider, a maverick vainly banging at the doors of power that would, by almost universal consensus, be shut to him forever.

All of a sudden, in 1967, he gained the public acceptance he and his party craved for and became *salonfähig*. The lesson was not lost on Begin himself, who is always quick to grasp tactical advantages. During his stay in the government, he kept a low profile, appeared as a reasonable though hawkish statesman, exuded confidence and respectability, and did his best to obliterate the erstwhile image of irresponsibility and street-corner demagoguery Ben Gurion had so skillfully attached around his neck. Not that he became exactly *papabile*, but the stigma was mostly gone.

The impact of 1967 was, of course, much deeper than that.

IN THE period from 1948 to 1967, despite the lack of peace and the constant and imminent danger from its Arab neighbors, Israel's political debate was largely devoted to internal issues. True, in 1956 the Suez crisis flared up into a war; but anyone looking at Israeli newspapers and public debates of that time would recognize that on external issues a general consensus had crystallized, and public debate centered on matters dealing with social and economic problems. The armistice lines of 1949 were considered the best possible borders Israel could ever achieve, and peace was considered as signifying Arab acceptance of these provisional lines as recognized and permanent borders. Nobody in power thought seriously about extending the borders, the division of Jerusalem was accepted nilly-willy as permanent, and even Begin's Herut party never publicly advocated an Israeli-initiated war for the "liberation" of the "lost territories." When asked how such an acceptance of the status quo squared with their irredentist ideology, Herut's people usually answered with a shamefaced smile that, after all, one has to leave something for the Messiah, too. The debate about partition, for all practical purposes, was closed—closed by the realities of the 1947-49 War of Independence and its outcome.

Thus Herut, in the 20 years prior to 1967, had very little to bring to the public debate. It lingered in the wings of the Israeli political system, quietly cherishing an impossible dream, almost utterly irrelevant to the real concerns of the country at a time when Israel's population more than quadrupled. In this period of national reconstruction—mass immigration, the Ingathering of the Exiles and the Blossoming of the Desert—the Labor party's social democratic ethos and vision appeared central, relevant, and responsive to the needs and vision of the country. In an era when almost 2 million people immigrated into the country, the philosophy of social responsibility and the welfare state preached by Labor addressed the main concerns of the new immigrants. When the establishment of new towns, settlements, and regional centers was undertaken with the usual combination of vision and messiness that characterized Labor's plodding and resourcefulness; this movement—symbolized by the kibbutz and the moshav and buttressed by the Histadrut [general federation of labor] and its publicly owned industries—captured the imagination of newcomers and old-timers alike. Herut's incoherent mirage of Biblical lands was just besides the point, especially as, paradoxically, these Biblical lands were now governed by precisely the one Arab government (Abdullah's and Hussein's Jordan) that appeared to be ready to acquiesce in a de facto coexistence with Israel.

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All this changed in 1967. Since those heady days in June, Israel has been in constant turmoil over security issues and the future of the occupied territories. The glory of a unified Jerusalem, the historical romanticism associated with Judea and Samaria—all these powerful symbols became a political reality, not a passive, quasi messianic hope. Are these "liberated" or "occupied" territories? Is there or is there not a "Palestinian people"? Does one or does one not have a right or a claim to areas that, while undoubtedly parts of the historical Land of Israel, are now exclusively populated by Arabs? Should one, or should one not, settle these areas? All these questions became the central issues of Israeli politics, requiring daily answers and necessitating governmental action of one kind or another. On the other hand, the salience of the internal issues of social justice, economic equality, and vision became secondary: not that they disappeared, but by necessity they had to take a backseat to the burning issues of security, defense, and preoccupation with the new territories now under Israeli rule.

The burden of security, too, which had been relatively light before the war, now was felt much more severely: in the proportions the government's budget and the GNP now devoted to defense, compared to pre-1967 days; in the daily terrorist threats to civilian life; and in the burden of army reserve duty, now demanded of the Israeli citizen.

In such times, a party like Begin's Herut, which comes out with simple, clear-cut moral choices and perceives the situation in terms of the battle of the Sons of Light against the Sons of Darkness—of either/or, of us/them —has a clear public advantage over a social democratic party that must steer a tortured course between its humanism and its concern for security, between its agricultural collective ethos and its wish not to create a South African settlers' state in the Middle East. Since 1967 the focus of public debate had moved, then, from the social to the national—and here, because of its simplistic nationalism, Herut had a clear advantage.

Another important factor is the shift in the composition of Israel's electorate at precisely the time when the shift from the social to the nationalistic was occuring in the public arena. For, in that decade, there has been a steady increase in the percentage of Israel's Jewish electorate comprised of "Oriental" immigrants and their children [Sephardic Jews from Arab countries]. If in the 1950s the "Orientals" were less than 25 percent of the electorate, in the mid-'70s they have reached almost 50 percent. By and large, this population is less secularized than the European immigrants and their descendants.

In most cases, the "Oriental" Jews did not go through the crises of enlightenment and emancipation that have characterized European Jewry: hence the Oriental's receptivity to social democratic ideas, and the universalist humanism underlying them, appears to be much lower than that of European Jews. Consequently, the kibbutzim have almost utterly failed to attract members from this new Oriental immigration. Furthermore, the Oriental's attitude to the Israeli-Arab conflict by and large has been much more hawkish, both because of their less secularized culture and because the bitter memories of their agony under Arab rule in Morocco and Iraq were only too easily translated into a hawkish attitude vis-à-vis the Arabs in the context of the political conflict. To put it bluntly: for the immigrants from Muslim countries, the *goyim* are the Arabs, and, generally speaking, their primordial reaction in the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict has shown as much charity toward the Arabs as one could expect of immigrants from the Pale of Settlement in Eastern Europe vis-à-vis Ukrainian nationalism. Hence, the percentage of the vote for Herut among these immigrants has been higher than Herut's share in the general electorate, and with the rise in the number of voters from Oriental communities (due to their generally higher birth rate), the tilt toward a more hawkish electorate has become evident.

A similar trend could be discerned—for different reasons—among immigrants from the Soviet Union. Those who came to Israel were not necessarily the most liberal-minded,

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universalistically oriented members of the Soviet Jewish intelligentsia. For the Soviet Jews who chose to come to Israel were usually the more religious, ethnically centered ones. And the traumas of the Soviet regime had left many of them completely color-blind when it came to Israel's social democratic Labor culture: red is red, many of them felt—and shied away from Israel's kibbutzim, because to them they seemed just another version of bolshevism with its kolkhoz and coercive labor. Thus the balance of these Soviet immigrants gravitated more toward the Likud than toward Labor.

Add to this the fact that many of the Oriental immigrants who came to Israel in the '50s were initially introduced to the Israeli economy as workers and laborers and taken immediately under the wing of the Labor party's benevolent bureaucratic structure, which also made sure that they voted for the right party come election day. With their gradual integration into Israeli society, and especially with the introduction of Arab labor into the Israeli economy after 1967, many of these erstwhile Labor voters from the Sephardic proletariat became petty shopkeepers, building contractors, truck and restaurant owners, plumbers, etc. Thus they found their niche in the nascent Sephardic petty-bourgeoisie, which graduated not only from its proletarian status but also from the tutelage of Labor block captains. More and more these Oriental Israelis were coming to vote for a party—now the unified Likud—that catered both to their primordial nationalistic feelings and to the economic interests of their newly acquired social mobility. Labor's successful policy of integration, in a sense, helped pave the way to its own political downfall.*

*The emergence of a powerful Sephardic new middle class in Israel always has to be considered against the background of the still existing poverty of other sectors of the Oriental immigration in Israel. Not all Oriental Israelis live in slums, as any tourist to Israel can find out very quickly when checking into the ethnic background of shopowners, truck and taxi owners, restaurant and entertainment operators, and various other entrepreneurial occupations now very much carried out by members of the Oriental communities.

The shift in Israeli politics reflects not merely a change in electoral moods but an underlying malaise in Israeli society. From the electoral point of view, however, the shift to the right has proved to be much less permanent than previously perceived, for many of the voters who have left Labor and shifted toward Yadin's party now are obviously shifting back to Labor. This is reflected in local and trade-union elections that were held since the parliamentary elections, as well as in recent public-opinion polls in which the Likud is now consistently trailing behind Labor.

A major feature characterizing the social and economic policies of the Likud government suggests, paradoxically, that the social democratic structures of the country are much deeper than expected and that, despite all the shifts and changes described, the future of Israel lies very much in the sphere of communitarian and not laissez-faire policies.

For years, a major feature of Likud propaganda has been its loud criticism of what was generally described as the socialist bureaucratism of Labor. All the ills of Israeli society, the Likud proclaimed, can be traced to the fact that under Labor the forces of the free market have been hampered by the regulations and bureaucratic controls of Labor's socialistic economic theories. Give free rein to laissez-faire policies—and overnight inflation will disappear, strikes will be unheard of, productivity will soar, investment will flow into the country, personal income will rise, and the national debt will decline! Government-controlled public companies will be sold to the highest bidder, Likud Finance Minister Ehrlich declared on assuming office, and the top-heavy bureaucratic costs of Israel's economy will be slashed.

No wonder that, when the Likud took over, Milton Friedman was called in for a quick round of consultations; and Friedman, in one of his *Newsweek* pieces, welcomed the Likud victory in Israel as proof of socialism's decline and the victory of the principles of laissez-faire. . . . Foreign-currency controls were abolished overnight, and some government-

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owned companies were sold to private investors. Yet the economy has gone from bad to worse, inflation has soared in 1979 to around 100 percent, strikes and lockouts are worse than ever—and while nobody can see an easy way out, it is now clear to practically every Israeli voter that a laissez-faire economy—whatever its merits in Adam Smith's 18th-century Scotland or Pinochet's 20th-century Chile—is out of the question in Israel.

FOR LAISSEZ-FAIRE IN AN ISRAELI CONTEXT, if taken seriously, would mean taking a number of steps that a society based on an ideology of national and social renaissance, as Israel is, would find impossible to implement. For laissez-faire means:

- New immigrants should be left to fend for themselves, allowed to drift at the fringes of the market rather than be supplied with highly subsidized housing, crash-course language boarding schools (*ulpanim*), and professional training—all instituted by Labor and still provided in Israel.

- The rat race, rather than social welfare policies, should decide who of the members of the Oriental communities should be able to "make it" into Israeli society in terms of social mobility.

- Large families in low-income groups should be discouraged if not penalized rather than rewarded with social benefits.

- Only merit—and inherited wealth—rather than an egalitarian ideology should direct the educational system.

- The function of the army should be limited to the military sphere of activities only, and should not also be the fostering of economic and educational mobility for newly arrived immigrants from less developed countries.

- No agricultural or industrial enterprise should be encouraged and bolstered through public funding—except on solely economic grounds—considerations that call, for example, for setting up new settlements only in the most lucrative locations and wholly abandoning all others.

- Moreover, immigration itself should be curbed or controlled according to economic capacity: certainly, on laissez-faire grounds, Israel should not be ready to take in an indiscriminate number of Jewish immigrants!

CONSEQUENTLY, it has become very clear even to the Friedmanesque Ehrlich that running Israel on a laissez-faire approach is a self-contradiction. Precisely because Israel is aimed at helping the weaker elements among the Jewish people to find a place under the sun for themselves (the stronger elements can always—and do—fend for themselves), the Likud government has realized that it could perhaps decontrol foreign exchange, and cause havoc to the economy, especially to the export-oriented industries: but it found itself continuing the policies of linking wages and salaries to the cost-of-living index, and going on with all other welfare-oriented programs. Even the government's most publicized project, launched under the personal patronage of the Prime Minister—Project Renewal—is (albeit not very well-coordinated) a plan for slum clearance and urban renewal, surely far from a laissez-faire-oriented program.

This, then, paradoxically, is the lesson learned in two years of Likud government:

- No government in Israel can be anything but community-oriented.

- Laissez-faire has no relevance in Israel.

- And the only difference between a Labor government and Likud in this sphere is whether such a policy is carried out consciously and with a (relative) amount of planning, as it was under Labor, or whether it is carried out contrary to its own principles by a Likud government that is patching up a badly tainted laissez-faire philosophy with bits and pieces of a social policy based on the fundamental needs of Israel's society—a society engaged in national reconstruction. It is highly improbable that any future Israeli finance minister of a Likud government will ever again flaunt Milton Friedman's name.

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But in discussing the impact of 1967 on the Israeli electoral scene, one cannot overlook another major side effect that June War and its aftermaths have had on Israeli society and on the tenets of the Zionist dream. And here the picture is much bleaker.

One of the basic elements in the Zionist revolution—institutionalized in the Labor Zionist movement's kibbutzim, moshavim, and the Histadrut industries—was a philosophy of radical social transformation. Zionism as it developed in Israel was aimed not only at a geographic shift of population from the Diaspora to the Land of Israel but also involved far-reaching social restructuring. Social Zionism was always animated by the ideas—expanded by Ber Borochov, Nachman Syrkin, and A. D. Gordon—that a Jewish society in Palestine must not replicate the social structure of Jewish society in the Diaspora. A national renaissance of the Jewish people will be possible, it was argued, only if an *overall* Jewish social structure will emerge in the Land of Israel, radically different from the Jewish concentration in middle-class positions in the Diaspora. *Galut* (the Diaspora), Gordon warned, is not only a geograhic concept: it also means alienation from manual labor, dependence on the manual work of others, escaping from, or not having the opportunity to experience, the difficulties and vicissitudes of filling every kind of work that is required to make up a full-fledged society.

Hence the Zionist ideology of "back-to-the-land," the stress on physical labor, the somewhat naively romantic idealization of agricultural labor, above middle-class "rootlessness," and the denigration of the mythical Jewish intellectual *Luftmensch*. For all the simple-mindedness that sometimes went along with these attitudes, at their root was a radical criticism of Jewish life in the Diaspora. In Eretz Yisrael [the land of Israel], Jews will have to fill every function, do every kind of work, hence the stress on Jewish labor even in the most menial positions. A Jewish community in Palestine that will depend on Arab labor will perhaps create Jewish latifundia and a class of Jewish *effendis* in the Middle East, another Algeria or South Africa—but not a new Jewish nation.

It was this centrality of physical and productive labor and the creation of an economic Jewish infrastructure to the Jewish society in Palestine that made Zionist immigration to the country an unusual social phenomenon. While all immigration movements always were motivated in one way or another by a dream of social mobility—the American Dream, if you wish—those Jews who came to Palestine (and they were a tiny minority in the great Jewish waves of immigraion of the 19th and early 20th centuries), believed in conscious *downward mobility*. Middle-class Jewish youngsters, students, intellectuals, petty businessmen and their children—they came to Palestine and became pioneers, i.e., agricultural and industrial workers, not out of mere necessity and the vicissitudes of immigration and its dislocations, but out of an ideology calling for the establishment of a Jewish proletariat in the Jewish land.

And while the overall structure of the Jewish community in Israel as it emerged after the establishment of the State of Israel obviously deviated from such an ideal type as envisaged by the visionaries of socialist Zionism, Israeli society by and large lived up to these dreams of a society in which all jobs, from the bottom to the top, would be done by Jewish people: the corollary to this idealism was a highly egalitarian wage system, frequently even penalizing the better educated groups to the benefit of the menial worker who was head of a large family.

The June War of 1967, and the resulting economic boom it brought in its wake, opened Israeli society to the influx of Arab labor from the occupied territories. Israeli agricultural expertise, which truly helped the Palestinian farmer in the West Bank, also created—through mechanization and modernization—an agricultural proletariat drifting toward jobs in the Jewish urban centers of Israel. While this labor is generally paid according to Israeli wages and has benefited from much of Israel's social legislation, it created—for the

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first time in Israeli society—a situation in which more and more menial jobs in the labor market were beginning to be filled with Arab workers.

Over the last 12 years, Jewish workers began to disappear from construction sites and from much of Israel's agricultural sector (not the kibbutz sector, where a strong ideology of self-work is still the most effective barrier against introduction of any wage labor from the outside); waiters and dishwashers in Israeli hotels and restaurants tend more and more to be Arabs, as do municipal garbage collectors and domestic workers in such ethnically mixed areas as Jerusalem. It is now estimated that almost 70,000 workers from the occupied territories cross daily into Israel proper for work in Israel's agriculture, industry, construction sites, and hotel kitchens.

This is reversing the Zionist revolution to the extent that on some sites of the new Jewish settlements put up by the Likud government and Gush Emunim on the West Bank many of the construction jobs are done by Arabs, and in the Yamit area of the Sinai (soon to be evacuated) some of the hired laborers working in the flourishing moshavim are Bedouins. For the Likud, whose nationalistic ideology was always completely immune to the social implications of Zionism, this poses no problem: but for the Labor movement, with its strong commitment to social reconstruction, this reversal of *galut*—where it is usually not the Jew who does the physical work—is a dire predicament and a grave warning. Nobody, of course, planned it this way. Initially, very few people (with the exception of such socialist radicals as former Secretary of the Histadrut Yitzhak Ben-Aharon) foresaw such social consequences of the Six-Day War. But today their impact is massively felt.

The debate about the future of the occupied territories and about the Palestinian question has taken on another aspect: while the government speaks about "liberated territories," on the left the question is asked, of course, in terms of people, not of real estate. On the Israeli left, the argument for a massive territorial compromise is founded not merely on the argument that one should not occupy another people: the argument goes much deeper. Occupation is not only brutalizing and dehumanizing—as recent instances of cruelty have shown—but it also upsets the social structure of the occupier itself. As it has sometimes been put by Labor spokespeople, not only the Palestinians have to be "liberated": the Israelis too have to be "liberated" from being masters, Israel's social structure has to be freed from the danger of the country gliding into a Settlers' State, into a situation in which the Jews will be the middle class and the Arabs the proletariat.

The traditional cleavages between socialist Zionism, with its awareness of the social aspects of what national renaissance means, and Revisionist Zionism, with its mere fixation on external symbols of statehood and military might, has thus been exacerbated by the debate about the implications for Israel's internal structure of the decisions regarding the future of the West Bank and Gaza. Nowhere could the linkage between the political and the social be better exemplified than in this debate.

A final word about the kibbutzim. They continue to be a success story, and there is little evidence that they are fading away or that their egalitarian or communitarian ethos is eroding. True, they are more affluent than in the past, and for outside visitors, who sometimes confuse socialism with Puritan asceticism, it is sometimes difficult to square flourishing villages with socialism. The truth of the matter, of course, is that many of the utopian communities established in the 19th century in America have disappeared not because they failed but because they succeeded: once economic affluence was assured, the founders or their descendants were under immense pressure to parcel out the wealth acquired through so much hardship—and the socialistic communities became "normal," private-enterprises farming villages.

Nothing of this sort has happened to the Israeli kibbutzim. The younger generation

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may be less involved in philosophical debates than their elders and may care more for the technological advance of their kibbutz than for the talmudic finesse of the debates between various wings of Austro-Marxism: but the communistic basis of the kibbutzim has withstood not only the challenges of poverty but of affluence as well. Kibbutzniks may be more interested in university studies today than their parents were (who usually came from an intellectual Jewish background in the Diaspora), but their commitment to the socialist values of their communities is undiminished. Technology is used to minimize the need for outside labor or to abolish it altogether, hence no Arab labor has invaded the kibbutz sector as it has other sectors of Israeli society. On another level, the extremely high percentage of kibbutzniks on the army casualty lists of Israel's wars (about 20 percent of those killed in the Yom Kippur War were kibbutzniks, with the kibbutzim comprising less than 4 percent of the overall population), also suggests a very strong involvement in community responsibility.

Yet, the kibbutzim have been justly accused—and only recently have they begun to acknowledge this—of having been very much self-centered and inward-looking. Many kibbutzim have flourished in areas where large concentrations of new immigrants have lived in rather dismal conditions, with very little involvement of the kibbutzim in their immediate human environment. Kiryat Shemona is a problematical immigrant town in the midst of the flourishing kibbutz area of the Upper Galilee, and Beit Shean is a dismal place in the midst of the fertile Jordan Valley, another highly successful kibbutz cluster. For many years, very little contact existed between the kibbutzim in these areas and their immediate urban hinterland, and consequently feelings of alienation and bitterness developed in the towns, mainly populated by immigrants from Middle Eastern countries, against the kibbutzim and their relative affluence. In some cases a reverse class-consciousness appeared, pushing many voters in Beit Shean, for example, to vote for the Likud as a protest against the "fat cats" of the Labor-associated kibbutzim.

This came as a shock to many kibbutzim with the results of the 1977 elections. Since then a lot of soul-searching has been going on in the kibbutz movement, which has produced a number of visible changes. Kibbutzim now have initiated programs of school integration, not necessitated by the law, aimed at bringing some of the children of the surrounding blighted areas into their highly developed schools; swimming pools in kibbutzim, naturally built to provide amenities for the local people, were ostentatiously opened free of charge to residents of surrounding immigrant towns; cultural events were planned to include residents of these areas as well as the more highly cultured kibbutzniks. And so, for the first time, an attempt at integrating the kibbutz society into its immediate non-kibbutz hinterland (not an easy decision for the kibbutzim) has been initiated. Of course, this should have happened long ago, and the kibbutzim now pay heavily—in public esteem as well—for years of of negligence and self-centeredness. But still, their ethos of social responsibility was strong enough to prod the kibbutzim into quick action once the glaring social injustice became evident.

Political activity in the kibbutzim, too, has recently gone through some changes. By and large, kibbutzim continue to be the mainstay of Labor, and in elections their members continue to support the parties of the Labor Alignment. But in the last decade or so, few young kibbutzniks got directly involved in party activity. While 20 or 30 years ago the percentage of kibbutz members active in various political and public institutions was very high, the last decade saw the younger kibbutzniks spend much time and energy getting involved in the economic and technological activities necessary to maintain their unusually attractive quality of life—but hardly in party politics. The representatives of the kibbutz movements in parliament, for example (all of them, of course, members of the Labor Alignment), until recently, belonged almost exclusively to the older generation.

Again, it was the shock of the '77 elections that shook the kibbutzim out of their self-imposed inward-looking attitudes: all of a sudden it became clear that a prolonged Likud hegemony would mean a profound change in Israeli society, bound to affect the

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kibbutzim (some particularly nasty remarks by Likud people that the kibbutzim ought to pay higher taxes drove the lesson home even at the gut level). As a consequence, in the last two years there has emerged within the Labor party a new group of activists coming from the kibbutz movement, activists who are already heading for leadership positions in any future Labor administration. The unification, after much squabbling, of the two different kibbutz movements affiliated with the Labor party (one traditionally linked to the Mapai wing, the other to Achdut Ha'avoda) also has visibly increased the political clout the unified kibbutz movement will have in the future councils of the Labor party. In the future, much more will be heard of such Labor leaders as Yaacov Tzur or Mussa Harif—young people practically unknown a couple of years ago—and hence Labor will be much less machine-ridden than it was in the past.

IN SUM: while structural changes in Israeli society have brought about the present government, and its existence cannot be discounted as a mere freak accident, much more powerful forces within the society suggest that Likud's attempts to steer a socially different course for Israel are basically abortive. It may perhaps be premature to say that the Likud government will be a mere episode: it does signify some basic shifts in Israeli society. But even Begin's government has begun to realize—though it will hardly admit it publicly—that its economic philosophy is utterly irrelevant to the realities of Israel. And the social and ideological forces that have formed Israeli society as we know it appear to have learned more than one lesson from the debacle of May 17, 1977. The wave of the future in Israel most definitely does not belong to Begin & Ehrlich, nor will Milton Friedman be added to the prophets of Israel. □

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Les pauvres en Hongrie
Les ananas de Bratislava
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Trente numéros de Contrepoint: index et table des matières

ABONNEMENTS:	France	Etranger
• Particuliers	100 F	120 F
• Institutions	120 F	140 F
• Le numéro	30 F	40 F

CONTREPOINT, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE,
4, rue Cassette, 75006 Paris - C.C.P. Paris 2.605-96
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James Wechsler

The Fonda-Hayden Show

The following comment, slightly abbreviated, is reprinted with the author's permission from the New York Post.

In their new incarnation, Tom Hayden and Jane Fonda talk brightly of "a new political era" in which California Gov. Jerry Brown—subject to change without notice—is apparently their highest hope.

But the crusade on which they have embarked seems to reflect much of the muddled double-think that has increasingly characterized Brown's own bid for national eminence.

It is in part an attempt to revive the passions of their earlier antiwar movement by permanently halting all uses of nuclear power (as if it were forever beyond mortal imagination to harness such energy for the elevation of the human condition).

At the same time, however, it offers an elusive mix of populist rhetoric with the neoconservative economics now deemed politically fashionable.

The contradictions and incoherences were painfully evident during a joint Fonda-Hayden performance on *Meet the Press* in which Miss Fonda was reminded of her statement that Gov. Brown "as far as I can see, is the only politician who represents that new era, who has vision for the new era."

After enumerating the varied social programs (health, education, guaranteed jobs, mass transit, grants for consumer advocates) embodied in the platform of the Hayden-Fonda "Campaign for Economic Democracy," a questioner asked Miss Fonda how this prospectus could be reconciled with Gov. Brown's call for "limits on the federal budget."

At first she sought to dismiss the question by noting Brown's proposals for "taking some of the profits of the oil companies and investing them in mass transit, solar energy." The interviewer persisted:

Q: But he [Brown] is also in favor of cutting back on federal spending.

Fonda: Well, it is becoming clear, isn't it, that the New Deal kind of liberalism, the welfare state approach, isn't working. The people who voted in California for Proposition 13 are middle Americans who can't afford to bear the burden of more taxes. . . . The welfare state is a bandaid, and we have to invest our nation's money in productive sectors that will create more jobs, keep the money in the United States, not in the Middle East or Indonesia.

At the very least the response—on which unfortunately no elaboration was sought—sounded more like old-fashioned Republicanism than new politics.

There was a comparable colloquy in which Hayden conveyed the image of the faded young rebel approaching mellow middle-age. Asked whether there were "areas in which your views may have changed," he replied:

"Oh, everybody's views change. I have been active now for 20 years. I have changed my mind about a number of things. I am more skeptical than perhaps I was 10 years ago about the role of programs like the Great Society program, or social programs. I now see these as expensive clean-up operations for corporations that move away to South Korea or the Philippines. I have more skepticism about busing than I did when I was a high school student and I supported Gen. Eisenhower, President Eisenhower, in Little Rock."

Whatever else may be said about them, these can hardly be called unconventional remarks. They are echoes of the phrases that tired and disenchanted ex-liberals have long been reciting and writing in many public symposia.

The real question is what is "new" about this "new era" message. It professes to forsake the "welfare state" and "Great Society" banners (without defining concrete areas in which existing programs would be abandoned or rolled back). Where are "the new solutions"?

"I believe in free enterprise capitalism, the family farm, the small solar energy businessman," Hayden said, "but I think that the problem with the system today is that the very large corporations are not under the control of supply and demand, nor under the control of government. . . ." □

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Michael Harrington

Why the Welfare State Breaks Down

I

America is at a turning point. The radical nature of the period is recognized even by conservatives. When he was sworn in as secretary of the Treasury last summer, G. William Miller said that the nation had "inherited the most distressing economic environment in 50 years." Leaving aside the evasiveness of Miller's verb—it is a way to ignore the failure of more than two years of the Carter administration—his central point is quite true. If the times are not as dramatically miserable as the years between the stock market crash of 1929 and Franklin Roosevelt's innauguration in 1933, they are at least as confused and bewildering. Simultaneous inflation and chronic unemployment subvert all the theories, and theory-based policies, of the past generation.

Does the moment simply mark the reassertion of traditional capitalist contradictions? That would be the diagnosis of a vulgar radicalism and it is, as we shall see, quite wrong. But then, are our difficulties the result of the welfare state, i.e., of the very reforms that were the response to the earlier crisis half a century ago? There are those on the right who think so: we went much too far along the road of government intervention, spending profligately, corrupting the people's moral fiber and productivity. There are also those on the left who see the welfare state as the problem: intervening timidly and inadequately, the liberals left the structural irrationalities of capitalism intact and subordinated Washington's actions to the priorities of giant, multinational corporations.

The rightist scapegoating of the welfare state is wrong, as Robert Lekachman has documented in the Fall 1979 *Dissent*. Obviously, there is substantial truth in the democratic left's indictment of partial, often co-opted, reforms that leave the basic system intact. But this does not take us far enough. One must also look at some of the unintended—social, psychological, cultural—consequences of the welfare state. These unintended consequences, it should be candidly admitted, were anticipated neither by the left nor the center and right. In some areas we can be fairly specific about the changes that took us by surprise. In others, it is necessary to speculate about a period that is postbourgeois yet not socialist, a time of in-between, the time of the "late welfare state."

Let us begin with the "old" and "objective" constituents of the crisis of American welfarism: *how traditional capitalist contradictions now manifest themselves, albeit in new and unprecedented ways.*

The most obvious factor here is the business cycle—which is now the political business cycle. During the euphoric period of "the Great Society" in the '60s it was said that the fundamental rhythm of boom and bust had been eliminated from the economy. The nation, Lyndon Johnson said, is no longer at the mercy of a "relentless tide of ups and downs," and the Council of Economic Advisers immediately added that prosperity had become the "normal state" of the American economy. At the very moment

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when those claims were being made, in January 1969, the economy was starting to destroy them. In the decade since, there have been three recessions, one of them as I write and perhaps the worst since the Great Depression and exacerbated by chronic inflation unknown in America in peacetime.

All three of these recessions were, to some measure, deliberately provoked, as we shall see shortly. But each of them also involved the resurgence of old-fashioned capitalist tendencies. Prosperity brings labor militancy, declining productivity, a loosening of industrial discipline, and soon the corporations begin to call openly for a downturn. Arthur Burns explained this antediluvian truth in 1978 to the American Enterprise Institute:

> Most people [Burns said] now realize that our economy is not recession-proof, and that our government's ability to deal with recessions—to say nothing of its ability to anticipate or forestall them—is quite limited. Most people also understand that however regrettable recessions may be, it is a mistake to view them as simply being pathological phenomena. In fact, recession often performs an unavoidable function by forcing managers to improve efficiency, by enabling interest rates to come down, and by wringing some of the inflation out of the economic system.

Thinkers as distant as Herbert Hoover—or Karl Marx—could agree with Burns. And although Burns (or Hoover) would not put it this way, it can be added that the process they describe is rooted in a system of unplanned, profit-maximizing production with a correlative structure of maldistributed wealth. For example, in 1977 the Congressional Budget Office said that a major reason for the "disappointing" recovery from the 1974 recession was "the stagnation of real income in recent years." The maldistribution of wealth, a basic element of capitalist—including welfare capitalist—society, thus functioned to perpetuate a crisis. This was one reason why joblessness at the peak of the 1978 "recovery" was higher than at the trough of the 1970-71 recession.

In thus arguing that classic structural problems of the capitalist economy persist almost half a century after the creation of the American welfare state, I am not saying that these factors alone were the cause of the nation's troubles during the last decade. Such contradictions never assert themselves in "pure" form. They are always part of a process in which accidents unrelated to the deep workings of the system play a role. I will leave unicausal theories to the legion of academic and government economists who explain that our problems derive from such "one-time shocks" as the OPEC embargo of 1973-74 and the subsequent quadrupling of oil prices.

Two comments are relevant to this thesis. First, inflation proceeded at a faster rate in the three quarters *before* the embargo in 1973 than in the quarter that experienced the embargo. This was a consequence of the effective end of price controls in January 1973, i.e., of allowing the "natural" economic forces to assert themselves. Thus, America's domestic inadequacies would have brought on a crisis in 1973-74 even if there had been no Yom Kippur War and OPEC cartel. Second, if it is undeniable that the quadrupling of oil prices exacerbated this "normal" downturn, it did so only because a wasteful energy system, built with federal subsidies according to corporate priorities, was there to make the very worst of a bad situation. That this central core of the American industrial system is so organized hardly seems the contrivance of Saudi princes and Libyan colonels.

Moreover, this last point relates to a neoconservative theme often used by Jerry Brown and other, more conventional rightists. We are, it is said, bumping into inherent and natural limits. The welfare state, this argument continues, cannot distribute nonexistent wealth or ignore the fact that a period of growth based upon cheap and abundant energy has come to an end. This is, of course, a generalization of the thesis that the 1973-74 stagflation was created by OPEC and the notion—promulgated by the Carter White House in the summer of 1979—that the 1979-80 recession is simply the result of the fall of the Shah of Iran and the consequent "energy spasm" in the economy.

The Harvard Business School report

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Energy Future provides a marvelous, and empirically documented, refutation of this rationalization. It holds that "if the United States were to make a serious commitment to conservation, it might well consume 30 to 40 percent less energy than it now does, *and still enjoy the same or an even higher standard of living*" (emphasis added). I would extend this insight beyond the sphere of energy. A reduction by eliminating the wastefulness imposed by corporate priorities could improve the quality of life in this country; but this can only be done through democratic, anticorporate planning. This is not to deny that resources in the world are finite and that there are, in this ultimate sense, "limits." It is to say that the limits we have thus far encountered are primarily of human—and, more specifically, of capitalist (or Stalinist)—construction rather than facts of nature. To return to the specific point at hand, the chronic recessions of the past decade result from the perverse workings of the system and are not accidents invented by foreigners.

So the business cycle, first exhaustively analyzed by Karl Marx, continues on its destructive way as we near the 100th anniversary of Marx's death. But there is indeed a new element in this old story: if the mysterious rhythms of boom and bust have not been brought under control, as the New Economics of the '60s thought, they have been politicized. The 1970 recession was deliberately provoked by Richard Nixon in order to purchase a little price stability with a little unemployment. The problem was that the Phillips Curve, which said that prices and joblessness vary inversely with one another, broke down. Nixon got *both*, politically intolerable levels of unemployment—which, in those ancient times, were reached at a point that is now called full employment by a good many experts—*and* what then seemed to be excessively steep price increases (which were, however, lower than anything seen under the Carter administration).

This was the background of Nixon's conversion to "Keynesianism," i.e., to his own reelection, in 1971. Arthur Burns, the Cotton Mather of the Federal Reserve, stoked up the money supply, fiscal policy became liberal, price controls were imposed, the President took credit for a Social Security increase imposed upon him by a Democratic Congress, and so on. All these policies accomplished their aim: unemployment dropped, prices stabilized, and the improved economy helped to reelect Richard Nixon. Not so incidentally, each of these policies also prepared the way for the extremely severe stagflation of 1973-74.

Here again, it would be wrong to counterpose the political and the economic, the conjunctural and the structural. The political management of the economy, which Nixon manipulated for his own purposes, had been created in response to the deep-lying trends in capitalism and cannot be understood without reference to them. Nixon's cynicism and dishonesty were not the work of History or of the System; but the context in which those vices operated, their ability to affect an entire economy, were the result of structures developed to counter basic capitalist drives. More to the point, if the welfare state is an attempt consciously to modify the workings and outcomes of that capitalism, then we see here the ability of capitalism to modify the welfare state.

Social Security is the most obvious case in point. It is, as Robert Lekachman has shown, the very centerpiece of the system. "Welfare," taken in its narrow sense, is a very subordinate function of the welfare state. Indeed, it is only one department of a Social Security apparatus that spends much more money on the non-poor than on the poor. The crisis of that Social Security system first surfaced in the 1973-74 recession. Pensions for the aging in the United States are not "funded," i.e., the government does not put the workers' contributions aside and then pay it back with interest when they retire. That is done in other countries, like Sweden, and the monies collected are even invested in socially useful projects, like cooperative housing. In this country, however, the current generation in the labor force provides the financing for the retirees through payroll taxes.

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In 1973-74, there was a drop in revenues in the Social Security system as unemployment rose to the highest levels since the Depression. At the same time costs were increased by stagflation, since the retirees' benefits are indexed. At this point, there was concern that the system would literally run out of money in the not-too-distant future. This, it turned out, was an exaggerated fear. Still, the Social Security tax—the most regressive federal levy—was increased. But then, in the summer of 1979, as the economy was entering its third recession in a decade, a Joint Economic Committee report (prepared under the guidance of a sophisticated conservative, Senator Bentsen) came up with a gloomy projection of a stagflationist future in which Social Security would once again be in deep trouble.

A little earlier, a cloud no larger than President Carter's hand appeared in the sky. In his 1980 Budget, released in early 1979, the President had admitted that "the present social security benefit structure cannot be financed over the long run under currently legislated tax rates." Therefore, he said, the Administration will put forth proposals to "eliminate unnecessary benefits." The sum at issue was, as such matters go, derisory: $600 million out of a projected expenditure of $179.1 billion. But the symbolism was not unimportant. When, during the last recession, Gerald Ford had proposed to deal with this problem by "capping" the cost of living increases for the aging, i.e., by legislating a decline in their living standard, one could see that as a traditional exercise of Republican social meanness. But now a Democratic president, in theory at least the heir of Franklin Roosevelt, was moving along the same path.

So the welfare state remains powerfully constrained by the inherent, and quite traditional, tendency of the capitalist economy to follow a rhythm of boom and bust. It also is profoundly affected by another classic capitalist mechanism: the concentration of corporate power. Indeed, that trend is a key to the understanding of our newest economic puzzle, the simultaneous existence of both inflation and recession.

The theory that capitalist competition leads inevitably to monopoly was, of course, at the very center of Marx's analysis in *Das Kapital.* It is a prediction that becomes more true with each passing year. In the 1930s, studies began to pinpoint one of the consequences of this development—administered prices. During the Great Depression, as Gardiner Means showed at the time, all prices fell, but the prices in concentrated industries declined much less than those in the competitive sector. Steel was an important case in point. Right after World War II, in the recessions of the '50s, that same phenomenon became even more marked. Senator Kefauver held hearings that showed how giant enterprises, like General Motors, targeted rates of profit and rigged the market to yield the returns that were fixed in advance.

In the recent period, the stagflationist decade of 1969-79, the phenomenon seemed to become so pervasive that a theory of monopoly price-setting seemed to be dubious. Now almost all prices remained high, even in times of economic downturn. Those anomalies can be resolved—there are sectoral causes of inflation in a non-monopoly sector such as health care; there is centralized distribution that dominates the fragmented system of production in apparel; and so on. The decisive fact is that the American economy has become much more concentrated in the years since World War II. The 100 largest corporations, hearings under Ted Kennedy have shown, now own the same percentage of total assets as the 200 largest corporations did 30 years ago. Thus a venerable capitalist tendency contributes to our unprecedented inflation.

When demand contracts, as it did in 1973-74, big business does not lower its prices in order to increase volume, which is what it would do if it had any respect for Alfred Marshall: it raises prices in order to maintain profit levels on the basis of a lowered volume, which is what Karl Marx and Gardiner Means thought it would do. This is one of the reasons why Arthur Burns's theory that recessions

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"wring out" inflation does not work. It is a major cause of the demise of the Phillips Curve and, much more important, of all the public policies based on it. It also shows how corporations that still seek recessions no longer respond to them by lowering prices, i.e., it allows us to understand at least part of the genesis of stagflation.

In two extremely important areas, then, the traditional capitalist demons are at work: in the business cycle and in the trend toward monopoly. The current crisis of the welfare state cannot be understood apart from that fact—but then, it cannot be explained by it alone. There are a number of other factors involved, some of them having to do with attitudes, psyches, even souls, and others more "objective" in character. Let us begin with the latter, less speculative category.

II

It is well known that federal spending is a major source of the problem of stagflation. Arthur Burns says so, and Jerry Brown and Jimmy Carter do, too. It is well known but wrong. Or, more precisely, it is right only in terms none of the proponents of this thesis ever mention. If one measures federal spending as a percentage of "full-employment GNP" and computes it in constant dollars, then the government took 20.7 percent of output in 1955 and 19.1 percent in 1976.[1] Indeed, the fluctuations during those 22 years are relatively minor. So the notion that accelerating outlay in Washington created stagflation does not survive the most casual investigation. There was, however, a considerable shift in the *composition* of those expenditures. Defense outlays were 58.2 percent of the total in 1955 and 24.6 percent in 1976. Meanwhile transfer payments to individuals went from 18.9 percent to 45.7 percent and social investments (in education, health, etc.) from 1.1 percent to 14.1 percent.

Given these patterns, one can only account for stagflation in terms of federal spending by arguing that social expenditures are more inflationary than military expenditures. The problem is, the opposite is much truer. Note that the largest single increase in spending occurred in payments to individuals (and Social Security was, of course, the mainspring of the trend, not "welfare"). In that extremely important instance the federal government does not spend the money itself; consumers do. This is inflationary only if it sends an excess of dollars into a market with insufficient goods (which is "demand-pull" inflation on the textbook model). Something similar happened when Lyndon Johnson refused to ask for a tax increase in order to finance an unpopular war. But since then, precisely in the stagflationist decade of 1969-79, buying power has been lagging behind prices, not bidding them up.

More broadly, as a recent study by the Machinists (IAM) has documented, military spending creates fewer jobs than social spending. And it also pays people for producing goods not going on the market. Thus it tends to be more stagflationist than social outlays, contributing less to employment and more to inflation. So the thesis that federal social spending is the cause of our woes doesn't hold up any better than the notion that federal spending, pure and simple, is at the root of our difficulties. And yet, there is a form of deficit-spending that has grown enormously in the postwar period and is rooted in the very nature of the system. It is corporate debt and, in the midst of all the jeremiads about federal prodigality, this federally facilitated private binge is rarely mentioned. Once it is described, it points the way to a larger proposition: that governmental subordination to boardroom priorities is a major source of the current crisis.

The maldistribution of wealth is, of course, a precondition for capitalism. Since a social class of private citizens has the function of making the key investment decisions on behalf of the society, that class must be much wealthier than all other classes. Moreover, unlike previous dominant classes (whose appetite for wealth was limited by their ability to consume) capitalists must get larger and larger profits over time. If they do not, they become a forgotten moment in the trend

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toward monopoly and concentration. The system, then, will not work without a basic substratum of injustice. At the same time, this precondition periodically turns into a curse. The inherently limited consumption of the majority becomes a lack of effective demand for the output of giant enterprises. The welfare state was, of course, in considerable measure a response to just that problem.

By increasing the ability of the people to consume through transfer payments and other programs, a gentle inflation is supposed to stimulate full employment. In the almost half- century since Roosevelt improvised this tactic, it only really worked during two brief periods—the first that of the massive military spending in World War II, which came to about 50 percent of GNP, the second the Kennedy-Johnson years, which is another story. The point is that transfer payments are not charity but a structural necessity of the system. In a study designed to show that we had overestimated the number of poor people a few years back—i.e., a study that underplayed poverty whenever possible—the Congressional Budget Office reported that the normal workings of the economy, uncorrected by those federal programs, left one quarter of the people poor.

The government in Washington, then, has to bring at least some of those people into the market or else the boom-and-bust cycle would be even more severe than it is now. *Deficit-spending is not a leftist aberration in late-capitalist society; it is a necessity of the system itself.*

This is a familiar story, even though the established wisdom does not tell it as I have. Not so familiar, but just as true, is the fact that corporations have become much more addicted to debt than the government. In 1946, public debt was equal to 129.4 percent of GNP, private debt, 73.6 percent. In 1974 (admittedly, a banner year for private-sector borrowing), government debt had declined to 46 percent of GNP, corporate debt had risen to 152.8 percent. This was not an episode, or even a simple reflection of the business cycle. During good times in the '60s, corporations got about two thirds of their funds from internal sources (profits and capital consumption allowances) and only about a third from credit markets or other external sources. In 1972 and 1973, even though profits soared, the ratios had changed dramatically. In 1972 borrowed monies accounted for about 50 percent of the corporate total, in 1973 for around 60 percent. Since an extraordinary portion of that credit was short term, there was a near financial panic when the recession hit. Had the Federal Reserve not played an active role, there might have been a number of dramatic bank failures.

Business learned very little from this experience. Corporate borrowing dropped dramatically in 1975 under the impact of the recession, but then began to climb again. In 1977, it was 45 percent of corporate funds; in the first three quarters of 1978, it was a slightly higher percentage. The standard establishment explanation of this trend is neo-Marxist: that a falling rate of profit deprives business of the chief internal source of monies for new investment, jobs, and productivity. This argument then rationalizes the central corporate political demands of recent years: that Washington legislate a higher profit rate by lowering corporate taxes and personal income levies on the rich, accelerate depreciation, relax environmental and occupational safety laws (which means imposing the private social costs of business upon defenseless individuals), and so on.

There has been a fierce controversy over whether the rate of profit is falling. Part of the confusion arises because the existence or nonexistence of that "fact" depends upon how it is defined and explained. Corporate profits are too low, someone like ex-Treasury Secretary William Simon would say, because business has been crowded out of credit markets by federal borrowing for social programs, because there is too much regulation, and so on. In short, it is interference with the benign workings of capitalism, not capitalism itself, that is the substance of the "fact." This, as we have seen, is not true.

But the issue can be examined from another perspective. The system is in a secular as well

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as a cyclical slump and both trends are inherent, not accidental. Under these circumstances, chronically poor economic performance in a time of structural changes that are systemically irrational, i.e., unplanned on principle, can pose some serious cash-flow problems for corporations. Where huge investments are needed, more often than not—one thinks of steel and energy—to pay for the antisocial and uneconomic results of past corporate policies, there can indeed be a shortage of capital, particularly when capitalists are speculating in land, jewels, and rare violins rather than putting their money into an uncertain economy. It is in this context that the private sector goes to Washington for its "risk" capital.

This analysis throws some light on a broader trend. The federal government facilitated a vast expansion of credit. Then, when panic threatened in 1974 and '75, it stepped in as a lender of last resort to banks—but not as an employer of last resort for workers. Arthur Burns, that supposed paragon of monetary probity, thus has the distinction of shaping an easy-money policy to help reelect his friend Richard Nixon, and of then organizing the rescue operation he himself had made necessary. Government in a capitalist welfare state, then, tends to promote the common good of the majority by first assuring the special interests of those at the very top. This is why the dole for the corporate rich is so much more generous than the handouts for the poor. That is not the result of the malevolence of the bureaucracy; it is an indispensable characteristic of the system itself.

A shocking case of congressionsl cowardice and hypocrisy in 1978 should help document this point. Five years of corporate propaganda about the capital shortage, low profit rates, and excessive government interference with the private sector came to a head in 1978 in the form of the Kemp-Roth and Steiger bills. Steiger provided for massive capital gains reductions, Kemp-Roth for a huge, across-the-board tax cut in which the lion's share of the benefits would go to the very rich. Neither passed in their original form but both helped shape the Revenue Act of 1978. That law increased the deductions for capital gains from approximately $16.8 billion in 1978 to $22.3 billion in 1980. That $5.5 billion increment in welfare payments for the rich is roughly equal to 80 percent of the $6.7 billion in the main federal welfare program, Aid for Families of Dependent Children. And the total value of the deduction is three-and-a-half times more than the outlays for AFDC.

As is so often the case in these matters, the rationale for this give-away was false. The Council of Economic Advisers pointed out in its 1979 Report that "lowering capital gains taxes is not an efficient means of promoting investment." Yet, its is an excellent way of increasing the maldistribution of wealth. However, I do not want to focus upon the fact of this scandal, which is rather commonplace, but upon what it reveals about the attitude of the corporate rich. In essence they agree with my analysis: the system can only work on the basis of huge infusions of cash provided directly or indirectly by the government. They want corporations and the wealthy to be absolved of the responsibilities ordinary citizens must meet, and they justify this blatant demand for higher profits through federal subsidy on the grounds that it will make the economy more productive, which has not been the case at all. In capitalist society, business wants government to provide it with "risk" capital, and that becomes a new source of stagflation.

In this example, conservatives ignore the truly inflationary tendencies of subsidies to the private sector while talking sternly about the relatively minor inflationary impact of social spending. There is an analogous pattern in the attack on government regulation. There have been endless and angry protests from the executive suite in recent years against legal limits placed upon the corporation's right to despoil the environment or to threaten the lives and limbs of working people. Yet, as Steve Kelman documented in the *New Republic* last year, these new, socially conscious regulations do not cost nearly as much as the procorporate restrictions imposed by agencies under the control of those

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whom they are supposed to monitor.

Robert Eisner, the Northwestern University economist, made a partial list of those measures in a 1979 column in the *New York Times*:

> . . . price supports for milk as dairy prices skyrocket; trigger prices to "protect" our steel industry from foreign competition as profits of our steel industry soar; licensing agreements and route restrictions that drastically curtail competition in the trucking industry, laying the ground for repeated increases in prices and wages while trucks suffer from idle capacity and small trucking firms go out of business; sugar quotas and price supports to maintain and raise sugar prices; acreage restrictions that reduce agricultural supply; import quotas, tariffs, and "orderly marketing agreements" that limit the import of cheaper and frequently better foreign automobiles, television sets and textiles; and federal, state and local restrictions in countless occupations and industries that reduce competition and raise prices.

Let me generalize. The problem of the welfare dependence of some of the poor has been widely recognized. *The problem of the welfare dependence, not simply of wealthy individuals, but of the entire system of late corporate capitalism has normally been concealed.* Yet this is, as we have seen in just a few examples—and they could be multiplied almost endlessly—a structural source of the problem of stagflation, which now threatens to subvert the reforms of the past generation. There are, then, both old and new "objective" causes of the current crisis that are capitalist in character: business cycles, the tendency toward monopoly, the creation of a stagflationary welfare system for those whom we still call, out of habit, entrepreneurs. New factors are also at work in social relations and even in the sphere of culture.

III

The state of nature, Hobbes said, was characterized by the war of each against all. The welfare state, we may now add, sometimes seems to be the war of each group against every other group. The resultant conflicts among, and between, the poor, the workers, and the middle class have in fact made the corporate rich more secure. But, as befits this time of transition and uncertainty, they feel threatened by the very measures that have done so much for them. Note, then, that this is a period in which everyone has reasons for being unhappy, a reality President Carter skimmed over lightly in his talk about a "crisis of confidence."

First, there is the new group struggle created by the welfare state.

It would, of course, be foolish to contrast the present situation to an earlier time when seamless, homogeneous social classes without divisions confronted one another. In America, above all, the social classes have been marked precisely by extreme internal heterogeneity: workers were not simply workers but native-born and foreign, black, white and Asiatic, skilled and unskilled, male and female, Catholic, Protestant, and Jew, and so on. Indeed, it was the existence of these intraclass conflicts on a scale unknown in Europe that contributed mightily to the failure (thus far) of American socialism. These differences were sometimes reinforced by law—racial and sexual discrimination is the obvious example—but they were not the *creations* of law. What has happened under the welfare state is that groups have been constituted around legal rights and entitlements (or their absence).

Consider an example of this phenomenon from the history of the recent British Labour government. Under Prime Minister Callaghan's "incomes policy," inflation was successfully reduced in dramatic fashion. But as time went on, under that policy some of the most nasty disputes had to do with pay differentials *within* the working class rather than *between* the working class and the corporate (or hereditary) rich. Trade unionists were concerned, not with keeping up with the Lords and Ladies, but with keeping up with other trade unionists. They pressured a Labour government to that end and helped to bring it down. In America, one union president noted a similar trend. Workers, he

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said, tend to view other workers as the prime cause of inflation.

Morris Janowitz makes some very perceptive comments on this phenomenon in his *Social Control of the Welfare State* (University of Chicago Press, 1976). He writes that

> . . . the influence of the welfare state on the social structure modifies and transcends the format of conventional interest-group politics. Political conflict becomes more than the struggle between competing occupational and interest groups. Each person and each member of his household must confront an elaborate set of contradictory or competing and often ambiguous issues in the pursuit of his self-interest—immediate or long-term. The new social and economic structure produces a fusion of claims and expectations about wages, property income, and welfare claims. A person's linkage to the mode of production under these conditions is based both on his occupation and on the institutions of social welfare.
>
> Of course, the claims and expectations of one's occupation remain central. However, the democratization of equity means that the return and stability of property rights, individual welfare plans, and the benefits of public social welfare are also crucial components for the citizenry at large. The task of assessing one's self-interest becomes continuous and more complex, and persuing one's personal or group goals almost defies programmatic articulation. . . .The complex social base of political participation under the welfare state conditions new patterns of political involvement—patterns characterized by high degrees of volatility, which do not really lead to stable and unified political preferences and alliances and which help account for the lack of clear-cut political majorities and the emergence of weak parliamentary regimes.

This is true enough—but it is a dangerous, potentially reactionary truth and has to be handled most carefully. Before getting to this point, however, a few more details should be filled in. In his book on postindustrial society, Daniel Bell made a similar point: that "situs" is becoming as important as status, i.e., the organization *where* one works is as significant as what one does *within* the organization. The united front of trade unionists and employers against some environmental regulations is an obvious case in point. Everyone in an industry, from the president to the janitors, feels a common interest in opposing measures that protect society. The active support of the UAW for a Chrysler bail-out is, however, a progressive departure from this pattern. The union is calling for roughly one-third control of the corporation by public and employee representatives in return for the government aid. It thus makes "situs" consciousness socially conscious.

A similar, but somewhat different, phenomenon was observable in the conflict between farmers and independent truckers during the diesel oil shortage of 1979. Clearly—to everyone except the editorialists at the *Wall Street Journal*—a "free market" solution to the problem would have been economically chaotic as well as socially unjust. Therefore the government had to play a role in the crisis. But note that now there was no classic fight between the workers and the bosses or the poor and the rich. The independent truckers involved were self-employed workers, precarious entrepreneurs. The farmers were a more socially variegated group that contained a good many individuals who could not be dismissed as agribusinessmen. This is a dramatic example of the kind of new social conflicts arising out of the welfare state apparatus itself. The focus of the dispute was government policy, not private capital, and both sides were made up of people who work. Second, there are new social problems of quantity and quality that affect the class structure.

There is a related, though quite different, point developed by Fred Hirsch in *Social Limits to Growth* (Harvard University Press, 1976). So long as there was constant economic growth, the demands of the people for more reproducible goods could be met without any redistribution of wealth or change in the way economic divisions were made. The past ten years, however, have been anything but a period of constant economic growth, which is why this pillar of welfare-state consensus is being eroded. Even more problematical, when people begin to seek after "positional"

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goods—not washing machines and cars, which can be turned out in almost any volume, but exclusive neighborhoods, "fine" schools, quiet, unspoiled vacation spots—there is no way, even with constant growth, to satisfy the demand. At that point, the rat race becomes not simply morally objectionable but self-defeating.

Finally, there is the question of affirmative action. The demands of minorities and women for public assistance in redressing injustices that have been reinforced, and even instituted, by public policy is unassailable. But given the failure of the welfare state's economic managers to come up with an effective response to stagflation, this has led to struggles between minorities (which is more important, affirmative action against racism or against sexism? for blacks or for Hispanics?) or between minorities and ethnic groups only a few rungs above them on the social-class ladder. Obviously, the solution is not to abandon affirmative action but to create an economic environment in which it can be much more effective than it is now; but to do it, one must resolve the crisis of the welfare state and that is not a simple matter.

The case of affirmative action, moreover, bears very much on the reactionary use that can be made of the theme of the new social complexity created by the welfare state. A report to the Trilateral Commission in 1975, written by Michael Crozier, Samuel Huntington, and Joki Watanuki and entitled *The Crisis of Democracy*, and Ken Auletta's book *The Streets Were Paved With Gold* (Random House, 1978) are cases in point.

The Crisis of Democracy develops a number of the ideas just discussed. It found:

> the social democratic consensus [in Western Europe] is breaking down while the relationships between groups have become so complex and erratic that citizens are more and more frustrated. . . .
>
> *Citizens* [the authors write] make incompatible claims. Because they press for more action to meet the problems they have to face, they require more social control. At the same time they resist any kind of social control that is associated with the hierarchical values they have learned to discard and reject. [Emphasis added.]

The last comment is, in scholarly language, the substance of a criticism often directed at those of us who favor affirmative action. All of this culminates in a survey of "the dysfunctions of democracy." It is democracy—too much participation, egalitarianism, and responsiveness to group claims—which has brought us to this pass.

In *The Streets Were Paved With Gold,* Auletta develops this concept in a journalistic analysis of the New York crisis (which has some value but only if its basic premises are carefully ignored). All the groups in New York—the bankers, the unions, the poor, the consumers of public services—were greedy. All of them looked out for their particular interest; none was concerned with the common good. What Auletta and the Trilateralists offer as a theory is vulgar pluralism. The impoverished black or Hispanic family who wanted their children to go to the City University *and* the accountant who fought, through his or her union, to get a salary approaching a modest but adequate budget *and* the people in Queens who wanted snow removal service *and* the banks that speculated in municipal papers at a profit—they all hid their knowledge of the crisis and then not only refused to help when judgment day came but also demanded that free tuition be abolished at City University, that municipal employees take a real wage cut, and claimed that people who talked about services were *all* greedy. In reality, only the greed of the people at the top is both real and satisfied—while that of everyone else in this example is imposed upon them because they do not have enough to make ends meet and it stays, in any case, frustrated.

Moreover, massive structures, operating according to corporate priorities were, to stay with the New York case, financing the exodus of jobs and tax monies as well as the immigration of poor, and often desperate, people. The corporations were thus not one "interest group" among many but the dominant class whose very special greed is the

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mainspring of the entire system. Indeed, a generalization made by Richard Titmus applies here: more often than not the welfare state is an inadequate response to the *dis*welfare state. After a corporate-dominated system destroys the economic basis of a minimally decent life in the South Bronx, the victims are given a few dollars in welfare and food stamps and excoriated for not achieving a minimally decent life on their own. But, and this is the terrible catch, those who are a rung or two above them on that ladder, unionized workers for instance, then perceive those welfare recipients as their enemy.

Much of the problem arises from the fact that there is a capitalist economy that "normally" leaves 25 percent of the people poor, and these then have to be propped up by a welfare-state apparatus that is nominally noncapitalist but actually operates on corporate priorities. But even though the welfare state thus discriminates in favor of the corporate rich in a way that is profoundly antisocial, the main beneficiaries of all this are as surly as anyone else.

In *Politics and Markets*, Charles E. Lindblom (Basic Books, 1977) discusses this point brilliantly. In Britain, Lindblom writes,

> . . . some observers hold union demands . . . to be the root cause of the "English sickness"—the decline of British productivity and economic stagnation. [And yet, when one looks at the reality in that country,] . . . for all their demands, union members have not won any great alteration in distribution of income or wealth, or in participation in management, or in recent decades any substantial equalization of educational opportunity for their children. It is difficult to reconcile these timidities or defeats with the hypothesis that unions have either disproportionately large political influence or the more modest hypothesis that they have influence equal to that of businessmen.

Lindblom's conclusion:

> . . . a market-oriented system may require for its success so great a disproportion of business influence, both through the privileged position of business and through business disproportion in electoral and interest-group activity, that even modest challenges to it are disruptive to economic stability and growth.

Obviously, two very different lessons could be drawn from this analysis: therefore one must retreat back to Herbert Hoover; or, therefore one must proceed far beyond Franklin Roosevelt. Clearly, I am for the latter option (as is Lindblom). It suggests, among other things, the relevance of a point made by Gunnar Myrdal some years ago.

Bureaucracy proliferates in the welfare state, Myrdal argued, because everything has to exist twice. There is the uncontrolled, profit-maximizing private sector with its bureaucracies; there is the supposedly controlling but often controlled, welfare state with its bureaucracies. But what if the social principles were located within, rather than imposed upon, the economy? What if there were a growing public energy sector developing new technology rather than a government subsidizing and monitoring the corporations as they try to resolve a crisis they did so much to create? What if it becomes the custom for auto workers and environmentalists and consumer advocates to sit on the board of directors of the Chrysler Corporation? I do not want to suggest for a minute that there is some simple way to cut the Gordian bureaucratic knot of the welfare state. The idea that public property miraculously cures all economic ills is in tatters. And yet, moving in that direction is, for the reasons suggested by Lindblom among many, basic to the solution.

To return to the point with which this section began: there are unintended consequences of the welfare state that impinge on class structure and consciousness, making the work of building progressive coalitions both more imperative and more difficult than ever before. This complexity is itself part of the crisis of this system since it makes any resolution of its problems, from the right or the left, that much harder to achieve. There is, however, a way out that is easier to define than organize but no less necessary for that fact: *to go beyond the welfare state*. This requires the emergence of a new social consciousness and raises some vexing, and

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speculative, questions about values and the political consequences of the death of God.

IV

There is bewilderment among the economic policy-makers because stagflation subverts the conventional wisdom of the last, Keynesian half-century. There is confusion among the politicians, because the traditional party loyalties are decomposing and no new realignment is taking their place. There is, all the polls report, a cynicism among the people who lack confidence, not simply in politicians, businessmen, labor leaders—but in all of them at the same time. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that people might retreat within themselves. But what happens if—in their flight to the inner sanctuary of transcendental values—that hallowed refuge turns out to be empty? What if the death of God becomes particularly apparent in a time of the failure of Man?

Christopher Lasch raises one aspect of this problem in *The Culture of Narcissism*. He writes of the "psychological man of our time"—

> . . . the new narcissist. . . .superficially relaxed and tolerant. . . .finds little use for dogmas or racial and ethnic purity but at the same time forfeits the security of group loyalties and regards everyone as a rival for the favors conferred by a paternalistic state. . . .Having overthrown feudalism and slavery and then outgrown its own personal and familial forms, capitalism has evolved a new political ideology, welfare liberalism, which absolves individuals of more responsibility and treats them as victims of social circumstances. It has evolved new modes of social control which deal with the deviant as a patient and substitute medical rehabilitation for punishment.

This line of thought, as Dennis Wrong showed in these pages (in Summer 1979), can be taken up by reactionaries and even fascists dedicated to the traditional values of *Kinder, Küche, Kirche*. But if these themes are used carefully, I think they are quite important. The welfare state is the first agnostic society in Western history. So religion—"the logic of the world in popular form"—is less and less of a force in the society.[2] Millions are thus liberated from the old values. Those values, however, are not replaced, as the classic Marxists hoped, by a new, this-worldly solidarity without need of absolutes. Rather, they decay in a time of manipulated and collectivized individualism in which consumption is defined as civic virtue. The result is a crisis of atheistic humanism as well as of religion—a devastation, as Nietzsche put it, of all values.

Clearly, the welfare state cannot be praised—or blamed—for a religious crisis that began at least as far back as the scientific revolution of the 17th century. But the fact that this crisis became particularly acute precisely during the time of the welfare state is relevant to its troubles. That is why I want to speculate, very briefly, on just a few of the political, social, and economic consequences of the death of God. The narcissistic personality that Lasch evokes is indeed a social product. It is also a postreligious product.

A number of significant thinkers long ago suggested that the decline of Christianity in Western society would require the creation of a new, secular faith. Rousseau's discussion of civil religion is well-known; so is Robespierre's Cult of Reason. Saint-Simon, that extraordinarily rich thinker—the last gentleman and first socialist of France, the guiding spirit of that country's most advanced workers and bankers, the inspiration of Stalinists, technocrats, and anarchists—is perhaps a less familiar case. His new church was going to have a Council of Newton under the presidency of the mathematician who received the highest vote.

There were also those in the Marxist movement who recognized this problem. Both Antonio Labriola and Max Adler, two of the most intellectually sophisticated thinkers of the first generation after Marx's death, doubted the master's teaching about the disappearance of religion. On a less profound level, Lunacharsky and Gorki became "God builders" in the years of reaction after the failure of the 1905 revolution and advocated a new and atheist religion. More recently, the cults of Hitler and Stalin

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were explained as the herd response of rootless masses to the loneliness of their alienation and anomie.

In short, the underlying idea suggested here, that the crisis of religion is also a crisis of society, is hardly novel. And even extending that insight to the welfare state is not new as Lasch's example, and others, show. Still, I want to at least circle around this theme, not to exhaust it or even outline it, but rather to evoke it as a significant element in the present situation. In the process, I will once again borrow from Fred Hirsch.

Capitalism was able to function in part because precapitalist religion survived within it. This was the case even though this social economic formation was the first truly secular order in the Western world. Feudalism, and indeed every form of domination in our history, had been sanctified by God—and supported by the crowd. Capitalism, on the contrary, claimed rational assent, its holy grail was a contract of mutual benefit, its priests were lawyers. Providence was now the invisible hand of the market. But Adam Smith, who theorized many of these concepts more profoundly than anyone else, recognized that people do not live by production alone. In the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, he had insisted that a certain altruism, a pleasure in other people's happiness, was necessary to society (there is a "young Smith, old Smith" debate, much like the young Marx, old Marx dispute, which bears upon this text, but it need only be noted here).

So if capitalism claimed to be ruthlessly individualistic, it had the good grace to contradict itself. People were often honest because they believed in honesty and not just because it was the best "policy." Ironically, however, as life became more social, more interdependent, not least of all in the welfare state, it became more atomized. In Robert Merton's famous example, the welfare bureaucracy replaced the political club. That was an advance, but it had its price: life was becoming less personal even if it was also just a bit more fair. More broadly, mass society dissolved communities, which had been the social substratum of the religious survivals. Once people had observed a moral code because they believed in it, or because their neighbors would see them violate it, or for both reasons. Now there were fewer and fewer neighbors. New York City, to cite a trivial but not insignificant case, had to pass a law requiring people to clean up after their dogs.

Then in the '60s hedonism for the people became a public dogma. In the rather simplistic, tax-cut Keynesianism of that decade, economic growth was to be stimulated by individual, not social, consumption. The latter policy, which was advocated at the time by the labor movement, the minorities, and economists like Galbraith and Keyserling, seemed to be much too radical to Kennedy and Johnson. Both felt that political wisdom required much more private affluence than public investment. Thus, the new collectivist management was permeated by the old individualistic values.

So economic growth was to be achieved by a civic hedonism. Children, in David Riesman's marvelous phrase, became "consumer trainees." It was precisely in the '60s that the culmination of this trend, and the religious and cultural and moral shifts, became most striking. Pornography appeared in candy stores, marijuana became ubiquitous, the academic doctrine of *in loco parentis* was destroyed in a few brief years, and so on. I do not want to suggest for a moment that the passing of many taboos and superstitions was bad. What concerns me here is that they disappeared within a culture and society with very little that was substantial to offer in their place. Many years ago, in a book that disbarred him from teaching at City College in New York, Bertrand Russell, a theorist and practioner of the new morality, said he feared that the liberation he urged just might trivialize sexuality. It is the trivialization of the liberation, not the liberation, that is the focus here.

The "Playboy philosophy" might serve as a paradigm. It was elaborated in a series of articles in *Playboy* magazine. On the one hand it championed an absolutist civil libertarianism that was compelling, fighting against the censors and the archaic laws with

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regard to private sexuality. On the other hand, it put that freedom to work in the service of a glossy, thing-ridden, sexist, and bourgeois hedonism. Left-wing values were summoned to defend a particularly shallow and superficial version of the status quo.

Then came the '70s. From 1969 to the present moment, as we have seen, the economy was completely unable to deliver on the promises of the '60s. Politicians, some of whom had been cheerleaders for the collectivist hedonism of the '60s, began to talk of austerity. In California, a young governor who dated a rock star but wouldn't live in a mansion inaugurated his second term by coming out for both gay rights and a balanced budget. Social radicalism and economic conservatism, somewhat on the *Playboy* model, went hand-in-hand.

People had been told by the new Coués that every day things were getting better in every way. Suddenly it was obvious that they were not. The old morality had become attenuated, the Playboy philosophy had become a national consensus—and now this philosphy would no longer work because of stagflation. This psychological, social, and even religious reality is, I think, one of the reasons for the militant unhappiness of the society. So many of the traditional sources of individual and community resilience have been sapped; the substitutes were shallow at best; and for a decade these have not even functioned.

This does not mean, however, that a new spirituality can be willed into existence. Something like that seems to be implied in President Carter's analysis of the "crisis of confidence." If, the President argues, we would only say something good about America every day, then confidence would be restored and the crisis would come to an end. But this is failing to understand that the spiritual crisis is part of a profoundly material process, reacting reciprocally with it. In a complex fashion, the economic and social changes brought about by the welfare state have reinforced the long-run crisis of religious faith, and the absence of religious faith has made the crisis of the welfare state all the more difficult. If God is no longer in His/Her heaven and the government is no longer in control of the economy; if both the this-world and the other-world have become problematic and for related reasons; what is there for people to believe in?

The United States, then, is not simply going through a crisis that is systemic, i.e., derives in considerable measure from its capitalist structures. It is also experiencing the crisis of a civilization or rather the most recent manifestation of that crisis. There is no hope of even beginning to confront that second challenge if the first is not met. Socialism, one should always remember, is not a secular salvation, a new religion on Saint-Simonian, or any other, lines. It is a political, economic, and social movement with specific proposals to make that can resolve the problems of the mature capitalist economy. Its success depends, not simply on developing the "correct" anticorporate program to transform the structures that are at the core of stagflation, but also on the ability to mobilize a democratic movement of men and women motivated by a practical solidarity. If that can be done—and it is a gigantic task we set ourselves—then souls will not be saved, but there will be an environment in which perhaps men and women will be able to find their best selves, and culture can recover its depths. □

NOTES

[1] One measures in terms of a hypothetical "full-employment GNP" (or, as it is now put in this chastened era of chronic joblessness, a "high-employment GNP") in order to determine the trends produced by policy decisions as distinguished from those imposed upon Washington by the economy. For instance, the enormous deficit in 1975 was the creature of stagflation more than of Gerry Ford's leadership. To compare federal priorities in different years (and therefore different economic environments), one reckons the direction and impact of Washington's actions within an assumed full-employment economy. That discounts the differing circumstances, and focuses upon the trends that result from government action.

[2] The revival of fundamentalist religion is a confirmation of this point. The only form in which faith can now survive among masses of people is as a will to believe in belief. The complexities of the modern world, including those found in Biblical scholarship, have to be ignored. One can retire to such a godly vendée for a while—but eventually the Revolution triumphs. □

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Rose Laub Coser

Women and Work

In the past 25 years the number of working women in America has nearly doubled. Today 55 percent of women aged 18-64 are part of the labor force. Still, despite the efforts of the women's movement—and much general lip service—women do not get the same wages as men for the same work, nor are significant numbers of women to be found in positions of power and prestige compared to the number of men. As long as women get paid less than men for the same work and are denied positions of power and prestige, they find themselves in the situation of an underprivileged class. And to the extent that women are steered into "female occupations" and "female shops," they have hardly any opportunity to interact with men in the workplace—a condition that is similar to caste segregation.

On the average, women employed full-time are paid less than 59 cents for every dollar earned by men in comparable jobs—a decline from 20 years ago when that ratio stood at 64 cents. Women's occupational segregation also has gotten worse. In 1976, 60 percent of most working women—up from 52 percent in 1962—were segregated into just four occupations: clerks, saleswomen, waitresses, and hairdressers (according to "Women in the Economy: Preferential Mistreatment," Report to the 1977 Working Women's Conference; prepared by Women Employed, 37 South Wabash, Chicago).

Janet Giele, in *Women and the Future* (Free Press, 1978), reports the research of Teresa Levitin and her colleagues, which compares the salaries of women and men who had the same attitudes toward achievement and the same tenure on the job, worked the same number of hours, and had the same degree of supervisory responsibilities. These researchers found that the salaries of women averaged about $3,500 a year less than those of men. Giele further reports that male/female pay differentials stem only partly from women's family obligations. She cites the work of economist Isabel Sawhill, who calculated that even if all women were single they still would only receive about 57 percent of the earnings of men. As Giele put it, "there remains a 43 percent differential between men and women who are similar with respect to age, education, race, region, hours and weeks worked, and time spent in the labor force."

This picture is much the same in all industrial societies, whether capitalist or not. One example: at the December 1978 Conference on the Changing Family, in Warsaw, the Polish sociologist Malanowski showed that in Poland 36 percent of the women, but only 9.2 percent of the men, earn as little as 2,000 zlotys a month. In contrast, 56 percent of the men, but only 15 percent of the women, earn more than 3,000 zlotys. In general, he reported, in Poland women make about 70 percent of what men earn. Women in engineering receive 75 percent, women in economics 74 percent, and women in architecture 81 percent of the salaries of men in their professions—even though education is fairly similar and, among young people, women tend to be better educated than men.

Still more insidious than these manifest inequities are the latent inequities resulting from "the dual labor market"—that is, the segregated occupational structure. In 1969,

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one-half of all female workers in America could be found in 21 occupations and one-half of all male workers in 65 occupations. Thus women have a smaller range of choice and therefore of mobility.

Female-intensive occupations earn lower salaries than male-intensive occupations, regardless of level of education. Retail sales clerks (a female-intensive occupation), with an average education of almost 13 years, earn $6,470, which is 67 percent of the $9,640 earned yearly by truck drivers, with 9 years of education. Mechanics, with 10.5 years of education, make $9,070, and delivery men, with less than 12 years of education, make $9,060, in contrast to women bookkeepers with almost 14 years of education, who average earnings from $6,070 to $6,540. Nurses' earnings are 59 percent ($8,090) of those of wholesale representatives ($13,690) and 48 percent of the earnings of managers and administrators in the nonfinancial fields ($16,770).

Under these conditions, equal pay for equal work would mean that *all* truck drivers would get equal pay and *all* nurses equal pay. This, it seems to me, is not a remedy. On the contrary, such measures would lead to complete segregation—as Janet Giele has put it—between "the preserve of the discriminators and the ghetto of the powerless." Men and women would live in different occupational cultures and not communicate with each other. Such lack of communication would be exacerbated in many working-class families where a mode of segregation between wives' and husbands' activities already exists.

In industry, the dual labor market fosters in turn a difference in on-the-job training. Women are not given the same amount of training as men. This may be due to the employers' experience that length of service on the job is twice as great for males as for females (4.8 years on the average compared to 2.4 years).

But what is cause here, and what effect? And do the employers take into consideration that people trained at a lower level don't have as much investment in the job? With few rewards to lose, it is easy to quit. By predicting that women will have a high turnover, employers help create conditions in which changing jobs is likely behavior. This, in sociological parlance, is "a self-fulfilling prophecy."

Not only are jobs replaceable on the lower-skill levels. It follows, of course, and is important to employers, that employees on those lower levels are easy to replace, too. Employers like to keep women in easily replaceable positions, because it is anticipated that family commitments will cause disruptions. Since there is a general consensus that women should be committed to the family first and a job only second, employers protect their organization from disruption by assigning women to routine positions and investing little in their training. This, parenthetically, is how the occupational system and the family system remain normatively integrated.

A Cultural Mandate

A WOMAN HAS the cultural mandate—or so it has been understood—to be committed to her family. This is seen as a source of disruption on the job because it is anticipated that her occasional absence will disturb her associates, if not also lower the rate of productivity. As I have suggested elsewhere with Gerald Rokoff (in *Social Problems*, Spring 1971), the conflict of priorities regarding families and work is structural not only because it stems from contradictory demands; it is structural also because women anticipate that under certain conditions this conflict is likely to create some disruption in at least one realm of their activities. For the conflict is between two "activity systems" that make conflicting demands on their allegiance.

If the type of employment held by women is related to their family commitments, it seems curious that women are fairly well represented among manual laborers and in such professions as nursing and elementary-school teaching—occupations where the workday is long and hours are rigidly controlled—while they are not well represented in the prestige professions where they could more readily arrange their time. Would it not follow from

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what I have said so far that women would be less likely to cause disruption in types of work not so rigidly dependent on their regular daily presence? The woman who is a physician, for instance, can decide to practice for only part of the day, or to have office hours at night—and some indeed do. The woman teaching in the academy can do much of her work evenings and weekends, her presence at school not being required except for meetings and scheduled classes. Yet, women are more likely to be found in occupations that demand rigorous workdays and allow little flexibility for schedule manipulation.

This observation may seem to contradict my earlier statement that sex distribution in the work world is rationalized as a means to minimize the disruptions that result from women's competing family commitments. Should it not stand to reason that occupations allowing for flexible schedules will absorb the shocks of disruption more easily than those that depend on rigid time-keeping? And would women not indeed be attracted to occupations in which they can arrange their schedule? But the point is that women predominate where workers are *replaceable* on the job.

What matters here is not so much the technical fact of task requirements as the social fact of normative requirements. High-status positions are said to require the kind of commitment that leads to a sustained exercise of individual judgment. In such positions people are supposed to be in charge of defining their work so that hardly anyone else can do it for them (a classical vision of unalienated labor). It's not that our society doesn't expect women to work—of course, it does. It's rather that women are not expected to make commitments to the kind of work that demands individual initiative and control. If they did, they would be subverting the cultural mandate, that is, it would be said that they are disrupting the family system or disrupting the organization of work. Or both.

Both the replaceability on jobs where women are readily admitted and the kinds of commitment to work in jobs where women feel unwelcome are socially defined rather than inherent in the nature of the work. This can be shown by two examples: (1) the social definition of replaceability in elementary-school teaching, which is mainly done by women; (2) the social definition of individual control over patients in a hospital by the predominantly male staff of physicians.

In elementary schools, there is an institutionalized mechanism for allowing absenteeism. The prediction of a high rate of absenteeism among teachers—who are predominantly women—has led to the now institutionalized practice of substitute teaching. Everyone knows, however, that substitute teaching is a poor substitute for teaching. Notoriously, students are hostile to substitutes, and their hostility is patterned—that is, it is expected to be tolerated by adults and acted out by peers; nobody expects that pupils will learn much while "their" teacher is off the job. Surely, if we examine the nature of teaching, we recognize that the grade-school teacher is as much in intellectual control of the class as a college teacher and should therefore be as irreplaceable. Yet, what seems to be important in elementary schools is to prevent not intellectual but physical disruption, the sort that would occur if pupils were left unattended or if the already overloaded classrooms were required to "double up." Substitute teaching does not serve to replace the performance of the classroom teacher or to assure intellectual continuity as much as it serves to avoid mere physical disruption.

By contrast, consider the highest-status professions, which allegedly value personal service to the client. The physicians' commitment must be to their work, first and at all times, day or night—or so the ethos has it. Although residents and interns working on the same hospital service usually know one another's patients, and although there is hardly anything in the nature of their work on the wards that would prevent one another's replacement, there is no formal arrangement for substitution. The house staff is supposed to learn the importance of commitment, and this legitimizes the disproportionate demands made on the trainees' time and energy. If it be objected that interns and residents often

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"cover" for one another, this is precisely my point. Here replacement is not part of a system of rules and regulations; "covering" is an informal agreement between colleagues. As Everett Hughes pointed out, colleagues are associated, as it were, in a *brotherhood*—like members of the same family (and it is no accident that the reference is to male siblings).

Thus allegiances are sex-typed: a man owes to his profession what a woman owes to her family. An occupation requiring commitment demands the kind of absorption of the mind that the family claims for mothers and wives. As Marya Mannes rightly says, "No woman with any heart can compose a paragraph when her child is in trouble or her husband ill: forever they take precedence over the companions of her mind."

As Rokoff and I argue, the commitment expected of the professional implies devotion to a calling that brings to mind a nostalgic picture of the traditional country physician who forgoes sleep to ride through the night in order to save lives; the traditional priest who forgoes the comfort of a family to save souls; the scientist who forgoes monetary gains for love of his work. This is the kind of commitment women are expected to make to their family.

A corollary of the principle of replaceability is that a profession or occupation in which women predominate will be defined as requiring less commitment, whether or not performance could profit from such commitment. Although grade-school teaching or nursing could be defined as needing much personal involvement, the premise of the cultural mandate depresses the commitment value of these occupations. Consequently, *professions that are sex-typed as feminine are accorded less prestige.*

The Vicious Circle

THERE ARE TWO related consequences:

(1) the more women there are in a field the less prestige it has. Therefore, adding a sizable number of women to a field will depress its prestige value;

(2) the more women in a field, the more they are discriminated against.

To illustrate point (1): let us take the salaries of deans in universities and colleges as indicative of the field's prestige value. In nursing, where women constitute 95 percent of the graduates, the average dean's salary in 1971-72 was $22,417. This salary goes up to $24,333 for the dean of home economics, where the number of female graduates is 79 percent. When we move from the "feminine" fields to fine arts, where the percentage of women doctorates is just over 50 percent, the dean's average salary goes up to $26,429. Moving from there to social welfare, where the percentage of women doctorates is about 30 percent, the dean's salary goes up to $27,875. The fields in which deans' salaries are $29,000 and over—engineering, veterinary medicine, dentistry, and medicine—have a percentage of women doctorates between 1.6 and 9.4 percent (according to the Scientific Manpower Commission, 1973, and the *Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 23,1978).

Now to point (2): the more women in a field, the more they are discriminated against. This is simply restating the familiar fact that women in language departments in colleges and universities suffer more discrimination than women in departments of mathematics or physics (once they have overcome the hurdles of getting there). In the country at large, if divided into 8 geographic regions, women's faculty salaries are on the average above 90 percent of those of men in 3 out of the 4 regions where there are relatively fewer women (i.e., where they constitute less than 18 percent of the faculty). In contrast, women's salaries are on the average below 90 percent of those of men in 3 out of those 4 regions where the proportion of women is higher (18 percent or more).

The picture does not look much different in other industrial societies. Take the Soviet Union. In all economic sectors in which women's presence is above average, their monthly earnings are below average; in contrast, women's monthly earnings are

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above average in four of the six sectors in which women's participation is below average (see Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, *Women in Soviet Society*, Berkely: University of California Press, 1978).

A fear of loss of prestige is, of course, not the only reason for occupational discrimination against women. Unions know that admitting a new, large group of workers to membership may cause wages to drop. Professionals know that if more women enter their field, rewards will tend to decline, be they in cash or in kind. That is, the more occupations are sex-segregated, the more stigma is likely to be attached to those sex-typed as feminine. This, in turn, will cause more resistance on the part of men to what they perceive as a threat to their domination of a field. Men react with status anxiety, and this both feeds, and feeds on, discrimination. The trend feeds upon itself by devaluing the work women do. This in turn leads either to further resistance to admitting women for fear of further devaluation, or to complete abandonment of the field by men. If left alone, the trend is toward more and more segregation—toward more and more inequality approaching that of a caste system. This type of inequality can be made to seem legitimate because of women's cultural mandate, and can by perpetuated even if equal pay were to become a reality.

Changes in the Division of Labor

DIVISION OF LABOR by sex in the past could be made to seem functional as long as there were clear gender differences in specialization. Women would be channeled into "light," men into "heavy" work. Or women would be channeled into professions or subprofessions in which their work could be seen as an extension of their family roles, such as teaching young children, pediatrics, or nursing. Women would be in positions in which, in addition to technical skills, they would have to exercise much "tension management"—a task that some sociologists assign to the mother-wife. But changes in aspects of the productive process as well as changes in the household economy have made it easier to overcome the social definitions of such sex differences. The place of work depends less and less on specificity of skills. As the office has grown faster than the factory, proportionately more people are working with people than with things. This demands nonspecialized social skills. We all know that a good department chairperson (like any administrator) is one who makes compromises, gives in to the needs of others, and lowers expectations for the sake of harmony and cooperation, in other words, is a "tension manager."

A division of labor based on social skills tends to blur the division of labor based on gender. Now that daily tasks at home can be accomplished with the help of goods produced outside the home, specialization of function within the family tends to be obsolete as well. In a society where labor has become so mechanized that women can operate overhead cranes, the household economy has become so simplified that men can open frozen-food packages.

Consequently, division of labor on the job by sex no longer serves any instrumental function. It can only serve the function of keeping women in "their place," of preventing them from sharing positions of authority and decision-making. Those who care for equality would do well to focus on this issue. The fight against job and professional segregation must be conducted at the same time as the fight for equal pay. □

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Elaine Hoffman Baruch

The Politics of Courtship

Since at least antiquity, animals have been used to illustrate the "natural" reasons for human behavior in both the economic and sexual spheres. Our own follies and foibles are thereby projected onto the animal world, where they lead a colorful if imaginary existence. The mythological view of the world may be dead in certain branches of theology today, but it is alive and well in ethology as any cursory glance through the male-dominated literature on animal courtship will amply demonstrate. At least in the popular treatments, whenever courtship is described, politics isn't far behind. For this reason, female animals as well as female humans are the objects of sexually tendentious observations.

A recent issue of *Science* magazine describes "femme fatale" fireflies who "lure" male members of different species to a culinary death by imitating the signals of the female members of those species. One can almost hear the Biblical injunctions of the scientific elders: "Beware the foreign woman."

Scientific American reports that French investigators (one might have guessed) refer to the postcopulatory songs of the male cricket as "triumphal songs." A rather different view of supposed postcoital merrymaking appears in *Science* magazine's account of the "ultrasonic postejaculatory songs" of the male rat, perhaps because one of the investigators was a woman. It turns out that vocalizations are less those of "triumph" than fatigue-"desist-contact" signals, in the case of the rat, anyway.

The term *courtship* with its echoes of courts and ladies leaves much to be desired in the way of scientific objectivity, but this does not prevent animal behaviorists from spinning out many a fanciful tale of animal wooing and wedding. Konrad Lorenz, the last of the eminent Victorians, sings the praises of the greylag gander who woos the "virginal" and "modest" female and exhibits lifelong fidelity to her in the "most beautiful bond of all, matrimony."

Surely the most poignant tale of romantic love in recent literature is Emily Hahn's recounting of the case history of the greylag who lived and died—for a garbage can. As a result of being brought up in isolation, this gander would only mate with corrugated metal. When his beloved can was itself hauled away in a garbage truck, the gander was so distraught, he chased it until he was killed in traffic, a martyr for love.

Readers less romantically inclined can find support for a promiscuous male "nature" in the behavioral accounts of primates with "harems," a rather exotic term for female groups with a single male attached.

Also fascinating in the spectrum of courtship behavior is the male cichlid fish. In a sermonlike tone that seems to exhort similar behavior on the part of humans, sociobiologists and ethologists of the male-bonding school report that this extraordinary creature is totally unable to perform sexually unless the female is prostrate with awe. A rather different view is held by female behaviorists with whom I have spoken, which

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demonstrates that what is pronounced "nature" all too often depends on who does the viewing.

This does not mean, of course, that methods of sexual arousal do not exist among animals, only that our view of them is rather biased.

The Encyclopaedia Britannica's section on "Animal Courtship" amused James Thurber some years ago. It is still amusing. There is the male bowerbird, for example, who builds a remarkable architectural structure, not for housekeeping but strictly for courtship purposes. (Afterward, he and his mate move into a far smaller unit built by the female.) There is the Hepialus butterfly who attracts by means of perfumes—or perhaps I should say colognes, since it is the male who emits them. My favorite is the tree cricket Oecanthus, who signals by means of a sweet liquor produced by his own body—an attractive prospect to anyone who has worked up a huge bar bill for the same purpose.

When it comes to courtship, we lack many of the built-in advantages of animals, having to supply them at the liquor, drug, and clothing stores—a necessity that once led Lord Chesterfield to grumble that the expense of sex was damnable. We have an even greater problem. Somewhere in our evolutionary journey, we left *estrus*, that state of temporary sexual excitement that prevails in animal life, and migrated to a state of perennial sexual interest. Being a Don Juan is now year-round work.

As far removed as animals may be from us, they provide us with analogies, those statements that Freud said prove nothing but make us feel more at home in the world. Whom he means by "us," however, is the crucial question. Perhaps understandably, considering that his essay "Courtship Through the Ages" first appeared in 1939, Thurber assumed that the female of the species—from crabs up to humans—had to be cajoled or cudgeled into sex. But the most recent edition of the *Britannica* seems to proceed on the same assumption. True, female monkeys are said to "present" themselves, but somehow this is viewed as mere "receptivity," in contrast to male peacocks actively ruffling their feathers, for example, or male nightingales vocalizing, an example perhaps of the male bias against female sexual initiation more than any bias in nature itself.

Among animals, courtship—that is, behavior for the purpose of sexual arousal—is either a preliminary to reproduction or a reinforcement of sexual bonding. Among humans it is often neither. Not only does human courtship sometimes have nothing to do with marriage and reproduction, it may even be used to delay the sex act indefinitely. Much of the love literature of the West (and the social conventions related to it) has to do with one or the other of these possibilities. Conversely, sexual consummation of the most striking sort often has nothing to do with courtship. In the affair of Helen and Paris, for example, there is no wooing. Contrary to popular opinion, there is no love either, but that is another story. The Greeks did have courtship, but in homosexual relationships only—their marriages were arranged—which would seem to give the lie to those feminists who find courtship a mode of dominance of one sex over the other. It can be that but, obviously, it doesn't have to be.

In ancient Rome, the god of love was often depicted as no more than a chubby boy with gilt-tipped arrows. It is under such diminished circumstances for erotic possibilities that manuals for courtship and sexual behavior arise. For Ovid, courtship is strictly an extramarital affair, designed to enhance sexual pleasure. Despite the use of the term *love* in his titles—a term that included the concept lust in many languages until the 19th century when the two were divorced—Ovid seems interested in commitments that often last for only an afternoon or evening at a stretch. In that sense he is very modern. But while we seem quite willing to dispense with it, Ovid recognizes courtship as the civilizing force that, by refining and polishing us, spurs us on out of barbarism.

In the Middle Ages, courtship became indissolubly bound up with love, but a love

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that was extramarital. At the court of Marie de Champagne, Andreas Capellanus (Andrew the Chaplain) wrote a book that is still highly influential, even in our anticourtship age: *The Art of Courtly Love*. Mainly a series of dialogues between lovers who are not married, at least not to each other, the work says little about consummation and nothing about reproduction—a fine example of the ability of writers in all ages to discount biological contingencies when talking about human affairs, especially with jealous husbands around.

In the Middle Ages, marriage was contracted much as any other financial arrangement and was often terminated—by the male—when more attractive prospects came into view; but courtship was a lifetime commitment—requiring a monastic discipline. No wonder women encouraged it, as a safety valve within an intensely patriarchal system. Since the women depicted in the love lyric, at least, were generally of higher social rank than the poets, there may well be some truth in the "bread-and-butter" theory that sees in this mode of courtship a means of entré into higher circles for the male.

While the rules of animal courtship always apply to the entire species, human courtship has often been limited to those of the upper classes or those aspiring to them (although, in the modern period, it has sometimes been used to delay marriage among the poor). Andreas finds it contrary to the nature of the masses to be stirred by Cupid's arrows—they have other things to do, such as plough the fields. He therefore refuses to instruct them in the art of courtship, something, it seems, that doesn't come naturally to humans. One might expect such a view in the fiercely hierarchical Middle Ages. Yet despite our professed egalitarianism, a look at the department store ads of any issue of the *New York Times* yields a similar view today. Only the rich, it seems, deserve the fair and only the rich can afford to be fair.

It is generally those who wish to preserve the status quo who point to nature for support, and this tends to make mother nature the arch conservative of the universe—a myth that even the briefest look at our evolutionary history should dispel and yet, it prevails. There are some exceptions, mainly in literature, that hotbed of subversive activity, but even they tend to represent the point of view of the dominant group, and an exploitative one at that.

The idea of nature as a gigantic bedroom, for example, has been a staple of seduction poems since antiquity. Flees, bees, and insects of all sorts generally represent symbols of libertine promiscuity, flitting as they do from one body to another with impunity, particularly in less hygienic ages than our own. Even in highly restrictive periods, the human female is urged to practice a similar freedom. Unless they are pointing out the diabolical nature of female sexuality, however, poets do not speak of what happens to the males of some of these insect species after mating. The "nuptial flight" of the drone, for example, is followed by something other than an ecstatic honeymoon. He always dies, his stomach destroyed in the act of ejecting his sperm. Somehow, behaviorists never see this as any norm to follow, although the example seems just as "natural" as that of the chichlid fish.

Human reproduction has sometimes seemed equally brutal, with regard to the female of the species, at least, which may be one reason why human courtship has sometimes been used paradoxically as a means of delaying the sexual act. The fear of biological consequences was very prominent among the 17th-century Précieuses, those ladies of the court of Louis XIV. It was one reason for their enhancement of courtship. There were others. Molière satirizes them for refusing to call a spade a spade. But nobody who wants romance calls a spade a spade.

In that great but neglected Précieuse work *La Princesse de Clèves* by Madame de Lafayette, the widowed princess refuses to marry the man whom she loves and who loves her, ostensibly out of duty but actually out of fear and anxiety:

> Monsieur de Clèves was perhaps the only man in the world capable of continuing to love after marriage . . . . perhaps his passion had not

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> lasted but that he found none in me; but I should not have the same way of preserving yours; I even think your constancy is owing to the obstacles you have met with.

This sounds remarkably like Freud centuries later: "some obstacle is necessary to swell the tide of the libido to its height." But what Mme. de Lafayette also recognizes and Freud doesn't point out is that the purpose of courtship is often different for the two sexes. Her princess seeks to prolong courtship not the heighten her desire but rather to mitigate the disparity in power between the sexes.

Much of so-called courtship behavior, it would seem, turns out to be less sexual than defensive, a means of warding off aggression. One finds such defensive behavior in the animal world also, although not necessarily in relation to the opposite sex. Male monkeys, for example, will "present" themselves to their male superiors, as a sign of submission.

But the techniques of courtship have also been a means of releasing aggression. The brothers Goncourt wrote of the famed 18th-century *Les Liasons Dangereuses* (*Dangerous Alliances*), "Seduction becomes an art equivalent in treachery, faithlessness, and cruelty to that of tyranny." This is as true for Laclos's heroine as for his hero. The Marquise de Merteuil is a "scientist of the emotions" who, herself without feeling, destroys men with a mathematical precision. Such sports, of course, were only open to women of the upper classes.

It was perhaps only "natural" that one outcome of courtship for manipulation and control should be force, and here it is certainly the men who come out on top. ". . . how much self-esteem, youth, manhood, and vigor must one have to be sure of producing in a woman that doubtful and unsatisfying impression of pleasure. That of pain, on the other hand, requires nothing at all," confides one of the Marquis de Sade's characters. Sade is one of the fathers of the heroine-as-victim figure that invades 19th-century literature like plant rot. But it's not just literature that mirrors him. There is much evidence today that the fear of being duped and of being unable to please often leads to male violence in fantasy and sometimes in fact. We are left with the uncomfortable possibility that if one function of courtship has been to contain violence, then one result of relinquishing it is the explosion of aggression.

I have not yet spoken of that form of courtship that most of us would consider most "natural": courtship for marriage. We should bear in mind that in many, perhaps most, periods and cultures, marriages are arranged and courtship does not precede marriage at all although it may follow it as part of sexual bonding. In the Western world, when love and marriage were united in the urbanized Renaissance, much of the courtship pattern of the adulterous Middle Ages was injected into premarital relationships. This is revealed in Castiglione's famous manual *The Courtier*, where, incidentally, there is an almost unisexual ideal of what makes the two sexes attractive, something that later centuries get away from. By the time we reach the 18th century, the right marriage was of importance to the woman in ways that it had not been previously, for, as Ian Watt has pointed out, it determined all of her emotional, economic, and geographic happiness in an age of economic individualism. Under such conditions, courtship for marriage became exceedingly important.

What has not been sufficiently recognized, at least on any theoretical level, although jokes about it are legion, is that courtship for marriage has been practiced as much by women as by men, and it has sometimes been a pretty grim business. "Courtship" under such circumstances often takes the form of a tantalizing arousal and denial at same time, forcing the male to propose, since marriage is his only route to sexual satisfaction. Such is the situation in Richardson's *Pamela*, that primary textbook for the professional virgin in fiction, films, and life. This tale of a servant girl who wins her master by keeping her petticoats down and his pulse up was preached about from the pulpit as illustrating the rewards of virtue. But what it reveals beneath its gloss of romantic wish fulfillment—perhaps the female equivalent of

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pornography—is a brutal quest for economic survival.

"Man, in supporting woman, has become her economic environment," wrote Charlotte Perkins Gilman, more than a century later.

> For in her position of economic dependence in the sex relationship, sex distinction is with her not only a means of attracting a mate, as with all creatures, but a means of getting her livelihood, as is the case with no other creature under heaven.

It was primarily this exacerbated economic dependence that encouraged the extreme sexual differentiation of the Victorian era, which ended with women looking more like upholstered armchairs, as George Bernard Shaw remarked, than women.

Although some modern Aesops in male chauvinist dress assert that sexual dimorphism (marked differences in appearance between the sexes) leads to pair bonding and that increased dimorphism leads to more pair bonding, there seems to be no correlation between the two in the animal world. Gibbons, for example, are not sexually differentiated in any significant way; yet they have pair bonding, whereas the dimorphic chimps, gorillas, and orangutans do not. What does seem to exist, however, is an environmental or economic basis for dimorphism in nature. Here one finds some interesting parallels between animals and humans. Just as the most gorgeously plumed birds are those who contribute little to subsistence, their looks alone providing their attractiveness for sexual selection, so too the human sexes are most differentiated when women contribute little to economic life. There is this difference, however. While dimorphism in birds is a fact of nature, differentiation in humans is enhanced through artificial means—purposeful inactivity, for example, and conspicuous consumption in dress.

It may seem extraordinary to us that the simulations of women should have looked enough like "nature" to fool the most brilliant naturalist of modern times, Darwin, who attributed to them inherent traits of chastity, modesty, and self-sacrifice. It is possible, of course, that we are the ones that are fooled, but we now feel that "scientific" findings are all too often dependent on economic models. In an age of industrial capitalism, Darwin saw women as the repository of religious values, as a museum of the primitive. Women always have to be good, it seems, as much on the ladder of evolution as in the garden of Eden; otherwise, they are doomed. The terrain of bodies "loved" and left, often with fruit blasted in the womb, stretches from one continent to another in 19th-century literature, partial proof perhaps that widespread liberation would only be possible with widespread contraception. One might say that the "correction" of nature provided by contraception enabled courtship practices as controlling devices to disappear since it eliminated the fear of sexual consequences. Both sexes have now arrived at the point where any form of denial is seen as an unnatural interference with sexual impulses.

Somewhere in all of our heads is the fantasy of the great sexual experience that transcends all considerations of time and place. From Tristan and Isolde's love potion to Isadora Wing's "zipless fuck," literature and fiction bear testimony to our wish for the primacy of biology to assert itself, our assumption being, rightly or wrongly, that sex is the rock bottom of our nature.

In our quest for the "natural," we forget that animals are not creatures of such urgency. The elimination of courtship may work against that very sexual salvation that each sex now seeks so earnestly for itself. In Norman Mailer's "The Time of Her Time," the sparring partners—one can hardly call them lovers—reveal that the pursuit of immediate sexual adventure brings them less often to the smell of the sea than that of the boxing ring. "I threw her a fuck the equivalent of a fifteen-round fight," boasts the hero.

In the past also, men and women no doubt were combatants, but it seems their matches usually took place outside the bedroom. What is extraordinary about the relations of men and women today is that the battle of the sexes is taking place *in* the sex act itself. Fears that

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used to be dispersed in the rituals of courtship are now displayed in the ringside of the bed.

If courtship practices reveal something about the environment, then the absence of courtship should tell us something about that environment also. In a charming modern bestiary, the French author Rostand writes, without objecting to it apparently, that with every naked couple in bed, there is always a third party present, that of society. Freud's bed was less crowded, containing only four in all, the two lovers and their parents of the opposite sex (today one must also include their two analysts, I suppose), but his was a similar point. It is precisely this social control that we seek to reject. The question is, what have we substituted for it?

Our innumerable sex manuals make a number of techniques available to interchangeable partners, much the way our fast food chains dispense the same fare to all comers. This leveling process is ironic when we consider that we have rejected courtship partly on the basis of a general distrust of societal conventions. There is nothing more conventional than McDonald's and its sexual equivalent.

It is just possible, however, that we have not eliminated courtship but rather changed its form. Perhaps we have substituted a spatial for a temporal signal, an environment for a ritual. The bar scene, for instance, might constitute such a new form. A sexual releaser for those who enter its doors, its activities bear some remarkable resemblances to the ritual of the ruff, Philomachus Pugnax, a European shore bird. In Edward Wilson's description, the males of this species "display frenetically on individual territories that are grouped tightly together in a communal area" and the "females wander singly or in groups from territory to territory, expressing their willingness to mate by crouching." There is no question that the animal courtship requirements of territorial confines, display, rivalry, and release are fulfilled in the bar scene, but whether this represents courtship in any human or humane sense I seriously doubt. It is disconcerting to note that the same kind of precopulatory indifference that has marked the traditional treatment of the prostitute is now exhibited to the women in the so-called singles scene.

If, as Marxists say, traditional courtship for marriage was oppressive to women by masking its basic motive—the exploitation of the reproductive labor of women—then lack of courtship or the "new" courtship seems hardly better. Yet, no doubt, here also there is accommodation to the environment. Our current sexual freedom with its denial of pair bonding is a highly effective way of discouraging reproduction. What the one-night stand of the bar scene reveals is less the fulfillment of biological need than obedience to cultural dictate.

The old pattern at least obscured some of the hostility between the sexes. But we can't go back even if we would, less perhaps because women no longer want to be sexual objects than because men no longer want to worship them. Besides, we have succeeded so well in eliminating prohibitions, if there were to be anything like courtship in the old sense, we would have to create obstacles first.

Yet, in some strange way, we may have already met the required conditions. For there is one object that we glorify, not for the moment, but, in the tradition of romantic courtship, for a lifetime—and that is the self. As for creating obstacles to heighten sexual pleasure, we have in some way done that too. The great prohibition from Biblical times on down has been self-love, onanism. Considering the plethora of vibrators that peer out of plate-glass windows and the paeons to masturbation that line the shelves of Brentano's, we are obviously much more tolerant of such love now than formerly; still, it is enough of an obstacle to present a challenge to courtship.

It should come as no surprise that what we have today is the courtship of one. We are willing to spend any number of years in any number of therapies to achieve the elusive object.

Trappings once used to attract the other are now used to court the self. This more than any new romanticism may be the underlying

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meaning of the current emphasis on fantasy dressing—even among so-called feminists. New social movements tend to be puritanical—and feminism was no exception, despite its apparent plea for sexual freedom. Once certain gains are made, however, restrictions tend to be relaxed. Liberation is now defined as the freedom to be feminine as well as feminist, which makes the economy doubly happy: fantasy clothes for night and dress-for-success uniforms by day stuff the wardrobes of the "liberated" woman—and the pockets of the successful ad man.

Of course, the economy thrives on the fears and needs of both sexes. The ad man is the pander between the self as lover and the self as object, bringing the two together in a relationship that we still view as forbidden, as witness all the guilt over our so-called narcissism. We hope that the right product will make us whole, just as we once had hoped—how far away that illusion now seems—that the right man or the right woman would make us whole.

Still, all is not lost. Though the courtship of one may be the only major form of courtship we have, nobody is particularly happy with it. Assuming that some kind of equality between the sexes is possible, a very different courtship from the traditional one would be necessary. For that reason alone, it might be worth changing its name; or, we might simply redefine it.

Such a courtship would not aim at manipulation or economic advantage. It would be more "natural." Though such courtship would be predicated on respect and attraction, it would probably not depend on exaltation of the object. With sufficient ego strength, one wouldn't have to turn the lover into a private minigod. Nor would this courtship need obstacles to thrive. It may be that hindrances to sexual gratification were necessary in the past because they alone could give members of an inferior sex, or class, or age group—as in the case of the Greek homosexual youths—some status.

With equality—we have hardly begun to explore some of the problems in this highly ambiguous term—the tenuous system of checks and balances that has prevailed for so long could perhaps be discarded. Not that every activity would necessarily have consummation as its goal, to be recorded on some sexual score board, but at least fear would not be a deterrent.

As more women enter the forest to study primates and the rat race in order to study humans, the customary bias against female courtship will give way to a more objective view of biological facts. We do not as yet know what they are. Right now, it is believed that the sexes are dimorphic in the matter of visual and tactile appeals, men supposedly more responsive to the former and women to the latter. But how can we be sure when all our training conspires to such results? In the new form of courtship, both sexes might well appeal to each other through different sensory means: visual, tactile, auditory, depending on predelection and circumstance. There would be mutual exchange of gifts, in support of each other instead of in support of a voracious narcissism or a voracious economy.

In the new courtship, women could perhaps be as overtly aggressive (again the term is unfortunate, but I trust the reader will correct the connotative seasonings) as men in sexual initiation, without incurring their traditional epithets of harlot or sorceress. I say *perhaps* because there may be something in the biology of men that would be violated by such behavior. Men's current resistance to female aggression may be something more than culturally acquired. At this moment, we cannot be sure. This is not to say, however, that we must grant primacy to biology, as some conservatives insist. If such were the case, then our anatomy would have doomed all of us—men and women—to extinction ages ago. As one of my friends put it, it may be that anatomy determines many destinies rather than a single destiny.

It is comforting to remember that even so great a suprematist as Darwin felt that females were active in the matter of sexual selection, opting for bigger, stronger males, for example, because they had reproductive advantage. No doubt human females have

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had some say in the matter of sexual selection and must bear at least part of the blame for the chauvinist type. Fabergé now has a cologne called Macho Macho Man, the implication being, of course, that a macho man is much man. If women do not want this equation, it will ultimately disappear. Even Rousseau recognized that male dominance depends on female acquiescence. A new courtship would perhaps allow for different personality types, determined not by sex but by temperament.

The term "courtship" as I have been using it in these last pages is obviously based on an egalitarian model. It is perhaps nothing more than a type of mutual caring. And it is related to love. □

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My Doezher

Having time on my hands, I sent away to the FBI for my dossier to which I am entitled under the Freedom of Information Act. I was sure I had a dossier (pronounced doezher by the FBI), because many years ago I had been a member of the dread Socialist Workers party. The FBI somehow conceived of the SWP as a great menace to the Republic, in spite of the fact that outside of the party membership and the FBI few people even knew of our existence, and the majority of those who did know thought we were a brand of paint.

I thought that my doezher would be a slim modest thing. After all, Leon Trotsky I wasn't. To my great surprise and flattery, the postman delivered a weighty tome of 293 pages—293 pages and all mine! The budget balancers in our midst would be shocked. Can you imagine how many man hours and how much expense a 293-page doezher represents?

Of course, most of the interesting stuff, where you get to find out who the stoolies were, was blanked out; except for a couple of spots where the blanking out was done imperfectly, and the names were partially revealed. But a lot could be learned of the workings of the FBI from the doezher. I felt like writing them a letter: "Look fellows, I won't get into ideology, because that would only confuse you. Let's stick to basics. All through my doezher you had my eye color as brown. Now you had access to all my records, military, birth, etc. My political opinions may have changed in 30 years, but the color of my eyes has not. They are grey now, and they were grey then." Among my "aliases" they had listed the name of an entirely different guy. He must have had a doezher too. All anybody would have had to do was cross-check doezhers to spot the error. It souldn't even have to be a Special Agent. Any clerk could have done it.

Of more import is the fact that during all the years of my serious and devoted activity—when I was a walking Little Lenin Library—during all those years I did not even have a card in the Security Index file. Only in 1957, many years after I was completely inactive politically and when I did not even much like the SWP, did I make the SI file. Which means that special agents were constantly going out to question informants about my whereabouts and activity. They could have found my address in the telephone directory, for God's sake. Instead, they sent a highly paid SA to question their informers. Only in 1962 did they finally get bored and take me off SI.

Then there was the time they got hold of my membership application to the SWP. They claimed they found it in the garbage can. Oh! We were dumb in those days, but not so dumb that we would throw membership applications into the garbage intact. They must have got the application by burglary. Anyhow, in sending the evidence to Washington an error was made. The enclosure was sent back but the evidence omitted. Did Washington send New York a steamy letter! New York defended the SA in charge of transmitting the evidence. It appears he was nervous because his wife was having a baby, and he was in a hurry to rush off to the hospital. Washington was not appeased. They sent back another steamy letter. Having a baby is no excuse! All Special Agents are to be instruccted in the importance of care in handling of evidence! A whole correspondence then ensued as to how to punish the Special Agent. Should the incident be reported in *his* doezher? Finally the less drastic step of noting the incident in his next salary review was decided upon. But what did all this have to do with me? Why was it taking up space in *my* doezher? I do confess, however, that I felt a little sorry for the Special Agent who fouled up. I hope he had a fine healthy baby who grew up to join the Anti-Vietnam War movement.

At one point they somehow got the idea I was teaching school in Boston. I have never taught school, and never worked in Boston. But the Boston office had to send out special agents on investigations before they could be convinced of this fact.

Before I saw my doezher I used to compare the dread FBI with the dread Gestapo or NKVD. Now I see that that was an injustice—to the Gestapo and NKVD. The FBI is much more akin to the secret service of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. It used to be said of the Austro-Hungarian Empire that it was a tyranny mitigated by *Schlamperei*. That is an untranslatable word, but bungling, inept, sloppy, and inefficient pretty well encompass it.

STEPHEN ROANE □

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Antal Deutsch

Quebec 1980

I

"Is Quebec still part of Canada?" asks the traffic policeman in Boston. The *New York Times* quotes an administrator of multicampus Antioch College as opposing a "Canadian solution" to his troubled institution. There seems to be an idea abroad that Canada is about to fall apart. I propose to argue that the possibility of disintegration is remote.

American awareness of current Quebec developments may be dated to November 1976, when the separatist Parti Québecois (it has no English name, hereafter the PQ) received 42 percent of the popular vote and 60 percent of the seats in the Quebec National Assembly. Curiously, the platform of the PQ, while not disguising its ultimate aims, excluded the specific promise of Quebec sovereignty, except for a commitment to hold a referendum (technically a plebiscite) on the independence issue at some unspecified time while in office. The major promise of the PQ in the 1976 campaign was good government.

The image of Quebec's Liberal government, in office 1970-76 under Robert Bourassa, eroded during its last two years. Taxes rose; scandals emerged; strikes plagued hospitals and schools, liquor monopoly and electric power system. Bourassa had promised increased employment but found the province caught in the North American recession. In an attempt to undercut their separatist foes, the Liberals sponsored legislation limiting the public use of English and the traditional access to English-language schools for the children of French-speaking and immigrant families.[1] The language measures alienated the newly constrained voters, without satisfying those with more extreme views on the language issue.

The federalist vote in 1976 was thus split between the Liberals, the Union Nationale (a faded conservative group that, for the occasion, adopted a stance in opposition to Bourassa's language policy), and even the separatist PQ, since the latter had removed the independence issue from contention. While the PQ's success was clearly a large gain for separatism, the 1976 election cannot be interpreted as a popular endorsement of Quebec independence.

The population of Quebec in 1976 was 6.2 million; 5 million persons reported French as their mother tongue, 0.8 million English, while the remaining 0.4 million recorded either as "unspecified" or as having spoken another language first. The evolution of this population from the handful of French settlers and Indians found by the victorious British after the Battle of the Plains of Abraham cannot be done justice here. Suffice it to say that under British rule French-speaking Quebecers were assured freedom of their religion and institutions. Mostly farmers, they looked to the Roman Catholic Church for education, hospitals, political inspiration, and spiritual salvation. With Canadian federation in 1867, French-Canadians played an increasing role in the political process, as well as in the conflicts

[1] Bourassa's legislation sought to limit admittance to English-language schools of both Protestant and Roman Catholic school systems to children who could speak English. This involved the highly unpopular practice of testing five-year-olds for language skills.

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within the larger country. Among the latter, the outstanding events were the loss of French language rights in the Province of Manitoba, and the development in Quebec of resistance to participation in the two World Wars.

French-speaking Quebecers were encouraged to limit their participation in the world of business.[2] Their prestige occupations were in the Church and in the professions. The French educational system remained religious and classical. Economic development was left, initially, to Scottish fur-traders and bankers, English-speaking railroad promoters, merchants, and manufacturers in Montreal. More recently, the subsidiaries of American corporations—attracted by tariff-protected Canadian markets, natural resources, and cheap labor—appeared in large numbers. Under these circumstances, English became the language of business. French-Canadians had to master it in order to advance in commerce. But English-speaking residents could get by comfortably in Montreal without learning French, unless they happened to be salesmen of consumer goods or first-line supervisors of labor.

English came to be seen as the language of "le boss," so that upwardly mobile French-Canadians sought to become bilingual and made sure that their children did not grow up as strangers to the English language and the customs that go with it. European immigrants usually learned English upon settling in Quebec (usually in Montreal) and sent their children to English schools.

By the late 1950s, Quebec had a stable, well-established English-speaking society, generally with middle-class characteristics. The small and conservative provincial government, while maintaining official bilingualism, was in fact almost exclusively French-speaking and nationalist in orientation. It was in the public sphere that dramatic changes became visible.

The long-governing Union Nationale lost the 1960 Quebec elections to the Liberals, who ran on a reformist and nationalist platform. In office, the Liberals substantially increased the size of the public sector by buying out the private owners of the electric power utilities in the province (thus converting middle-class English-language jobs to middle-class French-language jobs at public expense), displacing the Church in various social functions, and expanding the administrative and regulatory activities of Quebec. The prosperity of the early '60s and the frugality of their predecessors allowed the Liberal government easy access to revenues and borrowing. This phase is now known as the "quiet revolution."

The early and mid-'60s were also a period of rising expectations, rapid urbanization, a move by the Church away from authoritarian influence, and rapid strides in unionization as well as the secularization of the labor movement. Legal limitations on extra-provincial union affiliation did not protect the Quebec labor movement from "alien values." An indigenous leadership emerged, much more radical than the rank-and-file. The result was a surprising degree of militancy, particularly in the public-sector unions.[3]

The public sector kept growing. Church-run and private hospitals and universities as well as school boards found themselves relying on provincial financing to an extent sufficient to allow the Quebec government control over their key policies. The scope of public health and educational activities was substantially increased through the '60s and early '70s, largely through Ottawa-initiated offers of financial support. While elsewhere in Canada this process was merely one of public-sector expansion and income redistribution, in Quebec it meant a process of increasing job opportunities for, and the growing influence of, a new French-speaking middle class.

THE PQ ROSE in this environment from two traditions. Historical memories of resentment

[2] The Church has traditionally viewed the making of profit with suspicion. Those who dominated business in Quebec perceived French-speaking persons as ethnically different. The usual consequence is an additional barrier.

[3] The apparent intent of the Quebec government was to widen the scope for union activity on the basis of Church philosophy. Affiliates of the American AFL-CIO were to be kept out, at least in the public sector. The unforeseen consequence was the emergence of Marxist elements in the leadership.

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against British rule were reinforced by the ambitions of an aspiring French-speaking middle class to displace their English-speaking bosses. Quebec independence, as an idea, has been around for a long time. Before World War II there was talk of a corporatist Laurentian Republic with strong Roman Catholic characteristics. By the early 1960s the resurrectors of the idea dropped the name and the clerical association, and substituted a left-wing revolutionary model. The ideological content of their rhetoric was indistinguishable from that of the American New Left, except that the "people" were understood to be French-speaking, while the "exploiters" in Quebec were "aliens." Nor was it all manifestos in those days. Mail boxes and people were blown up. The violence climaxed a few months after the Kent State incident in 1970. A Quebec cabinet minister and a British diplomat were kidnapped in Montreal. The former was murdered, the latter held prisoner for several months. In the course of the crisis the government of Canada, in conjunction with the Quebec government, called in the Canadian Army and suspended civil liberties in Quebec. Judging by the polls the population of Quebec supported these policies of the Trudeau government overwhelmingly. The experience was traumatic to many Quebec intellectuals. "Armed struggle" failed. Pierre Vallières, the leading ideologue of violence, soon declared himself in favor of electoral politics, and took a job on the payroll of the federal government.

Meanwhile, a moderate branch of the independence movement evolved out of the Liberal party. René Lévesque, who served as a correspondent with the U.S. Army in World War II and subsequently became a popular French-language television commentator, was elected as a Liberal to the Quebec legislature in 1960. He was appointed minister in charge of mines and hydroelectric resources. Lévesque quickly became the leader of strongly nationalist, ethnocentric elements in his party. His major triumph in that period was the provincial takeover of the shareholder-owned electric utilities. Soon Lévesque began to take an ambiguous public stance on the future of Quebec within Canada. Following the victory of the Union Nationale in the 1966 elections, Lévesque and his friends were forced out of the opposition Liberal party. In another year or so, a larger group was formed with the various left, right, and center separatists constituting the PQ under the leadership of Lévesque. In 1970 the newly organized party obtained 23 percent of the popular vote on a straight independence ticket. By 1973 the PQ ran unsuccessfully on a platform of holding a referendum on the independence issue if elected. With 30 percent of the popular vote, they formed the official opposition until 1976.

Since its election in 1976, the PQ has changed things in Quebec. Perhaps its most important legislation was Law 101, formally referred to as the Charter of the French language. Law 101 officially abolished bilingualism within the provincial ambit, subject to certain minimal concessions to the minority. All signs on billboards and in stores, public and private, are to be in French only. Each business must obtain a Certificat de Francisation from the government by demonstrating that French is now its internal language of communication, and that French-speaking persons are being promoted to positions of responsibility. What these conditions mean in each particular case is determined by a government agency.[4]

Access to English-language elementary and high schools is limited to those new pupils

[4] The Office de la Langue Française (it has no official name in English) enforces the language legislation and sponsors related research. According to William Johnson's reports in the *Globe and Mail* (August 23 and 24, 1979), the Office is responsible for the publication of a study by Université de Montréal sociologists Paul Bernard and Jean Renaud. They found that in "management and administration," Francophones in Quebec gained 20,000 additional jobs between 1971 and 1978, while persons whose prime language is not French lost 8,000 posts in the same period. In "natural sciences, engineering, and mathematics," the number of Francophones increased by 26,000 while non-Francophone jobholders increased by less than 300. Bernard and Renaud are not pleased with their findings, and recommend "a model of appropriation or reappropriation of jobs, with Francophones expelling non-Francophones into the job categories that are less prestigious. . . ."

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whose parents obtain a certificate from the government. With some minor exceptions, the certificate is issued only to those parents who can show that at least one of them *completed English-language elementary schooling in Quebec.* In effect, this provision denies English-language schooling to the children of French-speaking Quebecers and of most immigrants to Quebec, be their origins in Toronto, New York, London, Paris, or Rome. Erosion of the English-speaking community is the predictable consequence. The English-speaking minority is reasonably mobile across Canada and perhaps the United States. Those entering Quebec are not able to send their children to English schools; those leaving will have them educated elsewhwere. Affluent families continue to have access to two or three English private schools not subject to the language legislation.[5]

The school issue is sharply contested by many affected parents for a reason that goes beyond the ethnocentric. The teaching of English as a second language is started in grade five in most French-language Catholic schools, and then without adequate resources. The effect, as perceived by parents, is an unreasonable limitation on the opportunities available to their children. By contrast, in the English system French is taught intensively, a welcome change that began in the last decade.

Another controversial change concerns income-tax rates. Quebec is the only Canadian province with its own income-tax collection machinery. (The other nine provinces get a percentage that's added to the federal income tax and collected by Ottawa.) In 1978 the government of Quebec decided to make its income tax sharply more progressive. While low-income earners had their taxes reduced, those with annual incomes over (U.S.) $26,000 began paying taxes substantially in excess of what is charged in Ontario and the other eight provinces. The combined effect of the language legislation and the income tax change, along with the political climate, caused a great many businesses to move their head office, or at least some key officers, out of Quebec; others complain that they cannot recruit qualified staff.

The uncertainty about Quebec's future began with the violence of the '60s and the emergence of the PQ. Businessmen contemplating long-term investment had to take into account the possibility, no matter how remote, of Quebec's secession. Independence implies risks to available markets and of unforeseeable modes of government regulation. On balance, therefore, investment in Quebec gradually became less attractive. After the election of the PQ and its introduction of language and tax measures, the adverse trends accelerated. The construction industry in Montreal went into a very bad slump following the 1976 election. (Public works now provide partial relief.) The head offices of national corporations in Montreal are being decimated by migration to Toronto and Calgary.

For Montrealers with good jobs the lack of prosperity is not unpleasant. Houses and apartments can be had relatively cheaply. The best restaurants usually have unreserved tables, and downtown there is a minimum of traffic jams.

Improving the lot of the poor is part of the PQ program. The sales tax on clothing and footwear has been eliminated. Income supplementation for the working poor, dental care for children, free drugs, and a property-tax rebate for the elderly have been introduced. Free milk is now provided in the schools, a measure not lost on Quebec's dairy farmers.

Private rights to fishing and hunting preserves, held largely by non-residents, are being terminated. These resources are

[5] The earliest measure to encourage members of the English-language community to attend university outside Quebec was provided by the Union Nationale government in 1967-68, with no serious objection voiced by anyone. This measure created a two-year junior-college system. Its diploma is a precondition for the admittance of Quebec students to three-year undergraduate programs in Quebec universities. Other Canadian universities admit Quebec students without the junior college diploma. Quebec universities admit non-Quebec students to four-year programs, without their ever having to attend junior college.

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transferred to government-administered zones accessible at a reasonable fee to everyone. Another measure limits severely the conversion of agricultural land in the St. Lawrence valley.

The Quebec government, including ancillary bodies such as school boards, is the largest employer in the province. During the years of Liberal government, confrontations with the unions were sharp and resulted in settlements favoring labor. During those years the opposition PQ generally supported the unions whose leaders in turn made separatist noises. For two years, the PQ enjoyed the resulting peace. Meanwhile, Quebec, like other governments in North America, found itself under pressure from some citizens who felt overtaxed, from others who requested additional spending programs, and from inflation. Quebec also suffers from some shrinkage of its tax base as people and wealth depart, as well as from limitations on its access to the capital markets in North America. The PQ seems to have adopted a two-sided stance to labor. With its own employees it decided to play tough: strikes and lockouts have paralyzed the liquor monopoly and interfered seriously with the operation of some hospitals. In an apparent attempt to do something for organized labor, the government provided legislation to help unionization, and to hinder strike-breaking activity in the private sector. Perhaps coincidentally, voices from the labor movement have become more cautious on the issue of Quebec independence.

Is the PQ a "social democratic" party? The "social" part may be answered with a cautious yes. Both the written program of the party and to a lesser extent the actions of the government favor the redistribution of income, more government regulation, increased public-sector employment, and the development of cooperatives. (The relations between the business community, English and French alike on the one hand, and the PQ on the other, suggest that the party is seen by them as antibusiness.) Lévesque speaks of his wish to follow the Swedish model; his critics argue that in fact the PQ promotes the rule of middle-class technocrats.

More interesting is the "democratic" part of the question. While many French-Canadians are as deeply dedicated to democracy as anyone, Quebec collectively has political traditions more in keeping with Tammany Hall than with Westminster. Until the early '60s how-to-vote instructions from the pulpit, stolen ballot boxes, baseball bats, and bribery were established features of the electoral process, on a scale unique in postwar Canada.

Since that time, however, Quebec now has accepted the public institutions of parliamentary government. The curious juxtaposition of traditions led to such oddities as the lack of a Quebec journal of parliamentary proceedings, on the pattern of *Hansard* or the *Congressional Record* (until the '60s), and to the decision of the PQ, then the opposition, not to accept routinely the election results in 1970 and 1973 when the party's percentage of the popular vote was more than the proportion of seats it collected. (Not much has been heard of the promise of reform since the 1976 election, when the PQ benefited from the system.) Another strange tradition, started by the Union Nationale and carried on by Lévesque, is the public reinterpretation of election results in terms of the French-speaking vote alone, suggesting none too subtly that the ballots cast by citizens belonging to the minority are somehow of less than full value.

The independence movement of the '60s also included some groups of Marxist-Leninist persuasion, who professed the belief that a sovereign Quebec was just another step on their road. There was also a gang of marching-in-tight-formation-under-a-sea-of-flags toughs led by a former boxer. The leadership of the PQ managed to get such folks to lower their profile to the point of invisibility.

Within the government, there emerged Culture Minister Laurin, father of the language legislation. His latest contribution is a White Paper on the cultural life of Quebec in the future (i.e., post-Independence), which reads more like a day in the life of Prague than of Stockholm. Soon after that opus appeared,

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rumors circulated in Montreal that Lévesque did not really trust Laurin.[6]

WORRIES ABOUT THE PQ REGIME may be roughly classified as follows:

(1) The language policies will make life uncomfortable, perhaps to the extent of making a living impossible, for those without the appropriate mastery of French.

(2) The PQ's antibusiness stance and the uncertainties created by it drive businessmen and economic activity away from Quebec, resulting in stagnation or worse.

(3) If the PQ attains its aim of independence, the government might restrict property rights and the mobility of persons.

The first fear is well warranted, but its grounds did not originate with the PQ. Ever since the early '60s, French has been gradually displacing English. The PQ has merely added shrill rhetoric, threats, and a language "police." Many in the Montreal corporate and professional world continue to live and work mostly in English even though they may know or may be learning French. The real hardship so far has been on unilingual persons seeking blue-collar and junior white-collar jobs; without French it is very difficult to find employment. Non-French-Canadians in the midmanagerial ranks might find themselves bypassed at promotion time regardless of language skills, where management seeks to show how anxious it is to earn its Certificat de Francisation.

Second, the fear of economic decline is well founded, judging by the experience to date. The PQ responds to the observed facts in three different ways. Sometimes they deny them by pointing to some statistic that happens to run counter to trend. On other occasions, they accept the facts as part of a long-term and inevitable trend in the westward move of Canadian economic activity. (On those occasions there is no explanation provided as to why the trend suddenly accelerated with the election of the PQ in 1976.)

The third fear is in part the worry that the PQ government may in fact introduce some measure such as a loan program or a "buy in Quebec" campaign that will speedily reverse fortunes.

The economic consequences of Quebec independence and the accompanying reactions of the government are unknown and, to make matters worse, they are unknowable. Economics, as a body of thought, does not provide a single, foolproof, workable method of quantifying future changes in trade patterns, tax policies, capital flows, or government reactions. Those who hazard predictions have to invent their methodology and then use it to obtain the results. (It is also possible to start with the desired results and work back to methodology.) The numerous studies in existence—some pointing to looming tragedy, others to business-as-usual, and one promised by the PQ for late 1979 points to prosperity arising from independence—rarely diverge in outcome from the known prejudices of their authors. What can be said with certainty is that the persons and the capital that would leave if Quebec ceased to be part of Canada can be easily identified. There is no promise of any offsetting inflow.

Reports of fears concerning the future of Quebec have often been attributed to members of the Jewish community in Montreal. It is unnecessary to point to the nature of diaspora experience with turmoil and emerging nationalism from post-Moorish Spain to the Ayatollah's Iran. To the misfortune of the PQ, some of their rhetoric sounds strangely familiar to survivors of the nationalist period of Europe. Lévesque becomes truly indignant when confronted with this similarity and points out, correctly, that there is nothing specifically anti-Semitic about the PQ's program. Some persons associated with Quebec separatism have been known to engage in pro-Palestinian Arab utterances, but this is as far as the matter goes.

[6] Cynics in Montreal hypothesize that Laurin and Lévesque have agreed behind the scenes to act out the role of the extremist and the reasonable compromiser respectively, to allow the government to assume whatever posture is expedient in dealing with the minority groups in Quebec, and at the same time continue to appeal to the various constituencies within the PQ.

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The PQ does have a handful of Jewish members. One of them, thirty-year-old David Levine, was until recently executive assistant to the Minister of Economic Development.

There is an economic basis to Jewish fears of the PQ. Though often bilingual, the younger members of the Quebec Jewish community, for the most part, were educated in English. The French-language Roman Catholic schools had no interest in accommodating Jewish students. The English Protestant schools agreed to do so. (There is no nonconfessional public school system in Quebec.) It took Jews, who had to build their own institutions in Montreal, until the late 1950s to be fully accepted by the English-speaking community. The threat to that English-speaking community affects established connections and business opportunities specifically, and the overall prosperity of the business community in general. The Jewish exodus from Montreal has been estimated at 5,000 to 25,000 out of a Jewish population of about 125,000. Those who have left seem to be young university graduates and professionals. On balance, the Jewish experience in contemporary Quebec is no different from that of any other upwardly mobile minority group.[7]

What finally is the probable range of outcomes in Quebec? The key facts are that according to the latest poll data about 70 percent of all Quebecers wish to remain within Canada (a proportion consistent with previous surveys over the years), while electoral support for the PQ is and has been consistently greater than willingness to secede. If the forthcoming referendum were to address itself to the issue of Quebec independence alone, the PQ should be resoundingly defeated. Lévesque seeks to avert this fate by repackaging the issue.

Orders have gone out to PQ activists to drop all references to separation and independence. What is to be promoted instead is "sovereignty-association," a term for which the PQ is gradually inventing content.[8] As revealed so far, "sovereignty-association" involves the devolution of all federal legislative and taxing powers for the territory of Quebec to the National Assembly in Quebec City. Quebec could then deal on an "equal-to-equal" basis with the rest of Canada, with which it would maintain a vaguely defined common-market and currency union. The PQ has its doubts about being able to sell even "sovereignty-association" to its electorate, so it is probable that the question on the referendum ballot (which is to be determined by the government and unveiled shortly before the actual referendum date) might read, "Do you give a mandate to the government of Quebec to open negotiations for sovereignty-association with English Canada?"

The PQ now is committed, should it win the referendum, to an unspecified "second consultation" with the electorate before any final action is taken on independence. The voters are now told that marking their ballots "yes" involves no risk, for it is only a mandate for exploratory negotiation; they will get another chance to say "no" if things are not to their liking. Meanwhile, PQ militants are told that they must be patient with apparent compromises along the road to independence.

The PQ has threatened to call a second referendum if it loses the first, and a third if it loses the second, etc. Time is on their side, the separatists argue on the basis of polls showing that the young tend to favor independence while the old tend to oppose it. (Conveniently overlooked is that today's young are tomorrow's old.)

If the PQ should win the 1980 referendum, complications begin. The government of

[7] In a well-publicized gesture, the government of Quebec promised separate municipal status to a group of Hassidic Jews near Montreal, enabling the group to regulate the community in accordance with its traditions. Unfortunately for the PQ, this gesture is not likely to deal with the difficulties noted in the text.

[8] Sovereignty Association was the name of Lévesque's original separatist group before the formation of the PQ. The resurrection of the term a decade later, without capital letters, is presumably intended to appeal, simultaneously, to persons who find independence too extreme, and to the separatist faithful conscious of party traditions.

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Canada as well as the country's other nine provincial governments are on record saying they have no intention of negotiating "sovereignty-association" with the government of Quebec. Lévesque argues in response that the other governments are just posturing before the referendum; afterward they are bound to recognize the "new reality." The government of Canada is likely to counter a referendum success by Lévesque by holding a referendum of its own, with a simple, straight question on independence.[9] Lévesque's only hope of winning that one is to engineer some sort of English-French confrontation that would result in a polarization of Quebec in support of the PQ. To accomplish this should be difficult, chiefly because his main opponents on the independence issue are also French-speaking Quebecers.

The new Quebec Liberal chief, Claude Ryan (a Francophone nationalist, the name notwithstanding), favors constitutional reform leading to greater provincial powers in a more decentralized Canada. His views are close to those of Prime Minister Clark and the premiers of other key Canadian provinces. Former Prime Minister (and now federal opposition leader) Trudeau, whose personal popularity in Quebec remains great, can be expected to campaign with Ryan for the defeat of the PQ in the referendum, in favor of constitutional reform. For these reasons, the chances of the PQ's ultimate success look slim.

If this scenario is right, the PQ should be back on the opposition benches in a couple of years. What if some unforeseen event makes this scenario wrong? It is hard to imagine a well-functioning rump-Canada consisting of two non-contiguous parts with a sovereign Quebec in-between. Perhaps it is even harder to imagine the 18 million inhabitants of this rump-Canada agreeing to share the running of their trade and monetary institutions on an "equal-to-equal" basis joined in "sovereignty-association" with 6 million Quebecers. United States politicians keep repeating proposals for closer links with Canada in energy and resource markets. How long could a disintegrating Canada resist the courtship of Washington? If the nine English-speaking Canadian provinces did close ranks with the United States, could there be a really independent Quebec in their midst?

November 1979 □

[9] The former Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau was committed to a federally sponsored referendum if needed. The newly elected Clark government decided not to proceed for now with the necessary legislation in the expectation that the PQ will lose its own referendum.

• I am indebted to Irving Brecher, Leonie Gordon, Richard Hamilton, Barbara Haskel, and Storrs McCall for comments on an earlier draft. — A.D. □

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John Kurt Jacobsen

The Republic of Ireland: Perils of Pragmatism

In a quaint Easter day speech delivered in 1943, Eamon de Valera, patriarchal prime minister of the Irish Free State (it became the Republic of Ireland in 1949), described his cherished vision of a self-sufficient nation—replete with comely maidens, cozy homesteads and, of course, a reunited Ulster. "The Ireland we dreamed of would be the home of a people who valued material wealth only as the basis of a right living," the Fianna Fail party leader intoned, "of a people who were satisfied with a frugal comfort and devoted their leisure to things of the spirit." By 1958 the autarkic economic policies pursued by his party since 1932 were abandoned without fanfare or remorse, for the Republic was adrift in a stagnant economy from which capital and people fled in frightful numbers. Now a new generation of self-proclaimed pragmatists in the Fianna Fail party (Gaelic; the party of the "Soldiers of Destiny") set out, so the saga goes, to steer their fragment of the island into Europe (i.e., the Common Market) and the era of push buttons.

Relegating the donkey-and-cart age to Tourist Board posters, the Republic of Ireland leaped forward industrially over the next 20 years by recreating itself as the most alluring haven for footloose capital this side of Singapore.[1] A 15-year export-tax holiday and, since 1973, access to the European Economic Community (EEC) crown the incentive package to foreign investors, who have located hundreds of industrial projects (though little actual capital) in this hospitable economic and political climate. Late last year, the Minister for Industry and Commerce announced a tax reduction on *all* manufacturing enterprise from the nominal 45 percent rate to a more civilized 10 percent. While Irish governments assured the less privileged tax-paying population that foreign enterprises would indeed remain fastened to Irish soil when the initial tax holiday expires in 1990, no unnecessary chances are taken.

By conventional standards, this "open-door-and-red-carpet" policy that is to lure potential investors has paid off handsomely for both sides. While British and West German investment is substantial (and the Japanese coming on), American firms provided the lion's share throughout the '70s. The U.S. Department of Commerce cites Ireland as the most profitable location in the world, with a 25 percent average profit rate for U.S. firms in 1977 (compared to a 14.3 percent return to U.S. firms in the EEC as a whole). Accordingly, the book value of American manufacturing investment rose 186 percent from 1973 through 1977, while worldwide book value increased by a comparatively paltry 47.7 percent. Last year the diminutive Republic (population: approximately 3.2 million) ranked second in number of U.S. manufacturing projects committed to Common Market countries. These "grant-aided industries" (including a native minority) accounted for almost three-quarters of Ireland's growth in industrial output and employment from 1960 until the recession set in. They accounted for nearly all such growth during the 1973-76 period, when the Irish cost of living doubled and the unemployment rate—averaging 6.5 percent over the 1960-72 period—exceeded 12 percent in official

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(understated) figures. Various agencies estimate that 25 percent of the population lives not in the famous "frugal comfort" but in outright poverty.

Since 1960, Ireland has averaged better than 4 percent annual growth and, in 1978, it led the EEC with a GNP growth of 6 percent. Indeed, in 1978 manufacturing output rose by 10 percent and manufactured exports by 11 percent. Fed by the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy, farm income increased by 20 percent in 1978. Farm income, however, is most unevenly divided: a minority of one-third of the farmers accrue 70 percent of all agricultural profits—and 60 percent of Ireland's farms have less than 50 acres of land, and thus are targeted for Mansholtian extinction. Agricultural employment has fallen from 36 percent in 1961 to approximately 22 percent today, with the attendant increase in service and manufacturing marred by the emigration "residual." Today more than 1 million Irish natives live and work overseas.

Answering the dilemma of chronic unemployment, the Irish Industrial Development Authority (IDA) announced further fruits of the "pragmatic way" last year in the form of 27,000 jobs promised through grant-aided industries. The IDA has set an unprecedented "projection" target of 30,000 jobs for 1979—well in line with the annual employment goal the National Economic and Social Council deems necessary for the attainment of full employment by the end of the 1980s (Ireland has the fastest population growth, the youngest age structure, and highest dependency ratio in the EEC). There also have been substantial recent additions in exploitation of natural resources. In addition to a host of less glamorous minerals, explorations have launched the largest lead and zinc mines in the world at Navan, natural gas works off the southern coast, and several promising but hitherto noncommercial offshore oil finds. Last year, even tourism receipts had risen by 20 percent, challenging the familiar Irish lament that "you can't eat the scenery."

With trade diversifying outlets among other EEC nations, the wobbly Irish reliance on the British export market has diminished from 83 percent in 1959 to about 47 percent today. This year Ireland is entering the European Monetary System; in the same spirit of blithe fatalism that characterized earlier EEC negotiations, the Irish now have opted to break the nefarious link with sterling for the steadier and sterner discipline of the West German mark. With both inflation and unemployment dipping below double figures in an agreed-upon conservative policy that, at least, acquiesces to a "jobs at any cost" imperative, an incumbent government might easily blend complacency with arrogance toward a customarily docile electorate—and it does.

This docility was reflected in a mid-recession (May 1975) survey conducted by the European Community that measures "overall life satisfaction" and "happiness." The Irish ranked second in "life satisfaction" (defined in terms of realistic expectations), while coming in at a more fitting eighth place in reported levels of "happiness" (implying "an absolute state of being, something more emotional and less cognitive").[2] A fresh survey might well detect striking shifts from that grudging tranquillity.

This international investment paradise, fashioned so painstakingly by past government policy, now is tottering. On March 20, in the largest demonstrations in the history of the Irish state, 150,000 Pay-As-You-Earn employees (PAYE) in Dublin displayed their collective displeasure about the highly skewed tax structure, while 40,000 simultaneously protested in Cork, "the second city." PAYE contributions to the total income taxation had risen relentlessly from 61.8 percent in 1969-70 to an infuriating 87.5 percent, as manufacturers, large farmers, and non-PAYE professionals chipped in a dwindling share.

Now pressed by its rank and file, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (62 percent of the employed population is unionized) withdrew from National Wage negotiations—which

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have loosely reigned since the government imposed them under statutory threat in 1970—until tax reform is effectively installed on the agenda. Although government waffling on a proposed 2 percent farm levy ignited the simmering anger, soon now the entire developmental wisdom is likely to be at stake. A faltering job-creation strategy may combine with the taxation issue to fuel a leftward turn in this country afflicted with the lowest levels of both incomes and social services—and also with the highest debt in the EEC (92.8 percent of Ireland's GNP). Last year, Ireland's cost of living, for example, was 12 percent higher than that in Britain (and 5 percent higher than in Northern Ireland), with wages 12 percent *lower* than in the U.K. (and 139 percent lower than for EEC's leader, Holland).

Ireland imported the Common Market price structure but, alas, omitted comparable wages.[3] Given a government that is hell-bent on wage restraint and crying for "competitiveness" in this painfully open economy, the stage is set for an outbreak of what Irish politicians call the "British madness."[4]

Viewing a 65 percent unofficial strike rate last summer, Prime Minister Jack Lynch scolded the errant work force for their wicked, wicked ways. "It is particularly unacceptable if those with secure jobs use their position in such a way as to destroy the job prospects of others worse off than they are," he admonished. "An accentuation of this trend would call for the most fundamental reappraisal." Indeed, strike activity now surpasses the worst historic levels in terms of lost man-hours. Strikes have disabled many vital areas such as water supply, electricity, bus transport, air travel. Most spectacularly crippling was a telecommunications and postal strike that left the Republic incommunicado for many months. The general motivation is much less greed then sheer need. "How could any family man, be he postman, busman, binman, or whatever," an Irish editor rhetorically asks, "exist with dignity on £60 a week at today's prices?"

Rarely have finger-wagging cabinet ministers so assiduously provoked the economic predicament they so piously deplore. To compound injuries, the Irish electorate lately indulges environmental issues—pollution control, a nuclear power debate, conservation of historic landmarks—with an energy most unbecoming to a developing nation. Little wonder that pragmatic politicians appear slightly confused these days.

The new Irish state, after winning its political independence from Britain in 1921, was indeed a deeply bourgeois product. Bowyer Bell summarizes the postrevolutionary consequences with acerbic accuracy:

> The judges would still have worn wigs, the pound sterling circulated, and the priests banned innovation. Ireland did, indeed, want to be a nation once again but not to discard the old peasant ways, the old respectable vices and virtues. . . .The puritanical and incredibly parochial Catholic Church, and the more recent but equally inviolate tradition of bureaucratic government controlled by democratic means, have hardly been challenged except by a few men of the most radical persuasion. Both institutions foster continuity, minimal change, appropriate conformity, the quiet life, and moral righteousness.[5]

The embittering 1922-23 civil war generated Fine Gael, the right-wing, propertied party that governed until 1932, and also the initially populist Fianna Fail party. Fianna Fail organized into a potent electoral machine, enabling the party to form governments for 35 of the next 41 years. Though founded with the widespread and loyal support of small farmers, Fianna Fail also snared in business support with its import-substitution policies. It soon expanded and embedded itself as a premier "catch-all" party in Ireland's political landscape. Always pragmatic, the party filled in the large entrepreneurial gaps in the economy with a growing set of semi-autonomous public enterprises designed to supplement, not challenge, private enter-

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prises. (This practice, however, had been inaugurated by the Fine Gael government when it created the Electricity Supply Board in 1927.)

THE IRISH LABOUR PARTY was severely handicapped by the clerical climate, the small industrial work force that was further divided by the Ulster border, and by the incessant emigration of its recruiting pool. No wonder that the party remained a marginal influence. It had never exceeded 17 percent of the vote, and it did not present a distinctly left-wing program until the late '60s ("The '70s Will Be Socialist"). But then the lackluster party was illuminated by the inflow of such talents as Justin Keating, Dr. Noel Browne, the late David Thornley, and Conor Cruise O'Brien. Alas, the new enthusiasm sputtered out with a dismaying 1969 electoral performance and the failure of the anti-EEC campaign in 1972. But then Labour formed a coalition with Fine Gael (which, to its own discomfort, was harboring a growing social democratic wing). In 1973 this coalition displaced Fianna Fail after 16 consecutive years in office. Just in time for the recession.

The coalition government discarded its initial grand designs as it increased the borrowing requirement from £134 million in 1972-73 to some £500 million in 1976 (23.2 percent of this from foreign sources) in order to uphold social services and stimulate the economy. The coalition did introduce a modest wealth tax and the first capital-gains tax ever imposed in the Republic of Ireland—with the result that a £141 million capital inflow in 1974 changed to a £68 million outflow by 1976. Minister of Industry and Commerce Justin Keating engineered the repeal of an absurdly generous mining tax holiday—a 20 years' total tax exemption for mines with even briefer life spans—while anguished cries in the Fianna Fail benches declared that this moderate measure signaled "the end of private property." (As of 1978, there were 52 undeterred companies actively prospecting for minerals in Ireland.)

For the first time, farmers now were drawn into the tax net. Value-added taxes were removed from food and medicines, and well-heeled tax evaders were sometimes genuinely hunted. Labour's proposal to create a fuzzily defined National Development Corporation (NDC) that would coordinate activities of the private and public sectors (and would expand the latter's commercial operations) was shelved along with all other really radical departures in policy. The evident *quid pro quo* for Labour's minor reforms was Fine Gael's recklessly zealous security policy, which alienated many citizens who found they needed guards for their guardians. The most telling testimony to the authoritarian arrogance of the Fine Gael-Labour coalition is the utter lack of preparedness with which it entered the June 1977 election. The result was a revived Fianna Fail, armed with a 47-page manifesto, sweeping into office with an unprecedented popular vote and 84 of the 148 parliamentary seats.

To "get the country moving again," the new Fianna Fail government abolished local property taxes, road taxes on smaller cars, and the wealth tax. It placed capital gains on a new sliding scale, substantially increased income-tax allowances, and sweetened its bid for the youth vote with £1,000 grants to first-time housing purchasers. The government borrowing requirement rose to 13 percent of GNP in 1978 in order to raise the level of demand through state spending. But the party manifesto's centerpiece was a pledge to create 20,000 new jobs within a year. With emigration outlets closed by high unemployment elsewhere, job-creation schemes were the most critical source of the party's appeal. The "strategy" was the soul of pragmatic simplicity—force-feed profits to private industries, and they will gratefully create more jobs via productive reinvestment.

The spending spree was unintentionally accelerated as wages and salaries in the "hot" economy doubled the 8 percent government guideline, so that the real purchasing power of the average married industrial worker rose by 7.25 percent. With total consumer spending up by 9 percent, the exposed Irish economy was predictably inundated by imports. So it incurred a 30 percent rise in trade deficit

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(August '77 to August '78)—a record sum of £672 million. By fall, the government ordered a credit squeeze and amplified its campaign for wage restraint. This campaign was distinguished by its hostile ineptitude.

The government announced a projected reduction in borrowing (its debt service absorbed 30 percent of all tax receipts) and in social spending, from 20.9 percent in 1978 to 18.9 percent by 1980. The £8 million so meagerly raised by the now-abolished wealth tax was to be met almost exactly by the proposed taxation of Children's Allowances. The £78.7 million lost in property taxes were to be offset by £63 million from the abolition of food subsidies (these had been introduced by the coalition government to induce a National Wage Agreement in 1975). A "work-sharing" scheme proposed by Fianna Fail amounted to mere income-sharing among workers living on overtime or in debt. The minister of Finance recommended the creation of a National Hire Agency that would cast off the dole anyone who refused the first available form of employment.

Fianna Fail generated and pandered to "welfare fraud" hysteria. Pension age was not lowered. Children's Allowances were not increased. Only the minister of Health—waging a fight to succeed Prime Minister Lynch—deviated by introducing a progressive hospitalization scheme last April. Cabinet ministers admonished the unions to moderate demands, since their wages—and their wages alone—either squeezed the profit margins of vulnerable Irish industries or else motivated the substitution of more machinery for men. Expansion of public enterprise (into commercial activities) was dismissed with the smug tautology that "four private sector jobs are needed to support one public sector job."[6] So much for the wage-earners "incentive package."

By the end of 1978, the government plaintively announced that while it had influenced the creation of 30,000 new jobs, industrial redundancies had nibbled the net total down to just 17,000—thus 3,000 shy of target—during a year brimming with impressive growth statistics. Though dole recipients declined by 11,000, renewed emigration alone could easily account for the drop. (Emigration had risen from a rare net inflow of 9,480 [est.] in 1973 to a more customary outflow by 1977 of 13,800 [est.].) The job tally appears all the more anemic considering that the state created 10,487 new posts in the nonproductive public sector. The remainder constitutes the work of the vaunted "engine of growth": private enterprise. Blaming wage rises and strikes for the shortfalls, the government maintained an awfully civil stance toward private companies, well indeed expressed last November by Prime Minister Lynch:

> While he commented that the substantial increases in the profitability in private companies had not been reflected in increased employment, Mr. Lynch said he felt sure that "industry will themselves appreciate that it is to their own long-term interest that further expansion is reflected in significant job creation." [*Irish Times*, November 18, 1978.]

"The correct approach," said the undaunted minister for Economic Planning and Development, "is to intensify our efforts and to press ahead with an even faster rate of job creation in 1979." Irish citizens can hardly be blamed for detecting a Swiftian "modest proposal" at the core of that sweet reasoning tone. The current job creation strategy appears to be unraveling due to (1) the exposure of the Irish market to its alleged saviors in the EEC and (2) the trend toward capital-deepening, which characterizes what Ernest Mandel terms the "third technological revolution." The latter is reflected in the rising costs of job creation.

The Industrial Development Authority (IDA) doubled expenditures from £63.2 million in 1976 to £121 million in 1977, but "jobs projected" increased by only one-third, from 17,893 to 24,028. (Less than two-thirds of "jobs projected" actually materialize.) Over the five-year 1973-77 period, the IDA claims it has created 57,500 jobs, while Irish industry "neutralized" the increase with 55,600 redun-

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dancies due both to the recession and to increasing competition from other EEC enterprises. (Competing imports, as a percentage of non-food manufactures, had risen from 19 percent in 1965 to 31 percent in 1973, as Ireland enacted tariff reductions with Britain *alone*.) Employment in the clothing industry, for example, has shrunk from 22,000 to about 14,000 over the last 20 years.

While certain industries were bound to decline, critics decry an excessive pro-multinational corporation policy. That policy results in fewer jobs due to weak multiplier effects (55 percent of their exports consist of interaffiliate trade), weak linkages, and control of approximately 60 percent of total manufacturing assets in the Republic today. The current credit squeeze harms the growth prospects of smaller Irish industries while foreign companies are immunized by their access to the Euro-dollar market.

The IDA—on the firing line—has responded to mounting criticisms with creditable efforts. The agency has developed an imaginative scheme to promote native entrepreneurs and small industries, but it clearly relies on large foreign capital-intensive enterprises to supply the bulk of jobs necessary to meet the government's employment goals. As the massive tax protest in Dublin and the increasing strike activity broadly hint, Irish citizens are beginning to oppose Fianna Fail's efforts to take the "correct approach" any further. For Fianna Fail, the European Monetary System (EMS) was a godsend from the secular mainland.

Where the U.K. feared to enter, the Irish government lunged in with suspiciously scant regard for the potential EMS impact on balance of payments, employment, and competition.[7] The sex appeal of the scheme was the "rigid discipline" it would instill into the wage front in order to remain within the band of currencies. With the pump-priming fiasco, the next step for this government, burdened by precise promises to keep, is a "blame-sharing" scheme designed to enable it to elude the cost of carrying out its threats to outlaw strikes and impose a statutory wage policy (for the present). To increase foreign debt through "soft" loans—not a real "transfer of resources"—is certainly a curious way to go about controlling inflation. Despite the U.K.'s assurances that it will independently stay within range of EMS, the wisdom of a link-up with currencies that appreciate against sterling was not compelling. The U.K. still is the market for 47 percent of Ireland's exports, and small Irish firms relying on it would most likely be hard-pressed should a total "break" come to pass.[8] Any deflationary measures taken to maintain EMS parity, of course, will prove most harmful to small firms affected by slackening domestic demand, and to employment.

Fianna Fail spokesmen, on the other hand, expect non-U.K. investment to flood in and, quite plainly, it would be difficult to design a better incubator for foreign investment. What Fianna Fail ministers propose as a better means to achieve their manifesto targets is viewed by critics as a less than sly effort to renege without appearing sinful. Yet, even a redemptive burst of spending in the run-up to the 1981 or '82 election will not erase serious shortfalls in manifesto targets for employment and standard-of-living levels. But by then a renovated Fine Gael-Labour coalition, sporting its own manifesto of remedies, will be poised for combat.

According to accurate Irish lore, Labour is a policy in search of a party while Fine Gael is a party in search of a policy. In disarray after the 1977 election, Fine Gael's right-wing leadership was displaced by Garret Fitzgerald—one of the brighter lights in European politics—who is arduously reorganizing the party structure and character along social democratic lines. Pressured on the left by the energies of the Sinn Fein-Workers party (which is more orthodox in its communism than the infinitesimal Communist party itself), and by the lively intelligences in the breakaway Socialist Labour party, the demoralized Labour party will resurrect and update the 1969 party program—all but the go-it-alone clause.

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Whatever the economic consequences, EEC membership has had a progressive impact on social and political attitudes and values throughout this formerly inward-looking island. Irish bishops can no longer demand and get offensive references, such as "workers' republic," deleted from Labour party documents.

Socialism is not so unsavory a word today. If the present framework of dependent capitalist industrialization aggravates unemployment woes and standard-of-living losses, a prospective coalition program emphasizing the expansion of productive state enterprises will acquire much more appeal (with attendant measure for workers' democracy). Of Ireland's 13 million agricultural acres 2 million stay unused. Food processing is underdeveloped (and actually discriminated against by earlier EEC incentives). Minerals are exported in unsmelted form, so that little downstream industry develops around it. The small Irish fishing fleet nets a mere 15 percent of the total catch in the 200-mile zone. However, a new government might well find itself too debt-ridden to maneuver in those areas by the time Fianna Fail calls an election.

But Fianna Fail isn't renowned as the party of pragmatists for nothing. Though they may worship devoutly at the altar of private enterprise, party members will not flagellate themselves there. As a recent National Economic and Social Council report urges, and in response to the PAYE workers' campaign for tax reforms, the government will probably decrease its scheduled borrowing reductions, increase farmers' taxation, and redistribute (some) of the revenues to urban workers and social welfare recipients. A prudent act of fiscal juggling would have defused the protests, protected other tax inequities, and encouraged the restricted view of the tax issue as a purely urban-rural conflict. If the taxation issue is to be brought into the purview of National Wage bargaining, the government will have expanded an agenda that may *eventually* also encompass investment policy. However tempting a turn rightward to full-blown state corporatism may be,[9] the uncertain capacity of the state to enforce such an arrangement against an increasingly urban industrial work force will probably counsel more moderate future behavior in order to muster support—not only "to get the country moving again" but in order to get the beleaguered Fianna Fail reelected.

The possibility of a corporatist outcome—despite the earlier sorry example of Britain's Heath government—cannot simply be dismissed. The temptation to speculate in this direction must have soared after the Irish Congress of Trade Unions rejected the government's first inadequate appeasement offer (given the merry misnomer, the "National Understanding"), voting against it on May 23 with a resounding 318 to 119. The "bashability quotient" is currently quite high (and rising).[10]

Perceived interference with industrial development draws heavy fire. Last year, a multinational chemicals firm "took its business elsewhere," when planning permission was held up by local residents who were seeking assured antipollution controls. "These people have a right under the law as it stands apparently to object," the minister of Industry, Commerce, and Energy ominously grumbled. "But I feel their democratic right should not extend beyond a democratic right to object." Characterizing the objectionable objectors as "unrepresentative," the IDA nevertheless threatened to completely drop the district of County Clare as an industrial zone.

ANY FUTURE IRISH GOVERNMENT will have to cope with an electorate that will question not industrialization itself but the *form* of industrialization, an electorate that will resist the "New Jerseyization" of Ireland. A lively antinuclear campaign, long before Three Mile Island, squarely opposes the current logic of development, promoting instead alternative energy research, smaller-scale industry, and—shades of de Valera—a more self-sufficient approach. Of more immediate importance, the campaign challenges the "beggars can't be

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choosers" attitude, which has so effectively stifled debate on developmental alternatives. Another event of wide, popular symbolic value was a massive march protesting against the destruction of an ancient (accidently uncovered) Viking settlement site that was to be obliterated in order to erect civic office buildings upon the ruins.

Ireland teeters on the brink of profound politico-economic change, but the land of frugal comfort may teeter there a long, long time. □

NOTES

[1] For a more detailed discussion, see my "Changing Utterly?: Irish Development and the Problem of Development," in *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review*, Winter 1978.

[2] See an analysis of the survey in Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977). On the peculiar impact of personalism and authoritarianism upon Irish political culture, see David E. Schmitt, *The Irony of Irish Democracy* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973).

[3] In 1973, for example, "Irish households on an average spent 32 percent of household expenditures on food, compared to about 22 percent in West Germany. . . ." but two-thirds of Irish households actually spent more than 32 percent, and at least one in five spent more than 40 percent on food. See A. Desmond O'Rourke, "An Unofficial Reappraisal of the Irish Economic Dilemma," in *Studies*, Autumn 1978.

[4] Fred Block argues that "the openness of an economy provides a means to combat the demands of the working class for higher wages and for economic and social reforms," in his *The Origins of International Economic Disorder* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p.3. That portion of his thesis could not be borne out better by the Irish case.

[5] Bowyer Bell, *The Secret Army* (London: Sphere Books, 1970), p.441.

[6] A sentiment that Minister of Finance George Colley shares with his Fine Gael predecessor, Richie Ryan. On the sources of this attitude toward productive state activity, see Claus Offe's essay in Leon Lindberg, et al., eds., *Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism: Public Policy and The Theory of The State* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1975), pp. 125-44.

[7] Irish wage costs per unit of output experienced the lowest rate of increase among EEC members between 1974 and 1977, though you would never guess it from commentary by employers or the government.

[8] As of mid-June 1979, the Irish pound—to the government's surprise —has been falling against sterling since Ireland joined EMS.

[9] On various forms of "corporatism," see the essays by Philippe C. Schmitter and by Leo Panitch in *Comparative Political Studies*, April 1977.

[10] In November 1977, a Dutch multinational firm—in the process of worldwide retrenchment—pulled out of the City of Limerick during an intra-union dispute and left 1,400 workers unemployed. A very large section of public opinion in the recriminatory aftermath held the unions exclusively to blame. □

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Timothy G. Massad

Disruption, Organization, and Reform

A Critique of *Poor People's Movements*

"What the poor win in American politics, they win by mass defiance, not by the use of the regular political system"; in their book *Poor People's Movements*, Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward draw this lesson from the study of protest movements. Because of its historical richness and provocative conclusions, this book deserves the attention of all those interested in the fate of protest movements in America, and of would-be organizers who wonder what is to be done.[1]

The book offers histories of four protest movements—the unemployed workers' and the industrial workers' movements of the 1930s and the civil rights and welfare rights movements of the 1960s. In these studies and in a theoretical chapter, Piven and Cloward sketch the following scenario for political change. Periodically, widespread social and economic change may sufficiently upset everyday life so that people will protest or "defy" the system. The poor may riot, break laws, and disrupt institutional operations. Because at such moments political instability is likely, disruption may force vulnerable political leaders to grant concessions in order to maintain social stability and the legitimacy of their own rule. These concessions may be revoked or restricted once disruption subsides, but Piven and Cloward believe that this is the most the poor can achieve. They do not have the resources to form and sustain organizations to represent their interests in the political process.

Two arguments concerning disruption and organization give the book its innovative force. Grave institutional disruptions, the authors argue, create social and economic crises that will compel the state to act. "Disruption," however, by their definition and examples, refers to a variety of actions—riots, strikes, rallies, boycotts—some of them not very threatening. A close reading suggests that disruption is not the only factor that determines whether the state offers concession, or chooses to repress or ignore the protesters.

> The main point . . . is simply that *the political impact of institutional disruptions depends upon electoral conditions*. Even serious disruptions, such as industrial strikes, will force concessions only when the calculus of electoral instability favors the protesters. [Authors' emphasis.]

Turbulent times are marked by political instability, with leaders unsure of their support and electoral alignments "unpredictable." In such times the government may offer concessions if it believes that any other action would alienate more supporters.

Although their language is often sensational—the state "concedes" to "eruptions" or "in the face of the threat of popular insurgency"—one might argue that Piven and Cloward's theory is not that different from liberal or pluralist conceptions of politics emphasizing coalitions. How the state chooses to respond to disruption ultimately seems to depend on the balance of interests supporting and opposing the protesters. Indeed, Piven and Cloward say that "when the political leadership is unsure of its support," the state may respond to disruptions that are "isolated within peripheral institutions." The authors also suggest that reforms may be granted even when no disruption occurs—when there is simply a "threat of electoral defeat." Moreover, the authors' argument about disruption loses meaning when they describe normal political processes in the language of disruption: they speak of the "early phase of protest at the polls" and say that "defiance is first expressed in the voting booth."

At other times, their analysis resembles Michael Lipsky's theory of protest. In *Protest and City*

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Politics Lipsky argues that the powerless use protest to activate the support of third parties, whose influence persuades the state to enact reforms. The level or seriousness of protest counts for less than the degree of third-party support for the protesters' demands. Disruption may be unnecessary or even harmful if it alienates potential supporters.[2]

Ultimately, Piven and Cloward seem to reject both these positions. Their principle argument in *Poor People's Movements* is that institutional disruptions *force* the state to grant reforms. This belief leads to the authors' advice to organizers. They reject the notion that tactics should be designed to arouse support for the protesters' demands. Rather, they tell organizers to generate as much disruption as possible, in order to provoke a crisis: "Strategies must be pursued that escalate the momentum and impact of disruptive protest at each stage in its emergence and evolution." The task, they write, is to push "turbulence to its outer limits."

Organization of the Poor

Piven and Cloward then argue that poor people lack the resources and adequate incentives necessary to build and sustain organizations. Organizers err by attempting to build organizations in turbulent times when elites may offer a few concessions in response to insurgency. But once the turbulence subsides, concessions are revoked, elites are no longer vulnerable, and the poor peoples' organizations collapse. Forming organizations may not be merely ineffective; it may also be harmful. Organizations tend to curb militancy at moments when disruption might bring about concessions. "Organizers not only failed to seize the opportunity presented by the rise of unrest, they typically acted in ways that blunted or curbed the disruptive force which lower-class people were sometimes able to mobilize."

Piven and Cloward seem to assume an antithesis between disruption and organization. Thus, their heading "From Disruption to Organization" is used to describe the demise of three of the movements they studied. The terms are frequently polarized: "organization" refers to highly structured organizations, which often attempt to lobby on a federal level. "Disruption" covers a gamut of tactics—demonstrations, local protest and lobbying efforts, strikes, rallies, etc. Apparently, Piven and Cloward believe these activities occur without the benefit of organization, or that organization diminishes their impact. Thus, they speak of "unorganized" cr "spontaneous" disruptions.

A sense of pessimism underlies not only Piven and Cloward's conclusions but the parameters of their study as well. Although they seem to consider themselves Marxists, they do not ask how structural changes in the system might be achieved, nor do they express any hope for the creation of a mass-based left in America. For reasons not fully articulated, they apparently regard those goals as futile. Instead, they ask how small gains—"concessions"—can occasionally be wrought from the system. Whereas the American left has traditionally been pessimistic about ends—reformist victories fall short of revolutionary aspirations—Piven and Cloward are also pessimistic about means: they doubt whether those reformist victories can be won through organization, and whether they can be won frequently.

Let us consider the authors' theses on disruption and organization in light of their four case studies—of the unemployed and of the industrial workers' movements of the 1930s. Here they reinterpret the history of the 1930s in fundamental ways, and the arguments closely conform to their general theory. (Their analysis of the civil rights movement is not as innovative nor does it support their theory as well. Their evidence and arguments generally conform to a common view of civil rights protest: well-organized acts of civil disobedience—not serious institutional disruptions—aroused the nation's sense of justice and the support of outside groups. The study of welfare rights is a hypothetical illustration of the theory.)

To assess these arguments, we must ask: Were there serious institutional disruptions or crises that compelled the government to act? Does the history of events suggest that reforms were enacted in response to disruption? Were protests generally spontaneous, or were there organizations responsible for planning, inciting, and directing protest? Finally, was formal membership organization consistently ineffective, or were there some situations in which it yielded significant power?

The Unemployed Workers' Movement

There are three parts to Piven and Cloward's argument that protests by the unemployed in the 1930s caused local and federal governments to grant relief. First, they contend that disruptive acts forced local governments to grant or increase relief. Second, they maintain that these increases exhausted municipal finances, prompting local elites to pressure the federal government for help. Third,

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in order to explain why Roosevelt, not Hoover, responded to this protest-originated pressure, the authors attempt to tie protest to voting shifts in the following manner: The "unrest that had spurred local leaders to try to respond to the unemployed spread upward to produce . . . the electoral upheaval of 1932." It is unclear what "spread upward" means, particularly if the subject is disruption. Similarly: "It had taken protest and the ensuing fiscal and electoral disturbances to produce federal relief legislation." Does "ensuing" mean that protest somehow *caused* these electoral disturbances, or did it simply accompany them? This third step of the argument is difficult to understand. Rather than suggest some casual connection between protest and voting behavior, it may make more sense to say that the discontent that led some to protest led many others to vote Democratic. Besides, as is generally agreed, the exhaustion of local finances spawned a lobby for federal relief. Thus, the more original first step of the argument—that disruption produced local relief—will be our focus here.

Although we cannot correlate increases in relief with the occurrence of protest in various cities in any precise way, a rough comparison is possible. We can compare Piven and Cloward's evidence on the incidence of protest with studies of relief expenditures across the country. Piven and Cloward argue that protest was widespread, caused relief increases, and increased at least until 1933. Their evidence, however, does not support these contentions. First, the incidents of protest they cite are concentrated in a few cities. Almost all of the large demonstrations occurred on March 6, 1930, when the Communists staged rallies of the unemployed around the world. Most of the subsequent protests took place in three cities: New York, Chicago, and Detroit. This data is insufficient to infer that protest was commonplace or nationwide. Since most accounts of the Depression emphasize the passivity of the unemployed, one tends to regard Piven and Cloward's examples as exceptions rather than the rule. Second, in only a few of the cases described do they claim that relief increases followed protest. In most of the incidents, we do not know whether there was a response. Finally, the only evidence they offer that protest increased up until 1933 is that the number of demonstrations in Chicago rose. This is inadequate support for a general argument.

It is easy to overstate the significance of these protests. From the evidence presented by Piven and Cloward, one surely could draw more modest conclusions: many protests occurred on March 6, 1930 but subsequent protests were infrequent, and in only a few cities did protest occur more than once.

We have a fairly thorough picture of relief expenditures across the nation during the Depression, although Piven and Cloward cite very few relief statistics. Emma Winslow's study of relief in 120 urban areas shows two important trends: first, there was a general upward trend in expenditures from 1929-35, beginning in December of 1929, and second, there was a consistent seasonal variation, with expenditures greater in winter than in summer. In each annual cycle, expenditures reached a peak in March. Winslow's data and a U.S. Census study also show that relief increased throughout the country. The Census study found an average increase between 1929 and 1931 of about 250 percent per city—and many cities had increases of 400 percent or more. Furthermore, many of the cities with the highest per capita expenditures or highest monthly relief payments—e.g., Rochester, Buffalo, Portland, or Racine, Wisconsin—were not even cited by Piven and Cloward in their discussion of protest.[3]

This evidence on protest and relief expenditures discredits the Piven and Cloward thesis. There was a pattern of nationwide relief increases, beginning in late 1929 and continuing through 1934 with seasonal fluctuations. During this time protest was apparently much less extensive, leading one to doubt whether protest caused the increases. Perhaps most revealing is the pattern of protest and relief around March of 1930. According to both Piven and Cloward's evidence and students of the unemployed movement, protest was most visible and involved the most people at this time. According to Roy Rosenzweig, the March 6, 1930 demonstrations representated the movement's "peak of visibility." However, relief expenditures decreased during the next four months, following the normal seasonal pattern.[4]

Certainly, relief increased even where protest did not occur. To consider protest the primary cause of the increases, one would have to argue that protest in a few cities prompted local governments everywhere to increase relief. But Piven and Cloward do not make that argument, apparently believing that elites respond to real and proximate disruption. Indeed, the argument would be difficult to disprove, since one could claim the slightest protest had national reverberations. Most important, the argument does not account for the decline in relief after March 1930, even though this was one

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of the few times when protests in some cities received national press attention.

Another source of evidence, the Lynd's *Middletown in Transition*, fails to support Piven and Cloward's argument. By 1930, every fourth factory worker in Middletown was unemployed. Yet, according to the Lynds, no protest occurred in Middletown during the Depression. Newspaper predictions of marches in 1931 and 1933 never came true. Some townspeople feared radicalism might develop, and perhaps for that reason supported an increase in the relief budget, but no protest occurred. Nevertheless, from 1929 to 1933, Middletown relief costs rose by 600 percent.[5]

Some of Piven and Cloward's key sources on the unemployed workers' movement also reach conclusions that differ sharply from those presented in *Poor People's Movements*. The leading authorities on the movement, Helen Seymour and Roy Rosenzweig, both conclude that the size and impact of the movement were less significant than Piven and Cloward contend. They say that probably only a small fraction of the unemployed, or of the relief population, was involved in protests and organizations of the unemployed. Moreover, they note a high turnover in participation. For many, protest probably was a one-shot affair. Seymour doubts that the movement influenced relief appropriations significantly; Rosenzweig suggests that demonstrations and organizations of the unemployed "helped create pressure" but concludes that their major accomplishment was resolving individual grievances of the unemployed.

THESE AND OTHER STUDIES also suggest that protest was not as disruptive as Piven and Cloward imply. Large and frequently violent demonstrations were common in the spring of 1930. But the constant repression and the failure of this tactic to win concessions prompted leaders to change their strategy. The unemployed began abandoning the movement as they discovered that "all their 'radical militancy' got them was a crack on the skull from a police club." So, in late 1930, the Communists, followed by the Socialists and Musteites, began forming local organizations that resolved many individual grievances of the unemployed. Some mildly disruptive tactics were used—crowding relief offices—but many less belligerent methods were employed as well—grievance representation, hunger marches, or public hearings.[6]

From all of the available evidence, I conclude that Piven and Cloward overstate the extent and impact of protest by the unemployed in the 1930s. It is implausible to argue that the scattered and sporadic protests forced local leaders around the country to increase relief, and it is difficult to claim that the federal government was threatened by the insurgency of the poor. How then do we account for the enactment and expansion of relief programs? Most observers simply point out that the need indeed was dramatic, widespread, and obvious. Such a comment may not be sufficient—but neither is that given by Cloward and Piven.[7]

The authors' critique of organization in the unemployed workers' movement can be summarized as follows. Around 1935, relief expenditures started to decline. Piven and Cloward believe that, had organizers incited more disruption, the poor might have won more relief. Instead, organizers formed the Workers' Alliance of America, a national organization that lobbied for welfare legislation. This shift "from disruption to organization" spelled defeat. "By seeking to achieve more substantial reform through organization and electoral pressure, they forfeited local disruptions and became, however inadvertently, collaborators in the process that emasculated the movement."

Forming the Alliance may have been a mistake, but Piven and Cloward's analysis—especially their phrase "from disruption to organization"—oversimplifies matters. There was a change from local organization to national organization. Local "disruptions" were neither unorganized nor very disruptive. "Disruption" in this case refers to a variety of tactics—such as rallies, grievance representation, public hearings—carried out by loosely structured local organizations. Nationally based radical parties formed many of these groups—which, in practice, usually operated independently or with citywide coordination, and only occasionally on a state or even national level. This larger coordination was indispensible to the most impressive protests of the period—the March 6, 1930 demonstrations.

These local groups united to form the Workers' Alliance. Because the Alliance was an internally democratic membership organization, taking on national instead of local targets, it was organizationally more rigid than its component groups had been. Resources were invested in building the organization rather than in local activities. This *form* of organization was probably unsuited to the unemployed, a highly unstable constituency. Local organization, however, could more easily tolerate the high turnover in

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membership, the participants' lack of resources, and the need for quick victories.

Although there are good reasons for criticizing the Alliance, it is not clear, from the available evidence, what strategy would have been best. Obviously, a number of factors limited the movement's potential impact, no matter which strategy it followed. The enactment of public-works programs and a slight decrease in unemployment began to divide the ranks of the unemployed, who believed FDR had their best interests at heart and now were less inclined to protest. And now, with the public's growing confidence in the government and the economy, the earlier widespread acceptance of the need for relief disintegrated.[8]

There is little reason to believe that disruption could have prevented this change in attitudes. Seymour notes that occupations of the statehouses in four states during 1935 resulted in many arrests and in condemnation of the protesters, but not in concessions. Rosenzweig suggests that the Alliance had limited success as a pressure group from the left within the New Deal coalition, but its influence is difficult to measure.[9] I would conclude that an emphasis on local organization would have been best. Local actions would not necessarily have threatened local leaders, but they could have been designed to show that unemployment was still widespread, in order to sustain the coalition, which had supported relief. This strategy might have prevented the isolation of the poor.

The Industrial Workers' Movement

Piven and Cloward contend that U.S. industrial workers in the 1930s won a variety of concessions from government because of their disruptions (strikes), not because of the power of organization. They provide evidence in support of this assertion for only two reforms, Section 7a of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Wagner Act. (Other reforms are mentioned but not discussed.) Furthermore, the authors do not provide a consistent explanation of the passage of these reforms. The dominant explanation, which mirrors their general theory, is that the state conceded to the disruptive power of the strike. Such statements as "the disruptive political force exerted by mass strikes had compelled the federal government [to grant reforms]" exemplify this view. But the authors also use a second line of argument, emphasizing the workers' electoral power. At times the authors suggest that the majority party enacted reforms in order to satisfy a key group—labor—in its electoral constituency. This emphasis on coalitions approximates liberal or pluralist theory and seems to contradict Piven and Cloward's general argument. But distinctions between these two arguments are lost, obscured by the manner in which they are woven into the narrative. Most confusing is the authors' use of the language of disruption to describe electoral processes: "The strike movement threatened electoral disruption"; workers had a "disruptive impact in electoral politics"; there was an "electoral impact of disruptions." Some casual relationship between strikes and political change may be implied here, but the language makes that difficult to discern.

As an alternative to the vague and seemingly contradictory explanations provided by Piven and Cloward, I offer the following explanation of the passage of these reforms. I suggest that Section 7a was not passed in response to disruption, since strike activity was very low at the time. It was added to FDR's recovery package for political balance, as will be noted below. Section 7a said that workers had the right to organize, but it did not delineate that right. It did, however, provoke a wave of strikes that quickly revealed the ambiguities of the legislation: would the right to organize be enforced, and by whom? What would be considered fair labor practices by employers or organizers? How would the representatives of workers be chosen, and could they claim to speak for all or only some employees? The federal government was compelled to intervene in these strikes in order to clarify its policy on the issues. But whether the government favored business or labor in resolving these questions depended more on the dynamics of political coalitions than on the level of disruption. Note, for instance, that the Wagner Act, which settled many issues to labor's advantage, was first defeated in 1934 but then passed in 1935. It passed the second time around, I shall argue, because of labor's enhanced position in the Democratic party and the increased strength of the Democrats—not because of labor's strike power.

The National Industrial Recovery Act and its Section 7a were formulated in the spring of 1933, when FDR took office, and it passed in June. Measured by the number of strikes or workers involved, strike activity was very low in the period 1928-32, compared to previous or subsequent years. Strike activity rose dramatically in the *second half* of 1933. This chronology suggests that disruption did not force the government to grant 7a; if anything, 7a *provoked* disruption.

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Historians of the Depression have noted that Section 7a was enacted in a period of industrial peace and may actually have precipitated strikes. Labor leaders proposed and lobbied strongly for 7a. According to Irving Bernstein, Roosevelt supported 7a, belatedly, in order to claim labor's endorsement of the recovery package. In addition, 7a seemed innocuous, because of labor quiescence at the time and because the NIRA industrial codes were expected to resolve the ordinary strike issues.

But 7a, as Bernstein noted, initiated a political battle over labor law that culminated in the passage of the Wagner Act. Organizing drives were launched, and the number of strikes escalated. The many ambiguities of the legislation soon became the focal points of labor disputes. FDR answered the calls for federal mediation of strikes by creating the National Labor Board in August of 1933. But while the NLB was prolabor, it depended on the probusiness NRA for enforcement of its rulings. The two agencies clashed, particularly on the question of majority representation: would the representatives elected by a majority of workers be entitled to represent all workers before management, or only their supporters? The NLB said all workers, the NRA disagreed. These conflicts continued until the Wagner Act was approved, which legislated majority (as opposed to proportional) representation and settled other issues to labor's advantage.[10]

The key question is: why was the Wagner Act rejected in June of 1934, but approved in the same essential form in June of 1935? Piven and Cloward do not give an adequate explanation. Most of their chapter devoted to this task is spent describing various strikes. There is no mention of the NLB/NRA conflict, or of the various aspects of labor law that were left unresolved by 7a and were to be the subject of the political conflict in the period 1933-35. As for the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, the authors merely say, "A year later the timing was right, and labor agitation had helped make it so." But the evidence tends to disprove that contention. Piven and Cloward do not show that there was a quantitative increase in strike activity between 1934 and 1935 (there was not); nor can they demonstrate a qualitative difference. They describe at length the major strikes of 1934 and 1936, but mention none in 1935. They concentrate on four "upheavals" of 1934—strikes that won notoriety for intense and often violent conflict. These were the strikes of Auto-Lite in Toledo during April and May, of the Minneapolis truckers in May, of the San Francisco longshoremen in May through July, and of the textile workers in New England and the South in August and September.

Did these upheavals provoke passage of the Wagner Act? The chronology leads one to doubt it. In May and June of 1934, when Roosevelt and many congressmen chose not to support the Wagner bill, three of the four upheavals had just occurred or were occuring. Must some lag time pass before the state responds to disruption? Perhaps, but the legislative history suggests that the state can respond swiftly. Bernstein says the strike situation in the late spring led some to support the Wagner bill. However, proponents of the measure, realizing they did not have the votes to win, planned to delay action on labor law reform until after the November elections. That plan was upset when the possibility of a steel strike arose late in May, which was more threatening to the economy and to Roosevelt's recovery plans than the localized strikes in Toledo, Minneapolis, and San Francisco. At that point Roosevelt decided it was necessary to pass some policy to clarify 7a, because the NLB was practically paralyzed. He proposed Public Resolution 44, which was less favorable to labor than the Wagner bill. While many fought for the Wagner bill, they lost out to FDR's forces. The crucial point, then, is that in the wake of these strikes and strike threats, Congress and the President rejected the Wagner bill and passed instead a measure of less benefit to labor.

Why was the bill rejected in 1934 but approved in 1935? Historians suggest three reasons: (1) the 1934 congressional elections; (2) Roosevelt's break with business; (3) the Supreme Court ruling declaring the NIRA unconstitutional. Unlike most interim elections, in 1934 the ruling party turned its already sizable majorities in both Houses to landslide proportions. In the aftermath, Democrats outnumbered Republicans by 45 in the Senate, and by 219 in the House. Moreover, Northern and urban members dominated the Democratic majorities.

While Roosevelt's relations with business had oscillated over the previous year, a publicly recognized split occurred in the spring of 1935. The election paved the way, and the Chamber of Commerce precipitated the break by publicly opposing almost all New Deal legislation at its spring meeting in 1935. As a result, many believe, FDR moved to consolidate his support among workers and farmers.

Another factor was the constitutionality of the NIRA, now being tested in the courts. If the NIRA, and with it Section 7a, was struck down, most

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people reasoned, the Wagner bill would meet the same fate. Before the Supreme Court acted, Wagner got his bill passed in the Senate. At that point, Roosevelt endorsed it. Three days later, the Supreme Court declared Title I of the NIRA unconstitutional. This had a curious effect on the Wagner bill. Proponents felt a greater sense of urgency, now that labor did not even have 7a—and FDR too stepped up his support. Many opponents, meanwhile, believed they could vote for the bill to win labor's support, and rely on the courts to nullify it in order to please business. Thus, ten days later, the House approved the bill without a roll call. The epilogue came in 1937: labor's foes were unhappily surprised when the Supreme Court upheld the Wagner Act.

Whether or not these factors constitute an adequate explanation for the passage of the Wagner Act, it is clear that Piven and Cloward's explanation does not fit with the evidence. There is little reason to believe that strikes forced the government to grant reforms. The chronology of disruption and reform makes it difficult to claim that either 7a or the Wagner Act was passed in response to disruption. And although strikes may have kept the issue of labor law on the public agenda, the passage of a bill favorable to labor did not depend on the exercise of labor's strike power. It seems we can better account for labor's political victories and defeats in the Depression by looking at labor's emerging position in the Democratic coalition than merely by noting its ability to strike.

LET US NOW EXAMINE Piven and Cloward's thesis about organization in light of the industrial workers' movement. The authors' assessment of unions provides the empirical foundation for their general criticism of organization. "The experience of labor unions in the United States is the historical bedrock on which the organizer's credo is grounded." That credo—according to Cloward and Piven—was erroneous then and is so today. The historical bedrock "turns out to be sand. Factory workers had their greatest influence . . . *before they were organized into unions.* Their power was not rooted in organization, but in their capacity to disrupt the economy." (Authors' emphasis.)

Piven and Cloward's argument has two parts. First, disruptions were "unorganized," or occurred "despite exisiting unions rather than because of them." Second, once industrial unions were formed, workers suffered a decline in economic and political power. Organization not only failed to win new victories from government, but "those already won were whittled away." The authors' first argument rests on an unjustified antithesis between disruption and organization. It is true, as many have pointed out, that the AFL generally failed to organize industrial workers in the early 1930s. But the authors exaggerate: "At this stage, organization failed, and perhaps for that reason, the workers' movement grew." A more reasonable conclusion would be: at this stage, the AFL failed, and new organizations were formed by those interested in industrial unionism.

Leadership and coordination were crucial to the major strikes of the 1930s, and especially to those strikes Piven and Cloward consider successes. These were not won by the work of individual agitators. Instead, several organizations, which existed prior to the strikes, were responsible for planning, inciting, and directing them. These organizations included the CP and other radical parties, and the unions that formed the CIO. The sit-down strikes in particular would never have succeeded without the careful planning provided by such organizations.

The role of organization is best seen in individual cases, as those of the steel and auto industries. It is true, as Piven and Cloward argue, that rank-and-file steel workers formed many locals on their own. But it is doubtful that these isolated unions could have taken on U.S. Steel without the centralized Organization provided by John L. Lewis's Steel Workers Organizing Committee, or the $2.5 million provided by the Mine Workers' treasury. Similarly, Piven and Cloward overlook the months of preliminary organizing and elaborate planning that made the 1936 auto strike a success. UAW and CIO leaders developed a plan for strategic, selective sit-downs, by which a small number of men succeeded in stopping GM.[11]

But what about the aftermath of a strike? Piven and Cloward believe that building a permanent membership organization constitutes a loss of power, not a means of defending and increasing the gains won in a strike. However, in the section in which they consider "Organization and Economic Power," they discuss only whether unions curb strikes—not whether they win economic benefits. Had they looked at the latter issue, they would have found a rare consensus among economists: it is generally agreed that union members receive greater economic benefits than nonunion workers. Since the 1950s, studies comparing workers in different industries or in the same industry have found that union members receive higher wages.[12]

Piven and Cloward's argument about unions

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and political power also has its problems. The authors select the 1940s as the period in which to evaluate labor's political muscle. In that decade, both the AFL and the CIO set up permanent political organizations, and labor also suffered two serious legislative defeats with the passage of the Smith-Connally and Taft-Hartley Acts. But while Piven and Cloward believe these defeats illustrate labor's political powerlessness, their argument runs against the chronology of events. They state, "Of the 219 Democratic congressmen who had voted for Smith-Connally, 191 had been supported by PAC," the CIO's Political Action Committee. However, PAC *was not even created until a month after passage of Smith-Connally*, in July of 1943. After that legislative defeat, the CIO realized it needed a political organization. Similarly, Piven and Cloward regard Taft-Hartley as the prime indication of the failure of organization. But at the time of its passage in 1947, PAC was still inexperienced, and the AFL had no political organization. The AFL established its political arm *after* passage of Taft-Hartley. In the 1948 elections—which Piven and Cloward fail to discuss—labor's political organizations were at least partially responsible for the defeat of many supporters of Taft-Hartley and for the reelection of many of its opponents.[13]

Although Piven and Cloward recognize that Taft-Hartley was a significant defeat for labor, they ignore one of the most important facts about the act: namely, that it was passed in response to the strike wave of 1946-47, the largest in the country's history. In 1946, the number of man-days lost because of strikes was more than five times greater than in the peak year of strikes during the Depression (1937), and ten times greater than in 1935. There were major strikes in the auto, coal, rail, and maritime industries, and a national telephone strike occurred during the week of House debate on Taft-Hartley. According to Piven and Cloward's model, one would expect this disruption to lead to concessions. But, instead, Congress reacted by approving a bill that was bitterly antilabor.[14]

Piven and Cloward do not examine the 1950s, 60s, or 70s. It would be more appropriate to test labor's political effectiveness in these decades than in the 1940s, since, after 1948, labor was fully involved in electoral politics. In light of labor's at least limited successes on social welfare legislation, and its influence within the Democratic party, it is implausible to conclude that organization does not yield power. One may argue that labor's leaders are too complacent, that they do not represent the true interests of the rank and file, or that labor would be better off as the base of a third party rather than wedded to the Democrats. But these arguments condemn labor's politics, not the principle of organization. Nor can one say that organization automatically leads to this brand of nonoppositional reformist politics: witness the more radical and highly organized European labor movements. If we are to criticize or explain labor's reformist politics, we must look at historical and structural reasons specific to the U.S., rather than to the phenomenon of organization as such.

Poor People's Movements: A Manual for Organizers?

In light of the foregoing analysis, we can now evaluate Piven and Cloward's "strategy"—that is, their call for disruption and their criticisms of organization. From the cases examined here, one doubts the wisdom of "pushing turbulence to its outer limits." The violent demonstrations organized by the Communists in the spring of 1930 were repeatedly and brutally repressed, and were apparently no more successful than the less belligerent tactics used by other unemployed groups. Hence, the Communists turned to a less militant approach. The strike wave of 1946 was far more disruptive than anything during the New Deal, but the result was Taft-Hartley.

Because disruptive tactics can be effective at times, a calculated use of disruption is surely more powerful than blind militancy. It is easier to sustain disruption where it is legal (some strikes and economic boycotts); where it is not, the cost and consequences of probable repression should be evaluated in advance. And when the poor need the support of other groups—as they often do—a strategy of maximizing disruption can be self-defeating, because it may alienate potential supporters. Unfortunately, Piven and Cloward ignore these considerations, write off the costs of disruption, and simply advocate mass defiance.

Piven and Cloward's critique of organization is inadequate as well. Although they have some valid complaints against membership organizations, their hostility to organization per se clearly goes further. They seem to believe that organizations cannot even generate disruption, but few of the incidents they mention can be considered either spontaneous or unorganized, and incidents on which they dwell—the March 6, 1930 rallies, the sit-down strikes, the Birmingham campaign in the

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civil rights movement—were indeed elaborately organized.

The authors also disdain all formal membership organizations in these cases. But I would conclude that some are effective and others not, for reasons more specific than simply "formal organization." One can argue persuasively that the Workers' Alliance, like the National Welfare Rights Organization, was a failure. In both cases the constituency was marginal or impermanent. These attempts to create national poor people's lobbies floundered because the membership was too small, too unstable, and lacked the resources necessary to sustain a national membership organization. Local organizations, looser in structure, could cope more effectively with the turnover in membership and the meager resources of participants.

But formal organization of industrial workers does yield power. Unlike the unemployed, this constituency is stable, and there is an institutional context that facilitates interaction and association. In large part because of the accomplishments of unions, it seems improper to call industrial workers "poor people."

Those who call for spontaneity and disdain unions for industrial workers should remember the example of the Industrial Workers of the World. The IWW was perhaps the American labor organization most committed to Piven and Cloward's strategy. The Wobblies distrusted organization, refused to enter into contract agreements, and preferred direct and often spontaneous agitation in strikes. Their tactics won them momentary fame in the successful Lawrence textile strike of 1912 and in a few other strikes at the time. But in Lawrence and elsewhere, the IWW failed to protect workers from management's reprisals after the strike. Moreover, their disruptive tactics increasingly brought police repression. The Wobblies' reliance on spontaneity and their failure to form permanent unions may have spelled their doom. By 1913, one executive board member, doubting the future of the organizaton, wrote:

> At present we are to the labor movement . . . what the high-diver is to the circus. . . . We attract the crowds. We give them thrills, we do hair-raising stunts and send the crowd home to wait impatiently for the next sensationalist to come along. As far as making Industrial Unionism fit the everyday life of the workers we have failed miserably. . . . Unless we organize the workers without doing the spectacular, we are doomed.[15]

Today, such a strategy would have even less of a chance for success. Spontaneous, localized outbursts of disruption will do little to modern corporations with their automated technologies and international capital flow.

In their new Introduction to the recent paperback edition of *Poor People's Movements* (Vintage, 1979), Piven and Cloward seem to retreat from their call for mass disruption and their condemnation of organization. Instead, they suggest their purpose was to criticize the strategy of forming "mass membership bureaucracies." This critique is quite modest in comparison to the militancy that characterizes the book. But even this point is not well developed. They note, for example, the well-known rigidities in the union structure, but they admit in the end that unions do protect workers, and the authors fail to offer any alternatives. They point out the pitfalls in forming mass-membership organizations of the unemployed in both the 1930s and 1960s; but their insights are not surprising and not much different than the arguments of many organizational theorists.

What then does *Poor People's Movements* give us? It is a well-intentioned effort at comparative history, though the strategical conclusions seem faulty, and the empirical material is often inaccurate and simplistic. But, despite the flaws in their analysis, we must acknowledge that the pessimistic tone of *Poor People's Movements* seems to ring true.

We still must ponder, why did America's protest movements achieve so little?

The answer lies beyond the scope of Piven and Cloward's inquiry into disruption and organization. Several factors, specific to the American experience, have put limits on protest movements and, generally, on working-class oppositional politics. These include the absence of workers' class consciousness, the two-party dominance of the political system, and ethnic divisions among workers. These and other factors—too complex to examine here so briefly—have long been discussed by those who seek to account for the absence of a mass socialist movement in the most advanced industrial capitalist society.

Because of their failure to examine these influences, Piven and Cloward can explain the demise of protest solely by pointing to the axis of disruption and organization. This is an insufficient explanation, and so it yields an inadequate strategy. Piven and Cloward may believe that the obstacles to sustained working-class oppositional politics in America are practically immovable—the

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left can only hope to wrest concessions from the system periodically. But even for this goal, the strategy has serious flaws. And if we desire something more than periodic concession, then Piven and Cloward's advice is woefully inadequate.

A mass-based left will be created only through some form of "organization." Past organizational achievements are stepping stones for future struggles, even though new leadership or political alliances may be needed to overcome old organizational rigidities. Instead of condemning organization, we must determine what kinds of organizations work best in different circumstances. To simply wait for the next protest movement, as Piven and Cloward suggest, will only deepen the despair so evident in *Poor People's Movement*.□

Notes

•*Acknowledgement*: I am very grateful to Robert Amdur and Theda Skocpol for their help on this article.

[1]Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People's Movements* (New York: Pantheon, 1977. Paperback, with authors' new Introduction, New York: Vintage, 1979). All quotations, unless otherwise identified, are from this book.

[2]Michael Lipsky, *Protest in City Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970), esp. chaps. I, VI, VII.

[3]Emma Winslow, *Trends in Different Types of Public and Private Relief in Urban Areas, 1929-1935* (Washington: GPO, 1937), pp. 8-16, 69-72, 96-101. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Relief Expenditures by Governmental and Private Organizations, 1929 and 1931* (Washington: GPO, 1932), pp. 25-35. U.S. Congress, *Unemployment Relief*, Hearings on S. 5125, Pt. I, 1933, p. 169.

[4]Roy Rosenzweig, "Organizing the Unemployed: The Early Years of the Great Depression, 1929-1933," *Radical America*, July-August 1976, pp. 38-44. Daniel Leab, "'United We Eat': The Creation and Organization of the Unemployed Councils in 1930," *Labor History*, Fall 1967, pp. 304-305.

[5]Robert S. and Helen Merrell Lynd, *Middletown in Transition*, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1937), pp. 14-15, 102-30, 541-42.

[6]Leab, op. cit. pp. 313-14. Rosenzweig, "Organizing. . . . " pp. 40-44 and his "Radicals and the Jobless," *Labor History*, Winter 1975. Helen Seymour, *When Clients Organize* (Chicago: American Public Welfare Association, 1937.) See also Eleanor Kahn, "Organizations of the Unemployed as a Factor in the American Labor Movement," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1934.

[7]In an earlier book, Piven and Cloward suggest federal relief was the result of party competition, not protest. See *Regulating the Poor*, (New York: Vintage, 1971), pp. 68-70.

[8]E. Wight Bakke, *Citizens Without Work* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), p. 40.

[9]Seymour, op. cit., pp. 29-30. Rosenzweig, "Organizing . . . " pp. 23-24.

[10]On these issues and the Wagner Act, see Irving Bernstein, *Turbulent Years* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), or his *The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950); also Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Roosevelt* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959).

[11]See Bernstein, *Turbulent Years*, p. 453; and Wyndham Mortimer, *Organize!* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 102-22; also Sidney Fine, *Sit-Down* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969).

[12]The literature is voluminous. See H. G. Lewis, *Unionism and Relative Wages in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); George Johnson, "Economic Analysis of Trade Unionism," *American Economic Review*, May 1975, pp. 23-28.

[13]J. D. Greenstone, Labor in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 50, 55. Joseph Rosenfarb, "Labor's Role in the Election," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. VIII, 1946; Harry Scoble, "Organized Labor in Electoral Politics," *Western Political Quarterly*, September 1963.

[14]Bernstein, *Emergency Disputes and National Policy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), pp. 92-93; also U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970*, Part I, (Washington: GPO, 1975), p. 179.

[15]Melvin Dubofsky, *We Shall Be All* (New York: New York Times Books, 1969 and 1974), p. 188. See also James Weinstein, "The IWW and American Socialism," *Socialist Revolution*, Summer 1970. □

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Robert L. Heilbroner

The Labor Theory of Value Revisited

The following article is excerpted from *Marxism: For and Against*, by Robert L. Heilbroner, © 1980 by Robert L. Heilbroner, to be published by W. W. Norton & Co. late in February.

I

Marx's view of capitalism is essentially historic, always on guard against temptations to depict the system in abstract terms that have no historical concreteness. Capitalism in his eyes is a stage and a staging ground in a long historic journey. Yet, to our surprise, his socioanalysis of the system does not begin with a description of its historic origins, a matter that does not receive direct attention until the very end of Volume I of *Capital*. Instead, the examination begins with what appears to be an unremarkable aspect of the system, indeed its simplest and seemingly most understandable element. This is the everyday commodity, the individual good in which the wealth of the system is incorporated. As the first sentence of *Capital* reads: "The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as an 'immense accumulation of commodities,' its unit being the single commodity."[1]

The choice of the commodity as the point of entry into capitalism seems odd. Why not the business enterprise, the locus of the distinctive form of productive activity in capitalism? Why not the marketplace, the social institution that organizes and colors so much of capitalist economic life? Why not an abstract model of the system as a whole, setting before our eyes the framework of ideas that would subsequently be demonstrated in detail?

The answer is that these and other apparently basic concepts or institutions reveal themselves from Marx's perspective to be aspects of the system that can only be understood after we have grasped its quintessential nature. Indeed, it will be Marx's purpose to enable us to see *through* the false simplicity by which business enterprise or the market mechanism or the larger structure of the system are ordinarily represented as the elemental building blocks of capitalism. And for this purpose, the "ordinary" commodity offers a special point of entry, just as daily speech or nightly dreams serve as portals through which the psychoanalyst can enter the hidden domain of the unconscious. For Marx the commodity is the simplest appearance through which we can pass to discover the essence of the system. The essence is contained in an aspect of the commodity familiar to economics since Aristotle. It is the double nature of a commodity. Commodities are objects that embody usefulness or pleasures for mankind—*use-values* as Marx called them, following the lead of the classical economists. But commodities also embody *exchange value*, the capacity to command other objects or money in the transactions of daily life.

Again since Aristotle, economists have been struck by, and have sought to explain, the relation between these two attributes of a commodity:

> The things which have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no value in exchange [writes Adam Smith]; and on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use. Nothing

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> is more useful than water: but it will purchase scarce any thing. . . .A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value in use; but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it.[2]

Marx had relatively little to say at first about use-values as a key to capitalist reality. Commodities are useful, he notes, insofar as they are combinations of two elements—matter and labor.

> If we take away the useful labour expended on them [he writes], a material substratum is always left, which is furnished by Nature without the help of man. . . .We see, then, that labour is not the only source of material wealth, of use-values produced by labour. As William Petty says, labour is the father of material wealth, the earth is its mother.[3]

It is not, however, because of their use-values that Marx chooses the commodity as his point of entry into capitalism. The socioanalytic question is raised by the exchange values that commodities "possess." For this attribute of commodities does not reside in them in the way that use-values do—because the labors of men or the properties of the earth are physically incorporated in a bolt of cloth or a sack of grain to give them their capacities to serve their users. Rather, the exchange values possessed by commodities are put there by society. For commodities in society do not exchange *in differing ratios*, as would likely be the case if individual hunters bartered their deer against the salmon caught by individual fishermen. What we find, instead, is that society manages to establish ratios that determine, for all its members, the terms on which deer can be exchanged for salmon (or to generalize the transaction, for money). Thus we learn from the newspaper or from visiting stores that a pound of venison sells for $2.00 and a pound of salmon for $4.00, so that a common exchange ratio of 1:2 has taken the place of the innumerable ratios that might have prevailed had individual hunters exchanged their products with individual fishermen. The puzzle of exchange value is how this social determination is made and what it represents.

Here we begin to pry open the commodity. What we find at first, however, is something already discovered and explored by the classical economists. For Marx is only following in the footsteps of Ricardo (and along the broad trail blazed by Smith) when he asserts that the regulating principle by which society establishes its common ratio of exchange is the quantity of labor that is embodied in each commodity, including the labor stored up in the tools or machinery used in its production. Marx would therefore have concurred entirely with Ricardo when the latter wrote:

> Suppose that in the early stages of society, the bows and arrows of the hunter were of equal value, and of equal durability, with the canoes and implements of the fisherman, both being the produce of the same quantity of labour. Under such circumstances the value of the deer, the produce of the hunter's day's labour, would be exactly equal to the value of the fish, the produce of the fisherman's day's labour.[4]

This assertion that labor is the regulator of exchange values, or prices, is commonly thought to be "the labor theory of value" on which the Marxian analysis of capitalism is conceptually based. But the determination of exchange ratios is by no means the most important consequence for Marx of his analysis of value. On the contrary, what fascinates Marx—and what he chides the classical economists for having failed to note—is the existence of a fundamental question whose answer has already determined that quantities of labor will be the regulators of exchange relationships. *This unexamined question is how we are able to use labor as a means for establishing ratios of exchange.*

For there is nothing in the concrete reality of labor that qualifies it to be a common denominator of "value" within commodities. On the contrary, labor as we see it in life consists of actions as different and as uncomparable as the traditional apples and oranges. The labor that is required to catch a

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salmon is altogether different from, and unusable for, that needed to capture a deer. Therefore if labor is to become a means of comparing or measuring the values of commodities, the individualized and differentiated activities of hunters and fishermen, farmers and factory workers, must be reduced to a common kind, as undifferentiated and quantifiable as grain or coal.

Here is where Marx's analysis begins to show its power. For his argument reveals that it requires a particular set of historic circumstances to bring about such a peculiarly "abstract" kind of labor. This particular set of circumstances is, of course, the mode of production called capitalism. Capitalism is a socioeconomic system built on profit gained from production, not from plunder, sharp trading with foreigners, or feudal exactions. It therefore organizes its productive mechanism in such a way as to reduce the costs of production to a minimum. In turn, as Adam Smith was the first to point out, this impels capitalist manufacturers to seek what Smith called a "division of labour"—a method of reducing individuated and differentiated work to routine and regular motions. Thus the profit drive itself creates powerful forces to homogenize labor and to simplify its form.

Not less important, the capitalist mode of production creates a market for labor, rather than a traditional man-master relationship. The prehistory of capitalism, Marx shows, is characterized by a violent separation of peasants and artisans from direct access to, or ownership of, the means of production. Peasants are separated from their lands by the enclosure movement that gives rise to commercial agriculture; artisans are driven from their crafts by the superior efficiency of nascent merchant-capitalist operations.[5]

Thus a market for homogenized labor arises because dispossessed peasants and artisans are forced to offer their labor power in the form needed by the social class that now owns the farms and manufacturing establishments. Labor becomes ever simpler as a consequence of the division of tasks; and the labor force becomes the provider of this homogenized labor power because it has no other way of securing a livelihood. In this way the rise of capitalism brings into being a new form of labor that is indeed capable of being bought and sold like coal or grain, a homogeneous commmodity called labor power created out of the original heterogeneous labors of precapitalist modes.

In this way Marx's socioanalysis reveals that the classical assumption of a common kind of labor within all commodities poses the question for, not the answer to, the problem of value. The labor theory of value in Marx's hands is therefore not merely a key to exchange ratios. Much more important, it is the key to the historic past of capitalism, the clue to the existence of social relationships essential for, but now half concealed from, capitalist society. What appears to naive eyes as the external reality of work becomes, from a Marxist perspective, the specific form of work required by the capitalist process. What appears as the eternal personage of the worker becomes the unique status and discipline of the working person under the duress of capitalist institutions. And what was formerly only a simple unit of wealth called a commodity now appears, in Marx's words, as a "social hieroglyphic."[6]

II

The decipherment of the social hieroglyphic of the commodity thus alerts us in the first instance to the fact that a commodity is not just a thing but also a bearer of social relationships. From this more follows. For the two-fold nature of a commodity—on the one hand a concrete thing indisputably possessing use-values, on the other a container of invisible social relationships—brings a special and far-reaching mystification to our perception of capitalist realities.

Marx calls this mystification *the fetishism of commodities*. By this he means that the exchangeability of commodities appears to result from their physical properties, not from the hidden social relationships that, by filling them with abstract labor, endow them with their attributes of exchange value. Thus, as Marx writes, a "definite social relation between men themselves . . . assumes . . . the

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fantastic form of a relation between things."[7]

There are few insights in all of Marx's writings as striking as the fetishism of commodities—indeed, few in all of social science. The perception that commodities possess the property of exchange value because they are the repositories of an abstract form of labor; that this abstract labor testifies to the social and technical relationships of a specific mode of production; and that a commodity is therefore the carrier and the encapsulation of the social history of capitalism—all this comes as a stunning realization.

The realization has many applications, not least the light that it throws on our conventional depiction of how wealth arises under capitalism. Economists from early days have taught us that wealth is the result of land, labor, and capital bestowing their respective contributions to the production of useful things. But the land and capital of which economists speak refer only to the thing-like aspects of resources and artifacts, which do indeed always enter into commodities to help endow them with their use values. Land and capital, however, like labor, are also social relationships—namely, the right accorded to the owners of land and capital to exert a claim on production on behalf of the contribution to output made by "their" resources or capital goods. The confusion of this social right with the physical reality of productivity is a central and enduring part of the fetishism that obscures the workings of capitalism. It is because of this confusion that even the most sophisticated economists speak of "land" as if the soil itself, and not the landlord, were being remunerated for its assistance to output, or as if the rewards "due" to capital were paid directly to a machine and not its owner. Thus capitalism becomes, as Marx describes it, "an enchanted topsy-turvy world, in which Monsieur le Capital and Madame la Terre do their ghost walking as social characters and at the same time as mere things."[8]

Were the hypnosis cast by the fetishism of commodities not so powerful, economics, which scrutinizes the mechanisms and institutions of capitalism, would not be the darling social science of bourgeois culture. For the examination of any wealth-gathering system is potentially dangerous for its ruling classes whose disproportionate claims on the material output of society must then be explained, whether by an indifferent acquiescence in plunder and exploitation, or by recourse to religious or traditional rationales.[9]

But, under the capitalist order, a similar transfer of wealth from those who produce it to those who play little or no direct role in the production of wealth can be subjected, without any qualms, to the most precise "scientific" inquiry. For once land and capital, like labor, have been sanctified into things (a Holy Trinity, Marx called them), all such possible subversive interpretations disappear. Land, labor, and capital then appear only as things that "cooperate" to create social wealth, each contributing its measurable share, for which each is properly rewarded. The antagonisms and conflicts apparent in the view of these same things as social relationships, in which some classes work and others exert claims of ownership, is effectively screened from view. The effect of the Marxian identification of the fetishistic element within the humble commodity is therefore shocking. Each commodity becomes in miniature a congelation of forces locked in combat, not in cooperation. No conventional explanation of the world of commodities can ever again be accepted at face value. In this way, Marx's analysis of the commodity gives us a truly socioanalytic insight into the system.

III

So far we have concentrated mainly on the peculiar nature of the labor that endows commodities under capitalism with exchange value. Now we must examine more closely Marx's analysis of the commodity labor power itself. Like all commodities it has a double aspect—usefulness and exchangeability. But Marx has discovered a special attribute of labor power that makes it unlike any other commodity. It is that the act of consuming its use-values yields a "surplus." If

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bread were labor power, so to speak, we would become rich by eating.

This special attribute of labor power comes about because its use-value lies in the products that are produced *for the capitalist* by the working man or woman during the period of time that he or she labors. For one of the conditions of selling labor power as a commodity is that the working person abandons any claim to the product he or she creates. As John Locke could write, without sensing any inconsistency, "the grass my horse has bit, the turfs *my servant* has cut, and the ore I have digged . . . become *my* property without the assignation or consent of anybody."[10] That is why the cars coming off an assembly line, like turfs that Locke's servant has cut, do not belong to the workers or even to the management, but to the company whose "servants" both workers and management are.

But labor power offered on the market as a commodity, Marx pointed out, also has an exchange value. Like all commodities, that value consists of the labor that has gone into its creation. The labor that goes into the creation of "labor power" is the living labor of the present and the stored-up labor of the past required to "make" the labor power offered on the market. To put it differently, it is the wages needed to sustain a worker in his conventional standard of living. This conventional standard need not be a bare minimum. Marx, along with Smith and Ricardo, recognized that "subsistence" was a sociological, not a biological, norm; and that the subsistence required by the labor force would increase as the productive capabilities of society grew.

Nonetheless, in his separation of labor into two constituents—a use-value for the capitalist, determined by the eventual exchange value of the products that labor would create, and an exchange value for the laboring power of the worker, determined by the subsistence wage required by the laborer—Marx discovered what he believed to be the innermost secret of capitalism. The secret was that profit is won not as a result of sharp dealing in the commodity market, but as a normal part of the production of wealth—not in exchange but prior to exchange, in production itself. The source of profit lies in the appropriation by the capitalist of the *surplus value*, or the difference between the value of labor power sold as a commodity by the working class, and the value of the product of that labor power when it is applied by the capitalist in the production process.

THE THEORY OF SURPLUS VALUE is central to Marx's socioanalysis, and we must take a moment to subject it to critical inquiry. At the core of the idea is the difference between labor and labor power. Labor power is the *capacity for work* that an employer buys when he hires a worker for a day or a week. Labor, on the other hand, is the *actual expenditure of human energy and intelligence* that becomes embodied in the commodities that laborers create. Marx's theory of surplus value asserts that there must be a systematic difference between the two—that one must always be able to buy the capacity for work for less than the value that will be created when that capacity is put to use and commodities are brought into being. Indeed, it is only because this difference exists that capital itself can be brought into being.

The idea has a prima facie plausibility in the historic setting in which Marx conceived it, a setting unforgettably portrayed in the ferocious chapter of *Capital* on "The Working Day." As we read the accounts of English factory labor employed for 12- and 14-hour days and paid a near-starvation wage, the existence of surplus value seems as undeniable as the naked extraction of a surplus from slave labor. In fact, however, there is no proof that surplus value existed even under these conditions. If wages were low, so was productivity. Competition among employers was fierce, and profits in many sweated trades may have been very low or even nil. Marx's depiction of surplus value carries the conviction of his outraged sense of justice, but even he did not claim to have "proved" its presence by a resort to empirical evidence.

In fact, Marx's intent was not to show its presence by measurement, but by argument.

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Marx's theory is not one of "unfairness," but of systemic tendencies that will generate surplus value even in situations where there is a formal "equality" of bargaining power, where worker and capitalist meet one another as free agents to enter into wage agreements, and where workers are paid the *full value* of their labor power. For it is his contention that even in such a setting—"the very Eden of the innate rights of man," as he called it[11]—the value of labor power will always be less than the value a capitalist will receive from the commodities that this labor power will produce.

This leads to a very important consequence. If there is surplus value available from hiring labor, one would think that employers would hire more labor to enlarge the base from which they can draw profits. Thus the demand for labor would increase, raising wages. Moreover, wages would continue to increase as capitalists continued to compete for access to surplus value, until there was no more surplus value to be had—that is, until wages were so high that they left no quantum of unpaid labor within the capitalist's commodities.

To forestall that outcome, Marx introduces two elements into the bargaining situation that tilt the balance of power in the favor of the capitalist. Both elements had, in fact, been anticipated by Smith. The first was the weak bargaining power of labor that derived from its inability to subsist very long if it held back its labor. "The workman may be as necessary to his master as his master is to him," wrote Adam Smith, "but the need is not so immediate."[12] Marx relies on this inherent inequality in his assumption that workers have nothing to sell but their labor power, and that capitalists have the bulk of society's wealth at their command. Thus workers cannot mount a strike effective enough to secure the payment of wages equal to the value of their output.

The second surplus-value-protecting element is a "mechanism" that will prevent wages from rising under the stimulus of competition. Again Smith (and Ricardo) preceded Marx with such a mechanism. They believed that the effect of a generalized increase in the demand for labor would be a stimulus to population growth, as the labor force used its increased earnings to produce or rear more children to working age (Smith estimates child mortality at about 50 percent). Marx has no dealings with such population reflexes. But he also relieves the squeeze on surplus value by matching an increase in the demand for labor with an increase in its supply. This comes about because Marx sees the pressure of competition inducing employers to introduce cost-cutting, labor-saving machinery. Technological unemployment thereby creates a "relative overpopulation" that plays the same role as the absolute rise in population proposed by the classical economists.

Thus, in Marx's view, the weak bargaining position of labor and the pressure of technological unemployment both operate systematically to maintain the value of the commodity labor power below the level to which it would otherwise be forced by the competitive bidding of capitalists. Note that these depressant forces do not bear on any other commodity, for instance, the machines the capitalists produce and sell to one another. If there is a "surplus" to be gained from the use of a machine, capitalists will bid for it until its price rises to the value that the machine embodies. Therefore, there can be no permanent layer of surplus available in machines, comparable to that which is maintained within labor power. Labor alone contains a potentially available source of profit—a conclusion that, as we shall see, has great significance for the fate of the system.

BEFORE WE PROCEED to that question, however, there is an issue that requires further exploration. It is the question of whether the theory of surplus value is still relevant in the changed institutional and dynamic conditions of modern capitalism. Does an imbalance in bargaining strength and an undertow of technological unemployent still bring about a permanent differential between the price of labor power—the wages paid to labor—and the value of the labor that is obtained for the payment of these wages?

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Curiously, the matter cannot be settled by direct inspection. Value is an abstract concept, like energy in physics. We do not know, and have no way of measuring, how much "abstract labor" may be embodied in a General Motors car, or whether there is a difference between the labor power for which General Motors pays its wages and the labor it receives in exchange. Between the abstract world of values and the concrete world of prices and wages lies the push and pull of the marketplace. Values, in Marx's scheme, reflect only the outpouring of labor energies, reduced to some common denominator. Prices reflect actual costs, and the ebb and flow of supply and demand. These prices need not—and as Marx pointed out *cannot*—correspond precisely to values. Thus the concrete sum we call "profit" is not the same as the abstract sum of surplus value.[13]

Therefore the relevance of the theory of surplus value must be judged by different criteria. Specifically, we must ask whether the presence of differential class bargaining power, or of technological unemployment, still act to depress wages—the value of labor power—below the value that labor power creates.

Even this is a question difficult to answer with certitude. Insofar as the bargaining position of labor is concerned, undoubtedly the balance has greatly changed since Marx's time. In some industries—those employing farm workers, for example—the superior bargaining strength of the employer is still patently in evidence. In others, such as the garment industry, the preponderance of power may now have swung to labor's side, which often holds the threat of bankruptcy over its employers' heads. In big business, the strength of corporations and unions is perhaps evenly matched, the corporation as likely to yield as the union.

Against this institutional redress of bargaining power, however, must be placed the deliberate efforts of all capitalist governments to prevent labor's strength from "getting out of hand"—that is, from raising wages until profits are squeezed out. In all European capitalisms, without exception, we find the importation of cheap labor forces from low-wage nations, such as Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey, or Portugal.

Unemployment also continues to act as a pressure against wage raises. Whether this unemployment is primarily generated by technological displacement, or by the recurrent crises also envisaged by Marx, is difficult to say, but it hardly matters. For once again we find all capitalist governments deliberately "trading off" unemployment against inflation—which is to say, *creating* unemployment in order to hold down wage increases, and thereby to restrain inflation.

Therefore I think it is a reasonable presumption that labor power sells for less than it would in the absence of pressures produced directly or indirectly by capital itself. To put it differently, wages would rise if labor were stronger, and labor *would* be stronger if its bargaining position were not undermined by economic processes and political policies rooted in the capitalist system. Although this does not "prove" the existence of surplus value (which in any event can never be empirically demonstrated), it is certainly a necessary condition if surplus value is still to exist. *This does not mean, however, that all bookkeeping profit derives from surplus value.* Marx himself recognized the possibility that individual capitalists could increase their profits through monopolistic market power, or by technological advantages, or "unequal exchanges" abroad. He might concede that these are greater sources of profits for large-scale business than in his day; and that some of the forces pressing against wages, especially that of an unequal bargaining power, had been considerably alleviated by the formation of powerful unions and welfare support systems.[14]

The existence of surplus value therefore remains an unprovable proposition exactly as it was in Marx's time. It is an heuristic rather than an operational concept. Its importance lies in its identification of the class struggle and the fetishism of commodities as the essential elements in producing and rationalizing the surplus that is produced by one class and appropriated by another.

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As such, the theory of surplus value provides an explanation for a problem that has always been the Achilles heel of economics, namely, the source of profits. Unwilling to attribute profits to the transfer of wealth from one class to another, bourgeois economists have struggled in vain to explain profits, not as a transient monopoly return or an evanescent technological advantage, but as a *persistent, central feature of the system of capitalism.*

To a limited extent Adam Smith acknowledged the source of all profits in a "deduction" from the reward to labor and , to a bolder but still incomplete degree, Ricardo did the same. Thereafter all efforts to explain profits disappeared before the fetishism that attributed rent to the productivity of the "land," and interest or profits to that of "capital." Marx's contribution was not only to remove the disguise that allowed "land" and "capital" to appear as things, not social relations, but also to explain how the forces generated by the capitalist mode could systematically depress the value of labor power below the value that it would bequeath to commodities. The purpose of the theory of surplus value is therefore to explain what is otherwise inexplicable—the presence of an enduring, although ever-threatened, surplus within the capitalist mode of production. As such, it remains an essential part of Marx's socioanalysis, without which we cannot penetrate to the core of the system.[15] □

NOTES

[1] The interior quotation is from Marx's previous essay, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.*

[2] *Wealth of Nations* (1936), p. 28. For Aristotle, see *The Nicomachean Ethics*, Book V.

[3] *Capital*, Vol. I. (New York: First Vintage Book Edition, 1977), p. 134.

[4] Ricardo, *Principles* (1951), p. 26.

[5] Among many accounts of this process, let me mention Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957); Maurice Dobb, *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (New York: International Publishers, 1947); Paul Mantoux, *The Industrial Revolution in the XVIIIth Century* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1952); and once again, Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Part VIII.

[6] *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 167. There are numerous problems associated with the labor theory of value that cannot be discussed here. Some of them—for example, the problem of deriving "abstract" labor from the concrete labors of men and women, or the task of reducing complex labor to simple labor—involve difficult, even recondite considerations. The labor theory possesses, however, one advantage of immense importance: it gives meaning to the measurement of aggregate production. Conventional neoclassical theory, which eschews a labor theory, is content to depict aggregate production (such as gross national product) as a sum of priced objects, and does not inquire into any real common denominator of that sum. In fact, each object in the collection is regarded by conventional economics as reflecting in its prices the interplay of the marginal utilities that it affords and the marginal disutilities that it requires for its creation. The idea of gross national product is therefore a summation of individuals' utilities and disutilities.

But such a concept is totally at odds with the conventional econimists' premise of the individuality of economic agents. Utilities and disutilities are held to be entirely private states of mind, with no public counterpart to "abstract labor." It is therefore as meaningless to add my utilities and yours as to add my hearing and yours. *This means, however, that there is no objective sense in the assertion that one gross national product is larger than another!*

The labor theory avoids this impasse by the assumption that abstract labor allows two disparate collections of objects to be "weighed" to determine which is larger. This is not only a useful clarification, but might result in a better definition of national income accounts.

[7] *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 165.

[8] *Capital*, Vol. III, p.830.

[9] Thus Aristotle writes, "From the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, some for command" (*Politics*, Book I); or Raymond de Lull, "It is seemly . . . that the knight, who rides and does a lord's work, should get his wealth from the things on which his men spend much toil and fatigue." (*Book of the Order of Chivalry*, cited in *Cambridge Economic History*, Vol. I, p. 277.)

[10] Locke, *Second Treatise on Government* (1962,1975), p. 18. My italics.

[11] *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 280.

[12] *Wealth*, p.66.

[13] Here lies the source of the famous and still controversial "transformation problem." Marx assumes that competition creates a uniform rate of surplus value—that employers in all fields extract the same proportion of surplus value from their workers. He also assumes, as do

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all economists, that competition brings about a more or less uniform rate of profit that employers earn on their total capital. It is apparent, however, that employers do not combine labor and capital (machinery or other nonliving means of production) in the same ratios in all fields. Yet, because Marx assumes that profits arise only from labor, not machinery, the question then arises as to how a common rate of profit can emerge from production processes with unequal labor/capital ratios. The answer is that the market must cause the prices of production to diverge systematically from their values, in order to redistribute surplus values equally in all lines of business. Marx does not demonstrate this process very satisfactorily, and it has engaged the attention of Marxist (and non-Marxist) economists ever since. For a recent review of the problem, see *Journal of Economic Literature*, January 1971 and March 1972 and 1973.

[14] For a recent effort to reconcile the theory of surplus value with corporate profits, see Ernest Mandel, *Late Capitalism*, Chap. 3. For the international transfer of surplus, see Arghiri Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972).

[15] An often heard criticism is that the validity of the labor theory of value is vitiated by the extraordinary power of modern-day technology. This is another example of the fetishism of commodities, leading us to confuse machinery as a source of use-value with its role as a source of exchange value. Marx himself anticipated this objection in a remarkable passage in the *Grundrisse*:

> To the degree that large industry develops, the creation of real wealth comes to depend less on labour time and on the amount of labour employed, than on the power of the agencies set in motion during labour time, whose "powerful effectiveness" . . . depends . . . on the general state of science and on the progress of technology . . . . Labour no longer appears to be included within the production process; rather, the human being comes to relate more as watchman and regulator to the production process itself.

Yet, Marx goes on the say, in words that dispel the fetish:

> Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting rules, etc. These are products of human industry . . . . *They are organs of the human brain, created by the human hand*; the power of knowledge, objectified. [*Grundrisse*, pp. 705, 706. Marx's italics; slight changes in punctuation and wording.] □

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Sanford Pinsker

Erasing the Sixties — Or, Whatever Happened to Mark Rudd?

Americans do not meditate on History; they dream about fresh starts and wide horizons. We are an impatient people, pragmatic to our bones, eager to get on with the business of getting on. It is hardly surprising that our response to the cultural baggage of History has always been a preference for "traveling light." At best, we see the Old through a glass, darkly.

I offer this thumbnail sketch of ahistoricity, American-style, less in a spirit of thrilling discovery than to suggest how potent the mythos still is. Some historians now have consigned the equation of America and Eden to the ashcan—as superficial, exaggerated, filled with more poetry than truth. But the illusion that American history is written on erasable bond persists. Americans operate on the gut belief that men make History, that dreams set events into motion. Yet, it may well be the reverse.

The late '60s were a hothouse for both points of view. Those on the New Left reserved a special contempt for nearly anything that smacked of history; the "old politics," the old left, the old classics, the old verities and, of course, one's Old Man. After warning others "not to trust anybody over 30," it was inevitable that, one day, they would turn thirty themselves. I offer an anecdote that puts our current situation into bold relief.

Imagine a symposium announcing itself as "The Revolution in American Culture" and then imagine the University of New Mexico in 1979. The campus has achieved some measure of national visibility by being featured in a series of Desenex ads, but nobody would claim it stood at the vital cross-roads of American education. Before the formal welcome, much less the first speaker, there were good reasons to believe that the advance billing was going to be more "revolutionary" than the payoff. Still, the middle-sized auditorium was packed as representatives from women's studies, Chicano studies, and American studies held forth. There were "position papers," questions, flickers of debate, even some polite dialogue.

At one point a young man in the standard dress of the Great Outdoors (blue jeans, flannel shirt, hiking boots, bandanna) began to develop the sort of protracted "question" that apparently comes with this territory. It was more an impromptu lecture than a genuine question: eloquent, intense, long-winded. But it was also five o'clock and the moderator felt duty-bound to call the proceedings to a halt. Enough was enough. The audience clapped and then milled toward the exits. The young man came forward to raise his query once again. This time, however, he introduced himself first: "Hello. I'm Mark Rudd."

Ten years ago Mr. Rudd would, no doubt, have taken rather unkindly to the specter of being "cut off" in mid-paragraph. Especially by a faculty member! But whatever else the University of New Mexico might be, it is not Columbia, and 1979 is less than a shadow of 1969. The world has changed—and so has Mark Rudd. He is still something of a political activist, especially where matters nuclear are concerned, but he insists upon a low profile. And in an irony that will probably set some of the grayer heads at Columbia wagging, he has chosen "education" as his undergraduate major.

The cunning of History had other ironies up its sleeve. When a dean was told about the "incident" at the American studies symposium, he had some difficulty *placing* Mr. Rudd. *Sic transit gloria mundi.* The campus newspaper contains nary a mention of Mr. Rudd and few, if any, undergraduate eyebrows would raise if it did. History is not this community's strong suit. Rather, the

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day-to-day anxiety is: Can I get a parking space? Longer-range concerns feature the word "job," as in "Will I be able to get a job?"—"Am I trained for that job?"—"Does this job pay Big Bucks?"

Granted, today's undergraduates are curious about the '60s, but with something of the same casual spirit that their parents stroll through the Smithsonian Institution or tramp across the Gettysburg battlefield. There is, after all, a difference between the "interesting" and the *central.* Mr. Rudd and his compatriots have come to seem a quaint, even slightly exotic, lot. Evidently people really *did* wear outlandish costumes, sport long hair, and wave their fists. The photographs of the era make that very clear. But to a generation not prone to taking History seriously, such is the stuff of which term papers are made.

ADD AN OLD-FASHIONED BRAND of opportunism to this newly fashioned "nostalgia" for the '60s and the result is Jerry Rubin, an ex-Yippie growing as comfortable behind lecterns as he once was atop "the barricades." At the University of New Mexico, the student newspaper billed it as a great chance to "find out what you missed." The article also took pains to include enough pertinent biography and thrilling credentials to make Mr. Rubin seem an appropriate Lazarus "come back to tell us all." It was the standard hype that preceded Rubin as he barnstormed across the mortarboard circuit.

At the University of New Mexico, a hundred + students got it from the horse's mouth. Or, rather, they paid $2 a head to watch Rubin play stand-up comic. Dressed in black trousers, a gray v-neck sweater, and open-collar shirt, he seemed more akin to Mort Sahl than an urban guerrilla. Even his rambling monologue had a Sahlian flavor: "The '70s," Rubin hectored, "are like oatmeal. One day is the same as the next. Can you imagine anyone getting nostalgic about the '70s?" Unfortunately, I could.

It was a predictable evening, one that made good on Saul Bellow's quip about History giving everybody a free ride and Andy Warhol's insistence that anyone in America can be famous for 15 minutes. It also suggested that there was still some gold to be panned in the hills of Woodstock Nation. But dollar signs were not the only source of Rubin's animation. Aging revolutionaries always have a special fondness for the days when they grabbed the headlines, a time when they were younger and more outrageous. Rubin was no exception. Nor was Mark Rudd, who sat up front and watched an old buddy do his shtick. Whatever their current differences, they both savored the Big Moments (Lyndon Johnson declining to run for a second term; the disruptions at the Democratic convention; the domino shut-down of college campuses) and agreed that the Kent State murders had killed the Movement. As Rubin put it, with all the emotion and timing he could muster: "Those bullets said, 'You gonna protest, we gonna kill you.' And they did just that."

Remembering the '60s, he oversimplified them. That Rubin and others overestimate the real achievements of the Movement is understandable, but that they should ignore the costs—in liberality, in tolerance, in a humane spirit—is selective vision of a very different sort. From the shambles of the Democratic convention and, indeed, of the democratic process, our country got Richard Nixon. From the turmoil on the campuses, we now have "expanded collegial governance," a phenomenon *requiring* students to join with faculty members and administrators on wheel-spinning committees. Only the last constituency does this as a full-time, well-compensated job. Rubin might have grappled with some of these vexing by-products of the counterculture, but he was clearly having too much fun cracking one-liners.

As a laborer in the fields of est, Mr. Rubin does not come cheap. Since his heady days as a media radical, he has been a litmus test for the New Consciousness. He once had a thick, Puritan hide—fearful of the body, of glowing health, of material success, or Big Money. But no longer. In *Growing (Up)* at *Thirty-Seven*, Rubin catalogues major landmarks toward Self-Fulfillment "...from 1971 to 1975, I directly experienced est, gestalt therapy, bioenergetics, rolfing, massage, jogging, health foods, tai-chi, Esalen...." The list stretches on, until one becomes convinced that Mr. Rubin must have worked as a marketing analyst for the House of Fads.

Jerry Rubin responds to History by merchandising it. By contrast—and to his credit—Mark Rudd has steadfastly refused. In his case this has meant turning down offers to (a) write a monthly column for *Hustler* magazine, (b) publish a book about his underground experiences, (c) go on the lecture circuit. But there is something both poignant and sad about his recitation of the litany. The pride at being neither exploited nor an exploiter seems to betray a deeper self-righteousness hiding just underneath. And, too, there are doubts—that when the book is finally completed, nobody will care and Mark Rudd will forever suffer the indignities of having to introduce himself.

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LARGER FORCES may be at work. If Christopher Lasch is right about what he calls "the culture of narcissism," more than the '60s will be erased:

> ...Americans seem to wish to forget not only the sixties, the riots, the new left, the disruptions on college campuses, Vietnam, Watergate, and the Nixon presidency, but their collective past....

Lasch is concerned less with selective forgetting than with the vision of a wholesale, national amnesia. Cultural narcissism becomes a dramatic way of focusing on lives out of touch with historical continuity. It insists that we live, albeit desperately, for ourselves and our moment. Neither one's predecessors nor one's posterity matter. The result is a bleak assessment, precisely in the tradition of other American Jeremiads and exactly the sort of text that would appeal to President Carter's evangelical side.

Lasch's thesis disturbs me, not because it is wrong-headed, but because it cuts far too broad a swath. History *per se* becomes the casualty, and we are invited to mourn, if we will, at the wake. Or put another way: why worry about competing notions on what the '60s meant when the deeper truth is that *none* of them matter? I refuse to accept such gloomy logic. To argue that versions of self-gratification (everything from belly-dancing to astrology) have replaced the responsibilities of History is rather like arguing that, because of Studio 54, decadence has replaced baseball as our national pastime.

What seems more likely is that one set of images from the '60s will be replaced by another and that rather than concentrating on the angry, volatile days at the decade's end, these newer images will focus on the earlier, apolitical days. With the exception of professionals like Jerry Rubin, both sides of the generation gap agree that the late '60s were a dreadful time. In this regard, a book like *The Culture of Narcissism* was unnecessary. Americans have never had any difficulty in remembering military victories, but since the Korean War we have been hard-pressed to develop strategies of forgetting. Vietnam continues to be especially galling. The nation watched the war on television, as its social fabric gradually pulled apart. Now, a decade later, no amount of juxtaposing the turmoil of "then" with the languor of now seems very consoling.

BY CONTRAST, images that erase the late '60s by constructing a less complicated alternative, at the moment just before all hell broke loose, can exert a genuine power. A film like *Animal House* is, regrettably, a case in point. The sweep of History is stuck at 1963 and confined to the idyllic campus of Faber College. There, the brothers of Delta House wage a relentless fight against the forces of respectability, whether dressed in academic gowns, ROTC uniforms, or Ivy League collars. There is a good-natured honesty about the lads who throw their beer cans on the floor and their food across the cafeteria. In this film, heavyweight theories about narcissism are reduced to an old-fashioned, hedonistic burp.

Nonetheless, everything conspires to make us cheer for this motley crew. The general scenario is familiar enough: we root for the underdog, the beautiful loser, anybody under Authority's thumb. The unshaven brothers of Animal House are hardly an exception to the rule.

There is, however, a subliminal message flashing just underneath—namely, that the late '60s simply never happened. Animal House freezes college life at a moment when politics were bordered by Greek Row and social responsibility meant stuffing tissue paper into a Homecoming float. More important, notions about what *was* become confused with what *is*. By that I mean, college life is seen as an endless round of toga parties and zany high jinks. No doubt some members of the Class of '63 will feel cheated by the comparisons between Life and Art, but *Animal House* was not made for them. Rather, the film caters to a decidedly younger crowd, one that sees History as both visual and vicarious.

At times this makes for large ironies. As the archvillain of the piece, Dean Wormer brings all the administrative force he can muster against Animal House. In fact, Wormer has become so obsessed with shutting this eyesore down that he looks like Captain Ahab in hot pursuit of the white whale. All this fierce dedication must strike real deans as amusing, especially when they have spent a gloomy afternoon mulling over demographic projections for the 1980s. Which is to say, History has a cunning of its own: well-heeled fraternities do what they can to project a seedy facade and the widespread popularity of *Animal House* may end up saving an avatar of Dean Wormer's hide. After all, an entire generation has gotten the message about college being too much fun to miss.

THAT MUCH SAID, let me hasten to point out that *Animal House* is everything its audience is not: anarchistic, libidinal, antisocial. The plain truth is, students worry themselves sick about future careers and lobby hard for "vocational" courses. "Going wild" is not on this decade's student

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agenda. In this sense *Animal House*—and much of the rest of our popular culture—works to erase the more disturbing confrontations of the late '60s and to fill the historical vacuum with a more acceptable substitute. A rebellion in fantasy is not the same thing as a rebellion in fact. Moreover, because farce insists that everything be played larger than life, it is possible to cheer oneself hoarse on behalf of the "animals" and, at the same time, know full well that the days of three-piece suits and attache cases loom just around the corner.

A meaningful sense of History is only acquired by hard work. "Animal House is, at best, an exercise in escapism; at worst, it will dominate the popular imagination's notion of the '60s. In short, what happened at Wisconsin, at Berkeley, at Columbia—and more important, what these disruptions of "business-as-usual"meant—will grow ever fuzzier. One thing is very clear: if people cannot give a mental design to the '60s, the media will.

Most members of the Class of '83 were born *after* President Kennedy's assassination. Indeed, November 22, 1963 has become one more historical date they are expected to remember and be examined about. Which also means that a certain number of them will get it wrong—some by a year some by a decade, some by a century. In the next decade our sense of "how it was" during that time and in those places will not come from Arthur Schlesinger or Norman Mailer or Robert Lowell, not from *American Mischief* or *Mr. Sammler's Planet*. Rather, it will come from television's retrospectives and documentaries, from assorted "novelizations" and comix and, of course, from rescreenings of *Animal House*.

Scholars will continue to poke at the library dust and to care, but the controversies that raged during the late '60s are over. At least in those particular forms. *Requiescat in pace.* □

To Our Contributors

- When sending manuscripts, please make sure that you do not send your only copy.
- And please also be sure to enclose a stamped, self-addressed envelope.

—The Editors

Harrell Rodgers

The Barred Door: Money and Public Office

There is overwhelming evidence that political power is a class phenomenon in America. From the beginning of the Republic, federal officeholders and most state officials have been drawn from the professional upper-middle-income class of white, Anglo-Saxon males.[1] While the civil-rights and women's movements have modestly increased the representation of minorities and women in high public office, it is still the preserve of the well-educated and well-heeled. (In 1979 there are 15 women and 16 blacks in Congress; of all office-holders less than 1 percent is black, and 8 percent women.)

One obvious barrier to public office is the high cost of a viable campaign—especially for federal office. In recent years it has cost an average of $80,000 to $100,000 to conduct a campaign for a House seat, and around $700,000 for a seat in the Senate. In urban and competitive districts, the cost is much higher. Some House races in 1976 and 1978 cost in excess of $500,000, and Senate races can cost over $1 million. In 1978 one Senator (Jesse Helms) spent $6 million in a successful reelection campaign against a poorly financed opponent.

THE IMPLICATIONS of these spiraling costs are numerous:

- Anyone who cannot hope to raise large sums of money has little chance of winning a seat in Congress.

Candidates who can raise the required sums are often compromised in the process. Large campaign budgets cannot be met without large donations, which generally come with some strings attached. In 1976, for example, the American Medical Association gave one candidate for the House (Ron Paul, R-Tex.) $30,000. It hardly stretches a point to suggest that a donation that large might influence his vote on matters affecting the AMA. One Senator from Texas (Lloyd Bentsen) received $265,181 from oil and gas lobbies. Bentsen could hardly be expected to reason objectively on matters affecting the energy industry, or to take actions that might lead to cutting off such funds.

In 1977, it was revealed that six senators who were helping to write a compromise energy-tax bill

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had received contributions from oil and gas interests in their last campaigns totaling $504,123. Also in 1977, it was reported that the Maritime lobby had won a controversial decision from the House Merchant Marine Committee that would require a rising proportion of all oil imports to travel in American ships at rates several times as high as prevailing shipping costs. The Government Accounting Office reported that this bill would cost consumers $240 million a year in unnecessary freight charges. President Carter backed the bill, even though his Secretary of the Treasury warned that it was inflationary, would create unemployment, would invite retaliation from other countries, and violated treaties with some 30 countries.

How does such a bill gain so much support? Certainly, lavish campaign contributions might have played a role. During the presidential primaries, the Maritime lobby gave Carter $100,000, and spent another $1 million on contributions to members of Congress. Twenty-six members of the House Merchant Marine Committee received a total of $823,263 (all but two of whom voted for the bill). The chair of the Committee, John M. Murphy (D-N.Y.) received $9,950 in 1977, not an election year. Many charged that the Maritime union had simply bought itself a bill. Other examples of campaign contributions distorting the policy-making process are glaringly obvious. During the Nixon administration, the Milk Fund, ITT, and Vesco scandals all involved influence-buying with campaign dollars.

- Incumbents can raise large sums easier than challengers because they are in a position to do more for donors. Typically, the 24 Senate incumbents who sought reelection in 1976 were able to outspend their challengers by a margin of about 3:2. In House races, incumbents outspent challengers by $12.3 million, a margin of about 1.7:1.
- Wealthy candidates have a significant advantage because they can substantially finance their own campaigns. In the 1976 House races, 10 candidates gave $100,000 or more to their campaigns, and 3 of these spent over $400,000 of their own money. In Senate races, 15 candidates gave over $50,000, and 9 of these donated over $100,000. H. John Heinz III contributed $2,466,910 of his own money to his successful Senate campaign.
- Expensive campaigns rely more and more on slick media campaigns, emphasizing image rather than substance. The obvious consequence is to make it increasingly difficult for the public to know the issues and vote intelligently.

THE POST-WATERGATE HUE stimulated support for some type of reform to control the most obvious problems caused by campaign donations. In 1972 the Federal Election Campaign Act was passed. This act placed limits on media expenditures (limits that were repealed in 1976) and required disclosure of campaign contributions in excess of $100. The 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act was much more comprehensive, providing matching federal funds for presidential primary candidates, and voluntary public financing of general elections. In the 1976 election, this legislation made it easier for candidates to seek the presidency, and it prevented a party from largely outspending the other (as had been the case in 1968 and 1972). The candidates' indebtedness to donors certainly was reduced.

The new law's most significant drawback was that the House and Senate could not agree on a public financing bill for themselves. During 1974, the Senate twice passed legislation establishing public funding for congressional races, and both bills were rejected by the House. Public financing of presidential campaigns, not House and Senate elections, caused an obvious problem. Those groups and individuals who could not give their usual sums to presidential candidates tried to retain their influence by making large contributions to congressional candidates. In 1976, interest groups provided congressional candidates with $22.6 million in donations, up from $12.5 million in 1974 and $8 million in 1972. These massive increases provoked John Gardner of Common Cause to charge that

> A lot of congressmen were bought and sold in 1976, just like the good old days except that the going rates were higher. . . . The money-heavy special interests couldn't buy themselves a President so they tried to buy as many members of Congress as they could.[2]

PUBLIC FINANCING LEGISLATION, to deal with these continuing problems, was introduced again in 1977. The House and Senate bills provided optional public financing, but only for general elections. The Senate bill provided matching funds for contributions of $100 or less. Candidates who opted for public financing could spend no more than $250,000, plus a sum equal to 10¢ for every eligible voter in the state. Senatorial candidates accepting public funds would be limited to spend no more than $35,000 of their personal funds on

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their campaign, and House candidates no more than $15,000. In order to qualify for public funds a candidate would have to raise $10,000 from small contributions, and then would be eligible for matching funds for contributions of $100 or less. Candidates who accept public funds would not be allowed to spend more than $25,000 of their own funds.

These bills spoke volumes about Congress. Most obviously, its members did not want to make it too easy for citizens to run for Congress. Thus the legislation covered only general elections, not primaries. The members surely understood that if large givers were unable to make their donations to candidates during the general election, these funds would simply be shifted to the primaries. Thus dozens of organizations and political-action committees could be counted upon to provide primary candidates (especially incumbents) with maximum donations. This would resemble the conditions that prevailed when presidential races were publicly financed, causing special interests and large donors to shift their funds to congressional races.

Once the primaries were over, public financing of the general election would be quite convenient for incumbents, freeing them from the burdens of fund-raising. Although debts would most probably already be incurred in the primary, this legislation did have a positive feature: a candidate's dependency on funds from interest groups and large donors during the general election would be considerably reduced. The bills also would have provided funds for candidates without cutting off private contributions—an important form of public participation. The spending limits set by the legislation also seemed reasonable.

The proposals for public financing of congressional elections met defeat in the Senate in 1977, leading the House to drop its consideration of the bill. The legislation was defeated in the Senate by a combination of Republican and Southern Democratic senators. The Republicans fought the bill for the stated reason that it would protect incumbents. They argued that even though incumbents and challengers would have about the same amount of money to spend, in the general election the incumbent would have the advantage because of name recognition, a home office, and more media coverage.

The Republicans' protests seem disingenuous, since they saw nothing wrong with limiting public financing to the general election and refused to support higher grants to challengers that would offset incumbent advantage. In fact, concerning the general election and according to the data, if incumbent and challenger expenditures in the 1976 election are contrasted with the expenditures that would have been allowed under this legislation, public funds often would have reduced incumbents' expenditures and raised those of the challengers.[3] Thus, to the extent that the bill protected incumbents, it did so because primary elections were not covered, an omission the Republicans supported. The reason for Republican opposition seemed to be that the Republicans are now having great success in raising money, and generally can count on outspending Democrats.

The Southern Democratic opposition, led by the late Senator Allen (D-Ala.), expressed strong philosophical objection to public financing—but this did not seem to be the real reason for their opposition. As the *Congressional Quarterly* said: ". . . beneath the surface was the unspoken fear that the bill would encourage Republican opposition in states which had known one-party Democratic dominance."[4]

In 1978 public-financing legislation failed again because of continued Republican and Southern Democratic opposition, plus a partisan attempt by the Democratic majority to alter the bill to limit Republican party spending. The legislation is now again before Congress, in substantially the same form as that of the 1977 bills.

The right wing of the Republican party and the Southern Democrats are still virulent in their opposition to the bill. The right-wing Republicans have enormous money at their disposal to finance campaigns, and they correctly see public financing as a threat to their advantage. Now 20 moderate and liberal Republicans are co-sponsoring the legislation in the House. Republican National Chairman Bill Brock is leading opposition to the bill with speeches about the bill being pro-incumbent, anti-challenger. The Chamber of Commerce is lobbying against the bill and so is the National Conservative Public Affairs Council (NCPAC).

Still, the bills may pass Congress in the coming months. If they do, they will have modest positive consequences. But, basically, the legislation is flawed because it does not cover primary campaigns, an extension that neither party would support. Congress has simply used the reform pressure to forumulate a bill that handles abuses poorly, threatens the members only mildly, and provides them with numerous benefits. Thus, even

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if the legislation is passed, politicians will continue to be bought, the balance of influence will still be biased by moneyed interests, and the door to public office will still be open only to those who can raise large sums for a primary contest—the upper-middle-income class. □

Notes

[1] See Thomas R. Dye, *Who's Running America?* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1976); Beth Mintz, "The President's Cabinet: 1897-1972," in the *Insurgent Sociologist*, Spring 1975.

[2] John Gardner, "Prospects Improve for Public Financing of Congressional Races," *Congressional Quarterly*, April 16, 1977, p. 707.

[3] See "Money, Incumbency Failed to Guarantee Success in 1976 Senate Races," *Congressional Quarterly*, June 25, 1977, pp. 1293 and 1294. Contrast the limits listed on p. 1294 with incumbent and challenger expenditures on p. 1293.

[4] "Filibuster Kills Carter Campaign Bill," *Congressional Quarterly*, August 6, 1977, p. 1634. □

Pran Chopra

India: Today's Politics and Beyond

December 10, 1979

Surface storms that shake up Indian politics, such as the one that uprooted Morarji Desai's government last year in mid-July or the more recent one over the year-end elections, are the only events in India's politics that catch the world's attention. Yet, far more important events that take place deep down, at the rural base of Indian economics and politics, receive little notice—events signifying that democracy in India is alive, and accomplishing a few things no other democracy has yet accomplished. And these events bear out that our storms indeed are merely Indian democracy's turbulent way of breaking new ground, of bringing new areas and classes into the political process.

The most important thing happening in India today, as I see it, is the ongoing transformation in the agricultural sector, and the related social and political causes and consequences. To get a sense of this transformation, let us, first, look at two of its obvious, measurable repercussions—the rapid increase in inputs into agriculture and in its output. Then, let us consider the nonquantitative aspects of these changes, for they are indeed most relevant to India's present politics and to its future.

AT THE TURN OF THE DECADE, from the 1960s into the 1970s, India had 37 million hectares of land under irrigation, with new areas being added at an average rate of just over 1 million hectares a year. At the time India was consuming about 2 million tons of fertilizers a year. If we set the overall index of agricultural production in 1969-70, the base year, at 100 (the base), it was around 80 in the mid-'60s. The index of per-acre productivity was below 90 in the mid-'60s and 104 at the turn of the decade. Some key output figures, taking three different kinds of crops, were around 108 million tons of food grains, 5 million bales of cotton, and 13 million tons of sugarcane (measured in terms of boiled-down sugarcane juice). India's first sustained effort at improving the technology of farming, begun in the mid-'60s, was starting to show results by the end of the decade; but progress was slow.

Now, as the '70s have turned into the '80s, irrigation covers 55 million hectares and is being extended at an annual rate of 2.5 million hectares. Consumption of fertilizers has more than doubled, to 4.5 million tons, has risen by 66 percent since 1974-75 (and there now is a thriving black market in all kinds of fertilizers and chemicals). Three years ago the index of agricultural production rose to just under 133, two years ago it rose by 2 percent, last year by 4 percent, and by now it should be over 140. The productivity index now exceeds 120. The latest key production figures are 130 million tons of food grains, 7.5 million bales of cotton, 19 million tons of sugarcane (measured as before).

Consequently, money is being pumped into the village economy as never before, both in expenditures on inputs and in output/sales. Agriculture's share in the total planned government expenditure has risen by about 35 percent since the mid-'70s, and industry's share has declined by just under 20 percent. A measure of what is being pumped in from the sale of produce is that the Food Corporation of India, which buys mainly food grains—and only about 15 percent of that crop (and only in order to balance the market interests of consumer and producer)—now has an annual turnover of about U.S. $2,000 million, which makes it one of the top two or three corporations in Asia, including the Japanese giants. Ten years ago its operations were miniscule.

As important as these economic aggregates are,

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certain changes in attitudes, too, have stirred up agriculture, and a hotbed of political change they have proved to be. When the scientific planners began to work in the agricultural sector, their biggest worry sprang from their own belief that India's farmers were so cut off in their cocoon of stagnation, ignorance, and apathy—so paralyzed by their acceptance of poverty as an act of God no mortal may challenge—that they might never respond to such mundane stimulants as more water, fertilizers, and high-yielding seeds. Indeed, our planners spent much time worrying about how to reach rural India in its fastness of subsistence farming. But, to their enormous surprise, at the touch of the first effort this fastness crumbled—and the planners' preconception and worry turned out to be only another of urban India's superstitions about rural India. Farmers not only accepted the new inputs but fought to receive them, as examples proved that the benefits justified the costs, and the planners' problem ironically turned out to be—and a continuing and dangerous problem it has become—how to keep pace with the demand!

This is not merely happening in some pockets of the country—but in the whole of the Indo-Gangetic plain; from the Pakistani border to the Jamuna basin in western Uttar Pradesh; in the greater part of West Bengal; in much of Gujerat; in most of Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu; and now the message is beginning to catch on in medieval Bihar, where it is creating an unprecedented upheaval (more about that later).

Market economists, too, have gotten over some preconceptions. They have discovered that "profit" means as much to the supposedly apathetic farmer as to any urban stockholder: farmers now invest, withdraw, and shift their crops as they perceive their economic advantage. Consequently the pricing mechanism—which is run jointly by the Food Corporation of India and its technocratic cousin, the Agricultural Prices Commission—has turned out to be as powerful in pushing up food output as any fertilizer could be. Better marketing is as much a reason for better farming in Punjab and Haryana as the hardiness of farmers in a frontier belt, and poor marketing is as much a reason for the backwardness of farming in Bihar as are its caste conflicts.

This change of attitudes—although in quite a different way—can be observed in Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh, too. For a poignant vantage point to literally observe this change I recommend, at harvest time, any of the bridges over the rivers that separate this, India's most extreme, poverty belt from the more prosperous areas that stretch westward to the Pakistani border. For, at harvest time, a stream of landless farm workers flows across these bridges—five, six, or seven hundred thousand people, no one quite knows how many are leaving that poverty belt for jobs in the richer areas on the other shore. Although among India's most densely populated, these richer areas suffer a farm-labor shortage; despite some mechanization, they cannot cope with their rapidly expanding harvests. So these farm workers from the other shore earn more here in the three or four months of peak farming than is India's per-capita income, and still, the demand for them remains unsatisfied. In a good month in Punjab an unskilled farm worker from Bihar, of very little experience though he may be, earns as much as a graduate-school teacher or an upper-division government clerk. And so, for such laborers, and not just for the landowning farmer who has a surplus to sell, agriculture is no longer the rags-to-more-rags economic cycle it used to be.

But, more important in the present context, these people, who travel a thousand miles for seasonal jobs, come home with stories of the rural wealth they see elsewhere, and now are forging in their own villages a rejection of poverty that is a strong force for change. A bloody rebellion now is going on in Bihar (and a still more bloody suppression of it)—a rebellion as much against social as against economic hierarchies, because the landless see both as the causes of their misery.

THE RURAL PEOPLE'S NEWFOUND ACTIVISM is both cause and effect of their new political consciousness, which has greatly enhanced the impact of their vote. In the past, too, the rural vote, because of its size, decided the fate of the parties. But then rural people largely were led by the nose by the predominantly urban leadership; for they did not know how to act in their own interests. Now they do, and use their new knowledge so well that no party dares offend them or oppose even their unreasonable demands. This phenomenon now is seen annually when the time comes for the government to fix farm prices—or whenever half-frightened economists suggest that, in order to raise more desperately needed resources for development, the government should at least reduce, if not remove, the total income-tax exemption enjoyed by the agricultural sector.

Now democratic politics in India is accomplishing what has not been accomplished in other democratic countries: political power is passing swiftly from the urban-industrial to the

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rural-agricultural India. And this is happening before urban-industrial India can monopolize real economic power and make the loss of political power meaningless. Usually, it is in nondemocratic systems that the rural classes have seized political power; in democracies, rural society is still struggling for political power or, if it has captured it, it has seized an empty shell, drained of real economic power by the urban-industrial complex.

The Indian peasantry now has begun to ensure that, in the future, state power will not be used, as in so many other countries and in India, too, up till now, to exploit the rural mass for the benefit of the industrial, powerful, few. (I say "begun" advisedly, because even now the agricultural sector receives merely a quarter of the total sum budgeted by the government for development, though it contributes nearly half of the total GNP. This is bound to get rectified, and how it is going to shake up economic group interests!)

India, too, like today's industrial giants, most likely will continue to finance industrialization with agricultural surpluses. But, by capturing state power, rural interests will see to it that they are not milked in the name of industrialization. The fat of the land will fuel industry in India, too. But those who work on the land will have the power to have a major say, through their representatives in Parliament, in deciding the means and ends of industrialization. For henceforth India will have more of rural agricultural politics, politics real and necessary for a country that is predominantly rural.

Yet, as every kind of politics, agricultural politics has its haves and have-nots, and, as usual, in this politics, too, the have-nots are in the majority. Therefore two parallel movements are active in India's ballot-box politics, and both originate in the village. In the first movement, the relatively well-off countryside is gradually taking over power from the city. In the second, the poorer two-thirds of the village now is struggling to take over power from the richer one-third. This class division in rural politics is much more inflamed at present than the rural-urban division ever was. For the rural, agricultural sector won over power from the urban, industrial sector in a struggle that escalated slowly and was mostly peaceful. The battles between the rural factions, however, are often violent and even bloody. This is true especially in such areas as Bihar, where the power of caste so long has combined with the power of class to keep the landless, who are the lowliest castes and the poorest class, under a relentless heel. Bihar and other poor provinces are paying a far higher price for the (much slower) transformation of their agrarian economy than was paid by the richer provinces in southern and northwestern India.

But this is only another round—the third—in a 30-year-old fight, in which more and more of India's people are struggling for a voice and a place in the country's economy and politics. And the creative potential of this third round is at least as great as was that of the earlier two rounds.

ROUND I: The Urban Middle Classes vs. the Old Feudal Landlords

• In the first round, fought immediately after India had gained independence, the winners were the urban middle classes (and especially the rising class of industrial entrepreneurs), whose members had been in the spearhead of the freedom movement against British rule. The defeated antagonists in this first round were the feudal, usually absentee landlords, generally of the higher Hindu castes, who long had ruled over the villages with great economic and social power. Most of these feudal landowners had been supporters of India's British rulers. But this was only one of the reasons why urban power, now largely held by people who had been active in the freedom movement, turned upon the landlords in the early days of independence; another reason was the natural antagonism between these two rival aspirants for future economic power. So, in the name of agrarian reform (granted, with much sincerity) and with the help of the votes of the vast army of the landless—the insecure, exploited tenants and laborers—this urban leadership carried out a swift and bloodless coup by passing legislation that abolished the old revenue estates. Thus a new rural class was born: a class of hardy and experienced farmers who now cultivate their own farms—by Indian standards, of middling size—of about ten hectares.

Most of these new farmers are members of the middle and lower-middle Hindu castes, in the past (and popularly still to this day) classified as the backward castes. Their great chance came with the new agricultural planning projects of the mid-'60s, and since then they have made their farms thrive as never before, and are using their rising economic strength to mobilize ballot-box power in their own economic and political interests.

ROUND II: The New Landowning Farmers vs. the Urban Middle Classes

• The farmers' political emergence—under the banner of their own party, the Lok DAL People's party"—rocked the parliamentary boat in many states about ten, fifteen years ago. Then, in round two, rural power launched its counterattack on

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urban-industrial power. Only when the farmers' own leaders began to form governments did some stability return to state politics. In March 1977 the Lok Dal party emerged on the national scene when Charan Singh, their most famous and most ambitious leader, became a deputy prime minister. The party again demonstrated its power at the end of 1978, some months after Charan Singh had fallen from office in the normal rivalries of inter-governmental politics. For then some 300,000 farmers marched on New Delhi and held the most spectacular political rally ever seen there. This more than anything helped restore Charan Singh in the same office. The party's, and Charan Singh's, ambitions soared still higher when Sing made his bid to become prime minister late last July.

The Lok Dal party has used its political power to bend state policies to further entrench its political and economic clout. In that process it has opened yet another front of round two: with the Lok Dal's influence, rural-agricultural power now is not only pressuring the industrial sector of urban power but the urban trading sector as well. Organizations formed by the farmers, or formed by the government on their behalf, are rapidly squeezing private traders out of their former footholds in the rural economy. State or cooperative farmers' banks now are the farmers' money lenders, which formerly had been the shopkeepers. The middleman grain trader has been almost entirely eliminated by the Food Corporation of India, which is now actively keeping up farm prices for the benefit of the farmers who have a surplus to sell rather than, as in the past, lowering prices as production rises.

This is part of the background of the bitter fight that has been waged for several months between Charan Singh's Lok Dal and the Jan Sangh, the party that represents the urban trading interests and is popularly identified with Hindu orthodoxy. Apart from Charan Singh's ambition to become prime minister before he breathes his last, it was this confrontation that brought down Morarji Desai's government in mid-July '79.

ROUND III: The Low-Caste Landless vs. the Middle-Caste Farmers

• A most grave threat to the future shape of Indian politics is the relentless use of power by the tough, aggressive, middle-caste rural class that owns and cultivates the middle-sized farms. For this class is far more determined to defend its newly won privileges than the old, indolent feudal landlords ever were. By its ruthlessness it has sparked off and given a blazing start to round three. Its antagonists are the bottom-most people in India's social and economic pyramid: the landless farm workers, the poorest by class and the lowliest by caste. Though as yet largely unorganized, this is India's most massive political constituency. Now the battle for its emergence has begun, and it is bloody, especially in Bihar, and promises to become still bloodier. In these clashes in Bihar, many farm workers are losing their lives every month. But the farm workers are retaliating, too, driven as much by a growing confidence in their numbers as by sheer desperation. Their retaliation may become very gory unless a politics of reconciliation will intervene and succeed. The dynamics of Indian politics in the coming decade is going to be decided by the course and outcome of this round-three battle, just as round two influenced the course of the past decade.

Some of the recent turmoil in India's government though it may seem merely the result of sordid clashes of personal ambitions also reflects in part a struggle for the future leadership of the landless. For the landless still have to find a leader—their equivalent of Charan Singh. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, a brilliant but erratic socialist leader, tried to fill this role a decade ago but, for one, the time was not ripe and, second, he was too unstable to succeed in building a durable party. Mrs. Gandhi, too, tried to fill the role, in a fashion, with her adventures in the politics of populism during the first half of the '70s but paid a heavy price for it. Her defeat in the March '77 elections was due mainly of course to the general revulsion caused by her "emergency" rule—but partly also to Charan Singh's new farmers' bitter hostility toward her for her championship of the low-caste and landless.

The most natural choice for leader of the landless might be Jagjivan Ram (who served as co-deputy prime minister with Charan Singh). Jagjivan Ram is the oldest and most durable, the best-known and ablest leader of the lowest castes. For some years now he has not been active in this role, having cast himself instead in the role of a general national leader. Last year, in mid-July, he nearly pulled that off when, after a temporary falling-out with Prime Minister Desai, he made a bid for that top job—a bid that ended, as we all know, in failure.

In that crisis, Mrs. Gandhi played a double game with Charan Singh. Officially, she supported his bid for the prime ministry after he had broken with the ruling party. Her aim, on the one hand, was to placate him and make him an ally, so that the two could carve out the rural vote between them. But, on the other hand, she aimed to make him absolutely dependent upon herself, stressing that,

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as he knew, his bid would be hopeless without her backing. After victory was won, she planned to pull the rug out from under him at a time of her choosing—to try, quite by herself, to lead both the better-off farmers and the landless.

The two found a fine affinity in their common enmity for Jagjivan Ram and for the Janata movement. Jagjivan Ram, were he to become prime minister, would certainly provide inspiration and support for the lowest castes, who are hostile to Charan Singh's main constituency—and he would indeed be Mrs. Gandhi's formidable rival in her bid for the leadership of the landless. The Janata movement, Charan Singh's and Mrs. Gandhi's other mutual adversary,—at the time in government (but since fallen)—had a well-considered program for reconciliation in rural politics. Had this program succeeded, the Janata movement would have assumed a role similar to the one Mrs. Gandhi wishes to play. A Janata government also might have brought about a fairer distribution of the fruits of rural development, which are at present hogged by Singh's constituency.

Strange things happen in India's world of byzantine politics: Madhu Limaye, the best-known heir to Lohia's socialism (like Lohia himself, a victim of his own brilliance), has become Charan Singh's close ally and chief theoretician. . . . This, alas, has cleared a path to the constituency of the landless for the Communists, who can be trusted to take full advantage of it. They gave massive proof of that in the winter of '78-'79, only a few months after Charan Singh's rally in New Delhi, when, clearly as a counterblast, they organized a still more impressive rally of the landless, to which Bihar alone sent an estimated 150,000 farm workers. The Communists also have in their favor a record of good work for the landless chalked up by their government in West Bengal, a neighbor state of Bihar.

It is very likely that the last bout in round three will be fought by Charan Singh's new farmers on the one hand and the Communists on the other. It may well be fought at a bloody pace—unless, in the meantime, policies of rural reconciliation will prevail. But whether they do or not, in the future India will be hearing a lot more from its landless than it has heard so far. □

Jayaprakash Narayan 1903-1979

The death of Jayaprakash Narayan—known to his compatriots and throughout the world simply as JP—brings to an end a life that spanned every important event in 50 years of Indian history, ranging from the struggle for independence to the most recent effort to solve the country's major political, social, and economic problems. This is not the time to evaluate his historical role (I would only suggest now that his major achievement will undoubtedly be his almost single-handed success in bringing to an end the authoritarian regime set up by Indira Gandhi). We now mourn the passing of a good and noble man who was indeed the "conscience of his nation," much in the sense that Norman Thomas was of his.

Known to millions of people in every corner of India, JP was a complex man who deeply felt the poverty and misery of so many of his compatriots. His inspiration clearly was Gandhi, but he never achieved the balance between "saintliness" and politics so evident in the Mahatma. Instead, he struggled throughout his life with the issue of power and its responsibility, always rejecting offers of the highest posts. As Herbert Passin wrote in *Encounter* ("The Jeevan-Dan," June 1958):

> At a little over fifty, JP is tall and handsome, as if chiselled by some ancient Greek sculptor and brought to life. His eyes are warm and have a touch of sadness; he speaks slowly and softly. But underneath the gentleness one feels a barely restrained violence, and an occasional flash of fire will remind one that after all he has been an underground guerrilla leader.

Throughout his lifetime and while passing through a series of intellectual and political changes (Marxist, moderate socialist, Gandhian, etc.) JP asked essentially the same question: can democratic processes be adapted to carry out a significant redistribution of income, status, and power to alter the structure of existing society? His answer became increasingly problematic and pessimistic. We must accept the fact that he died a disappointed man as he contemplated the fragmentation of Indian politics. The idea of political consensualism as opposed to partisanship, which he had advanced in his later years, seemed routed by the realities of Indian political life. His argument in favor of a neo-Rousseauist politics within the context of a radical decentralization of a life to be lived in small-scale communities seemed increasingly utopian. But in integrity, courage, example, JP never wavered. His proposed "total revolution" meant just that: a secular socialist society, a dismantled hierarchical caste system, a devolution of political power to the lower ranks of India. JP belonged to those who consciously choose the hard road. —S.P. □

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Nicolaus Mills

Football, Play and Obsession

Unlike most books by former athletes, Dallas Cowboy wide receiver Peter Gent's *North Dallas Forty* is anything but a modest "I was there" piece of writing. Although structured around eight days in the life of Phil Elliott (like Gent, a wide receiver), *North Dallas Forty* is really a survey of the 1960s from the point of view of a football player whose lifestyle—particularly his opposition to the Vietnam War and his fondness for grass—has put him in conflict with the team he plays for. In Gent's novel, Elliott's struggle to maintain his independence and stay in a game he loves is a heroic, losing battle; in the end black comedy and murder dominate his story, as the woman Elliott loves is murdered by a psychotic fan and Elliott's "Bad Attitude" leads his coach to bench him and finally the team owner to force him out of the league on trumped-up drug charges.

By contrast, director Ted Kotcheff's *North Dallas Forty*, which Gent helped write, is not nearly so ambitious. Gone is the bloody climax of Gent's novel and with it many of the social and political questions he explicitly raised. But what remains is by no means a violation of Gent's book. Kotcheff's abbreviated version of *North Dallas Forty* allows him to use comedy to explore what American sports movies with their past emphasis on the athlete as noble sufferer (*Pride of the Yankees, The Babe Ruth Story, Fear Strikes Out*) and their current Nader-inspired emphasis on the athlete as exploited performer (*Bang the Drum Slowly* and *Slap Stick*) have rarely treated as their primary subject—sport as play.

In this undertaking, *North Dallas Forty* relies principally on the comedic talents of Nick Nolte as Phil Elliott, but *North Dallas Forty* is in the best sense a gang comedy and Elliott is never forced to carry the picture by himself. Mac Davis, as his buddy quarterback Seth Maxwell, is a perfect sidekick, and as foils there are the whole North Dallas coaching staff plus Bo Svenson and Oakland Raider John Matuszak as two terrifyingly funny brutish linemen. What makes the comedy of *North Dallas Forty* so special, however, is that only rarely does it settle for easy targets—a smarmy monsignor who leads the team in pregame prayers, an assistant coach who angrily orders the players "not to scratch their nuts" during the playing of the *Star Spangled Banner*. For the most part, the comedy of *North Dallas Forty* centers on two related concerns: the way Phil Elliott simultaneously accepts and distances himself from the pain he is in in order to go on playing football and the way he uses the juvenile role the North Dallas coaches and owner inflict on him to escape the business ethic they would inflict on the game.

The first brand of comedy sets the tone for *North Dallas Forty*, and we see it in the opening scene, when Elliott tries to get himself going on the morning after a tough game. As the camera closes in on him, there is nothing he can do naturally. He cannot breathe freely without using Q tips to clear a passage in his bloody nose; he cannot make it to the tub without first popping codeine pills, and every joint in his body seems damaged. What makes for the comedy here is not, of course, Elliott's pain, but the virtuoso style he uses to deal with it. On the one hand, we see a youthful Elliott moving about like an arthritis patient and, on the other hand, we see that the same Elliott has calmly accepted this state of affairs as no more than an inconvenience. Clearly he is two men, and not about to let the man in pain interfere with the man who takes pleasure in football. It is a division we see even more fully illustrated the next day in a love scene between Elliott and Joanne, the fiancée of the team owner's brother. Each time the passionate Joanne touches Elliott, she hits a tender spot, and what ought to be moan of pleasure turns into a cry of pain. But again Elliott pulls off a virtuoso comic performance,

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drawing Joanne to him despite his screams and flinchings, and the end result is the same as before: we are made aware of Elliott's liberating capacity to trade in pain and function as two different men.

THE PROBLEM for Elliott comes when he has to move beyond his private life and tries to use the same kind of distancing to deal with a coach and team owner who both are obsessed with winning and see the players as mere equipment. For Elliott, the juvenile clowning he goes through—giggling during an "inspirational" talk by an assistant coach, running backward like a movie in reverse when told he is so slow he looks as if he were running backwards—is a way of asserting a sense of proportion, of keeping alive the boyish feelings he has for football; and as *North Dallas Forty* unfolds, the logic of his clowning becomes increasingly apparent. The hitch is that the kind of distancing that works for Elliott when he is on his own does not finally work with the North Dallas staff. For them, football has ceased to be a game of personal skills in the same way that modern warfare has ceased to depend on individual bravery. In their eyes players do not win games; game plans win games, and the best player is not the man motivated by a feel for the game but the man who loyally accepts the game plan. When Elliott defends himself by pointing to his game performance, all he does is emphasize how threatening he has become. "We let you score those touchdowns," he is told by an enraged coach, who insists, "None of you is as good as the computer."

Missing Mail

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THE IRONY is that by the middle of *North Dallas Forty* it is clear that, although Elliott knows the bind he is in, he lacks the will to get out of it. For him, the bottom line is getting to play, and he will do whatever is required, short of total self-abnegation, to make that happen. Because his coach puts him in the game only when North Dallas is losing, he sits on the bench rooting for the opposition. And because he can play a whole game only when filled with novocaine, he allows the team physician to deaden his knee to the point where he can feel nothing. It is the North Dallas management that finally says, enough! Only when they use a trumped-up drug charge to break Elliott's contract does he stop his clowning and compromising and quote back to them the Pauline homily the coach has always used to chastize him, "When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child . . . but when I became a man, I put away childish things. . . ."

For Elliott, the outburst is a turning point—he is now on his way to a new life. But in the context of *North Dallas Forty*, it is a sad moment as well. Elliott ought not to be the one quoting St. Paul this way, nor in a position where he must equate growing up with no longer playing football. The real lack of perspective, as Kotcheff's direction has emphasized over and over, is with the North Dallas coaches and owner, who falsely equate professionalism with seriousness and fail to understand the chance the game provides for genuine play, for freedom from routine and coercion.

The final scene of *North Dallas Forty* brings all of this home. In it a disconsolate Elliott leaves the supersleek office complex of the North Dallas owner and finds Seth Maxwell waiting for him. The two talk for a few minutes, and then as Elliott walks away, Maxwell, who has brought a football with him, throws him one last pass. Elliott, the man "with the best hands in the league," sees the ball coming, but just as it gets to him, he puts his arms down and lets it bounce off his chest. It is, in an obvious sense, a gesture that reflects his final break with football, but as the film ends with a freeze-frame shot of the ball dropping to the ground, we are left with the feeling that things are going to be much rougher than Elliott imagines. For some time to come, denials and willed acts rather than spontaneity are likely to rule his life. □

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Murray Hausknecht

Clear Thinking About Crime

CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, by Charles E. Silberman. New York: Random House. 540 pp. $15.00.

Calling a book a popularization is usually taken as an unkind remark. This is mostly a matter of snobbery: the popularizer is writing for the masses and, therefore, his work must lack depth and sophistication. But popularizations need not be shallow, and to think only of those that fit the stereotype is to ignore the service performed by good popularizations.

Most people are, at best, functionally illiterate with respect to a number of specialized fields. Yet, some knowledge of these fields is often needed to think rationally and to some purpose about public issues. A good popularization makes the esoteric knowledge embedded in a special language or jargon accessible to a lay public without sacrificing too much meaning. Since few issues of public concern involve problems of Biblical hermeneutics or techniques of prosody, a dearth of good popularizations in such fields is of little social consequence. But it is a different matter when the issue is, for instance, nuclear energy, inflation, or crime. One of the great virtues of *Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice* is that it helps combat functional illiteracy about its subject matter.

Literacy starts to overcome ignorance by making sheer factual knowledge of the world more accessible. And in this sense, throughout his book, Silverman provides basic information about crime and criminal justice. For example: in 1976 about 75 percent of those arrested for serious crime—murder, aggravated assault, robbery, rape, burglary, larceny-theft, and auto theft—"were under twenty five-years of age, and more than 40 percent were seventeen or younger." A controlled experiment in Kansas City demonstrated that there is no relationship between the number of police on patrol and the rate of crime. "It is not true that the courts are more lenient than they used to be; available data indicate that a larger proportion of felons are incarcerated now than in the 1920s." More specifically, "about two-thirds of those who are convicted serve time in jail or prison."

Knowledge, of course, does not arise out of discrete bits of information; "knowing" implies some grasp of larger wholes and processes. Silberman describes how major components of the worlds of crime and justice, like the police and prisons, work or do not work. In the past ten to fifteen years the police have become the functional equivalent of primitive tribes—the civilian you see in the patrol car may not be a suspected perpetrator but a sociologist or political scientist doing "fieldwork." (Silberman too rode the cars.) Recently there has also been what seems a quantum jump in the number of studies of prisons as communities and social systems. Silberman has ranged through the literature in these and other areas. Here he coherently summarizes the experts' knowledge of how these institutions function in order to explain, for example, why prison riots are always with us or why plea-bargaining is an inevitable characteristic of the criminal justice system.

Good popularizations that convey accurate information are important, for one, because they deal with conventional notions that often are based on simple ignorance. The facts about punishment, for example, undercut a favorite neoconservative complaint that few offenders—about 1 percent according to Ernest van den Haag—are ever imprisoned. Nor is it true, to take another complaint, that recent judicial decisions that protect defendants' rights aid large numbers of criminals to escape punishment. A review of the relevant data inevitably suggests that arguments about liberal permissiveness "are rooted in ideological preference rather than empirical research."

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Actual public policies can also be tested in order to see to what extent ideological preference has been transformed into action. A case in point is the Nixon administration's war on drug addiction. It consisted of a strongly supported law enforcement effort directed against the availability of heroin, and it was coupled with a heavy investment in methadone treatment programs. This policy, with its law-and-order focus, was thought of as a hard-headed approach in contrast to a bleeding-heart-liberal focus on eliminating the root causes of addiction. But while James Q. Wilson and others were congratulating themselves and the administration on the success of the program—Silberman notes that Wilson as a consultant "helped devise the policies he found so successful"—the actual use of heroin was increasing. Nor did methadone turn out to be the quick fix for drug abuse: It soon became "the drug of choice for a significant number of drug abusers" and, until addicts learned to use it in less fatal ways, "deaths from methadone overdoses exceeded the number of deaths from heroin."

USEFUL AS THEY MAY BE in shaking faith in the received wisdom of simple answers, popularizations are most affective when they confront us with the real complexities of most public issues. White-collar crimes or the so-called victimless crimes are not the crimes that worry people; rather, we are concerned about violent acts, the crimes that turn familiar surroundings into a territory in which we fear for our own safety.

Violent crime is associated in the public imagery with blacks, and this is not a wholly irrational, biased, and stereotyped response. Although all data about crime rates must be treated cautiously, there is still enough evidence to suggest, Silberman says, that the rate of violent crimes among blacks, the major brunt of which is borne by black communities, cannot simply be accounted for as a function of poverty or minority status. "To be poor and black is different from being poor and Puerto Rican, or poor and Chicano, or poor and a member of any other ethnic group."

Drawing upon an extensive body of scholarly literature Silberman makes a case for the uniqueness of the history and status of black Americans. Their survival required accommodative behavior based on the suppression of anger and the development of internal mechanisms for controlling the violence to which they were continuously provoked. Out of this historical experience grew an oral tradition in which words have been used to gain a measure of respect and to strike back at those with power. Part of this tradition are the Uncle Remus stories in which Brer Rabbit is engaged in an "unending struggle for power and prestige." The tradition also encompasses the adolescent contests of "sounding" and "playing the dozens" that have the object of making the opponent "lose his cool." Little known outside the black community are "toasts," stories that are part of a folklore in which "black men have converted their supposed exaggerated sexuality, physical prowess, and animal-like (or child-like) inability to control their impulses from negative to positive attributes. "Toasting" ultimately involves celebration of an inverted morality, in which being "good" means knowing one's place and being "bad" means defiance of those standards. To say of someone, as black kids do all the time, "He is real bad," is to pay the other a high compliment.

The history of blacks, then, has generated impulses to aggressive and violent behavior. Now, however, the traditional order of things has changed. Among the more important changes Silberman talks of is, first, the decline of the fear of retaliation from whites. In the past, the psychological and cultural mechanism that kept impulses to violence under control were both the result of and reinforced by the brutal repressiveness of the white community that is now less free to be violent towards blacks. At the same time the control that black communities once exercised over their own members has weakened as a consequence of a loss of social cohesion. The civil rights movement made the barriers of segregation permeable, and the more economically secure members of the communities—the "middle class" families, who had traditionally provided stability and leadership—left the segregated neighborhoods. These neighborhoods now tend to become purely lower-class ghettos, with no countervailing forces to the demoralizing effects of poverty. Finally, the "politicalization of the 'bad nigger' myth has further weakened the constraints on black anger and violence." The prime examples here, of course, are the Black Panthers and the ideologies of other extreme nationalists.

This perspective differs from the usual simple-minded reductionist views, for it emphasizes the inseparability of criminal behavior from its sources in the historic situation of a group. On the other hand, the perspective can and has been used to justify a policy relying almost exclusively on punishment—"Get 'em off the streets!" By stressing the black cultural themes supporting impulses to

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violence, proponents of punishment argue that crime is a part of lower-class way of life to which blacks are irremediably committed. But Silberman, with a greater respect for evidence and intellectual consistency, rejects the argument: In the long run *"the history of ethnic groups in the United States demonstrates that upward mobility is the most effective cure for criminal violence."*

It follows, therefore, that greater efforts must be made to reduce poverty and the current scandalous unemployment rate among young blacks. But Silverman warns against expecting too much in the short run, even if maximum efforts were made to change the situation. It is unrealistic to anticipate that economic improvements will be reflected in immediate changes in the crime rates. The warning is necessary, since conservatives buttress their arguments about "throwing money at problems" (as if that had ever been done) by pointing to the failure of the War on Poverty to affect crime rates.

A final test of popularization is whether it becomes part of the problem or a force for its effective resolution. In the former category are the misreadings of ethology and sociobiology that continue to muddle discussions of race and gender. I would say that Silberman's work leads to greater clarity of thought about crime and punishment.□

Martin Green

Glimpses of Life in the Factory

ON THE LINE, by Harvey Swados. New York: Dell, paperback. 237 pp. $2.25.

Harvey Swados's *On the Line* appeared in the fall of 1957, barely noticed among the long-running best sellers of the day, *By Love Possessed, Peyton Place,* and *On the Beach*, or among the works of fiction that were just beginning to catch public attention, *On the Road* and *Room at the Top*. Swados's collection of eight interlocking stories of men working on an assembly line in a New York-area automobile plant lacked the shock appeal or the exotic ambience that marked those best sellers.

Swados himself, in one of several essays he wrote between 1957 and 1962 on the problems of work, put his finger on one reason for the book's lack of impact: in the prosperity of the post-World War II boom, the workingman had become invisible. A commonly held notion, Swados argued in his essay "The Myth of "the Happy Worker," was that the working class no longer existed; it had become indistinguishable from the middle class in income, ideals, and expectations.

The paperback republication of *On the Line*, almost 23 years later, is a tribute to Swados's prescience as a social observer if not to his ability as a fiction writer. In the years since Swados died prematurely in 1972, work has come closer to becoming, in Swados's phrase, "a public issue." The wildcat strikes of the workers at General Motors' Lordstown plant in 1971 caught national attention and led to a major report to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. The HEW report, *Work in America*, articulated the sense of dissatisfaction, the hostility, and frustration that became known by the catch phrase "the blue-collar blues," but it also indicated that this malaise was as endemic to white-collar workers as to men on the assembly line. *Work in America* suffered the fate of many similar blue-collar studies: after a brief period of intense debate, it dropped from public consciousness. But other books, some popular, some scholarly, kept the issue alive. Of these books, Studs Terkel's compilation of interviews, *Working,* enjoyed the ultimate mark of success in our time: it became the basis for a Broadway musical.

Like Terkel's interviews, *On the Line* is a testament to the violence that Terkel maintains is synonymous with work. The direct violence of the union-management confrontations of the 1930s or the extreme conditions of the early years of industrialization may be something of the past; but there remains, for many workers, the physical violence of the workplace—the noise, the heat, and the relentless pace of the assembly line—that still takes its toll despite several generations of union activity and enlightened social legislation. There is, too, the more subtle violence to the spirit as people accommodate themselves to the demand of the machines they operate and to the economic system that the machines have made possible. Much or most work—white-collar as well as blue-collar—has become boring, soulless, trivial, and meaningless.

Swados is more interested in these subtler kinds of oppression than in direct physical violence; he depicts only two such incidents. Rather, he

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examines more closely the grinding routine of factory life. Inside the factory the individual's hopes, dreams, and needs become subordinate to the imperatives of the machine and the demands of management to produce efficently and at the least cost. Joe, a rebel and a drifter who calls himself the "vanishing American," lectures Walter, a young worker saving money to go to college, on the economic realities:

> The big pitch has always been that we're practical people, that we've proved to all the impractical Europeans that production can serve people. But instead, people are serving production. Look how frightened, how hysterical the bosses get when the line stops—they can't afford to figure what it costs *you* to keep it moving—they only know they got a production quota.

The workers are in a double bind. Drenched in sweat, his clothes stained with paint primer, Buster, a foreman, fights to keep ahead of the line's relentless pace on a day when a change made by management deprives him of a worker, and two other workers are absent. Having risen from the ranks, Buster still thinks of himself as one of the men, but in their eyes he is on the other side, and they regard his plight with indifference or barely disguised scorn. Swados shows the reality behind the ideal of the solidarity and brotherhood of labor. There is comradeship in *On the Line* in almost every chapter, but there are also any number of examples of suspicion and hostility.

On the Line also indirectly chronicles the often contradictory economic and social pressures that are the context of work in the factory. On the one hand, most of the men are on the line because this is the only way to earn a living when their dreams and aspirations have not been fulfilled. On the other hand, working in the factory is a source of shame and guilt, a mark of their failure to succeed in the mythic pattern of the American dream. Frank, who at the age of 56 has returned to the factory after failing in business, is a determined worker, but he is ashamed to meet his former coworkers, and when his grandson's class comes on a tour of the factory, Frank hides among the tires.

Not everyone on the line is beaten down by the machine or by the social mechanisms of which the machine is a part. Harold, a failed artist and alcoholic, rebuilds his life by submerging himself in the impersonal rhythms of the factory. Kevin, an Irish immigrant, drawn to the factory by images of instant wealth, decides to return to the simpler life in Ireland after he becomes disillusioned with the embodiment of his new-found status—his car. Finally, there is Joe, the "vanishing American," the one nearly mythic figure, who transcends the dehumanization of the factory by being able to work with a craftsman's skill at even the most trivial job, and by being able to leave whenever he chooses.

AS DANIEL AARON NOTES in his Introduction to this new edition, writers about work have often failed to capture what it is really like to work. Engels, for example, writing about the factory workers in Manchester in the 1840s, presented crushing details of their oppression, but only in terms of their life outside the factory. The feel, smell, and look of a Manchester cotton mill are buried in the statistics of diseases, maimings, and miserable housing. Novelists have not done much better, Aaron argues, even in the heyday of the proletarian novel of the 1930s. In the popular media, the life of work remains hidden despite a number of working-class "heroes." Who knows what Archie Bunker did on his loading platform or what Ralph Cramden felt like on his Madison Avenue bus?

Swados's success in bringing factory routine to life more than redeems the moments of occasional sentimentality. *On the Line* remains a vital document not only as a chronicle of the factory but as the vision of a committed and compassionate writer who saw the fictional possibilities in the drama of the everyday. Despite occasional heavy-handedness, *On the Line* is metaphorically eloquent about the condition of our working lives. Throughout, the factory is compared to a prison and the men regard themselves not as working, but serving time. The line is also a metaphor for the testing ground of human strength and endurance, and Swados is as sympathetic to those who meet the challenge of their physical being and endure as to those who escape.

In the late 1950s, as the postwar boom began to give way to recession, Swados was an almost solitary voice calling out eloquently in his essays, and dramatically in *On the Line*, for a total reexamination of the meaning of work. Now, 23 years later, work has not become a public issue to the extent that Swados would have liked to see it—an issue in the political arena; but the same pressures that faced the late Eisenhower years—unemployment, underemployment, inflation, economic stagnation—have made the issue even more pressing today. *On the Line* is a cogent reminder of the need to see beyond the abstractions of economics to the human dimension of work. As Joe says: "Never mind the machinery. Remember the men." □

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Margaret Kahn

The Unions and the State

THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, by Colin Crouch. Fontana, 1979. 223 pp. £1.50.

This March Britain's Labour government fell in a vote of no confidence after months of industrial strife. Ford machinists, truckers, local-authority manual workers, social workers and civil servants had battered and broken the government's wage guidelines. Five years ago Heath's Conservative government fell over the union question. Then, the National Union of Mineworkers declared an overtime ban and later a strike, refusing to settle within the government's Phase III. Heath called an election, confident he could win on the issue, "Who governs, the unions or the government?"

Colin Crouch's book *The Politics of Industrial Relations* is about the increasingly explicit challenge that unions have posed to British governments, which to an important degree look after the interests of capital. Unions, which immediately after the Second World War stood on the sidelines of political conflict, today are in the very center of political controversy and seem to determine the rise and fall of governments. Crouch suggests that unions themselves have become more politicized as the strategies of dominant interests for containing the conflict between capital and labor have become more explicitly political.

The history he recounts begins immediately after the war, when institutional and consensual elements safeguarded the industrial order. Most important, there was a national system of bargaining under a centralized trade-union leadership, which broadly accepted the priorities of government and industry due to the urgency of postwar recovery and its special links with the governing Labour party. This Labour party, further, was committed to full employment and welfare state. In addition, says Crouch, both major parties, Labour and Conservative, accepted a policy of trying to keep industrial relations out of political controversy. There was a paradox in this postwar arrangement, however: there was a growing political involvement of trade-union leaders alongside a depoliticization of industrial relations. The contradiction would gradually be resolved at the expense of the latter.

As the Conservatives took the reins of government from Labour, they dismantled much of the apparatus of economic planning and reduced the integration of union leaders with the government. The national sovereignty of the union leadership was at this time placed in doubt by rank-and-file discontent. Prosperity, the capacity to "buy off" union demands, provided the new basis for containment of the organized working class. But by the late '50s and early '60s the British economy was in decline, and the Conservatives resorted to institutional mechanisms of integration and an incomes policy.

The Labour government of the 1960s was faced with similar economic problems and tried various solutions. The government tried to construct a "tripartite consensus" by institutionalizing discussion among labor, business, and the state and by planning the growth of incomes in general. But an increasing trade crisis and industrial unrest led the government to deflate the economy and impose a severe incomes policy, including a pay freeze and statutory restraint. "Productivity deals" became a way in which the guidelines could be breached. They represented an attempt to enlist labor in a managerialist consensus at the level of firms. Already in the mid '60s little remained of the postwar consensus in industrial relations; there was no sovereign national union leadership, no urgency about postwar recovery, no priority accorded to full employment or expansion of the welfare state. Special links that Labour claimed to enjoy with the unions "had been used so heavily to badger the unions into accepting wage restraint that a few union leaders formally questioned whether the relationship was worthwhile." By now, the industrial-relations problem was at the center of the political agenda of both parties.

By the very end of the decade and the beginning of the next, however, a new device for the control of unions was introduced: the law. Though Labour itself had first suggested legal reforms in its White Paper *In Place of Strife*, it was the Conservatives who used it as the centerpiece of their strategy of control. The Conservatives allowed unemployment to rise, cut off accustomed channels of communications between government and unions, stood firm against public-sector pay claims, and passed an Industrial Relations Bill. This Act entailed a major change in the legal structure of industrial relations in Britain, a change that would weaken the power of the unions and was successfully resisted by them. The Conservatives had to resort again to tripartism and incomes policy.

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So did the Labour government in 1974 in the "social contract." In it, Labour agreed to repeal the punitive Industrial Relations Act and statutory incomes policy; to strengthen price controls; to introduce legislation strengthening union and worker rights; to introduce industrial democracy and to maintain and expand elements of the welfare state. In exchange, unions would voluntarily recognize the need to take the economy into account in framing wage claims. The "contract" worked for a while, but it fell apart under the strains of international economic pressures and demands of union rank-and-files and leaderships.

IN ORDER to make sense of this history and to explore policy alternatives, Crouch introduces two concepts, "liberalism" and "corporatism," which represent contrasting approaches to the problem of political economy. Early in the postwar period, he suggests, a predominantly liberal pattern of industrial relations persisted on amended terms:

> The two sides of industry remained separate from each other, jealously guarding their autonomy and accepting a degree of conflict in their relationship (replacing the separation of individuals in the classical formation); the government abstained from detailed involvement in industrial issues—the tradition of voluntarism; . . . the law remained individualistically liberal, occasionally creating difficulties for the unions but also enabling them to emerge and define themselves autonomously and without state interference.

But later in the period, elements of corporatism appeared:

> The idea of corporatism . . . refers to a system of politico-economic organization that is fundamentally different from liberalism. The economy remains capitalist in the sense of being privately owned, but the stability of the system is ensured through the close *integration* of political, economic, and moral forces, rather than through their separation. And workers are subordinated, not through individualism, but through the very fact of belonging to collectivities, organizations; the organizations which represent them also regulate them.

The devices of incomes policy, industrial relations law reform, and tripartite consultation with union and business leaders represent corporatist strategies. The return to high rates of unemployment, control of money supply and spending, free collective bargaining all are liberal strategies. In analytic terms, it is the introduction of corporatist strategies, in response to certain weaknesses of liberalism, that has politicized unions and industrial relations in Britain.

There is a third sort of arrangement, of which Crouch detects traces in recent years: "bargained corporatism." It involves the unions' acceptance of several strategies that restrict the freedom of maneuver allowed by free collective bargaining; but it holds out the possibility of greater political influence. In exchange for restraint of their members in wage demands, more state interference, and "fuller acceptance of the industrial order and its priorities," unions might receive more and broader power for their members in the workplace, certain welfare measures, and a regular role in economic decision-making. It is the arrangement that Crouch himself seems to favor.

TWO CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS regarding this analysis may be appropriate. First, it is sometimes unclear what Crouch thinks it is about industrial relations in Britain that has become political and what sort of politics is involved. At a minimum, "the industrial relations question" is now openly debated and acted upon by political parties. The TUC is increasingly consulted and bargains with the government. Though Crouch differentiates lower levels of the workforce from the TUC, it is not clear whether and in what sense they have become political. If politics is indicated by corporatist bargaining, then many of the TUC's constituent unions are not political; they strike rather than bargain. If strikes themselves may be more or less political depending upon the aims of strikers, it is still not clear that British trade unions have become political. Few strikes have positive political purposes. They may have unintended political consequences or register opposition to particular wage policies or governments. But the labor movement as a whole does not seem to have an alternative vision of political economy to put in the place of Britain's capitalist order. As Richard Hyman wrote (in the *Socialist Review*, June 1978), there has been a "gap in British labor between consciousness and activity." A host of limited sectional struggles contributes to instability at the level of the polity and economy as a whole, yet unions do not intend to create such disruption and they don't do so as part of a radical political program. It is not surprising that these questions of exactly who is politicized how are not thoroughly explored in a study that focuses upon governments and strategies of domination rather than upon labor and forms of opposition.

Second, Crouch advocates "bargained

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corporatism"—a sort of halfway house between liberal collectivism and corporatism—as a radical solution to Britain's problem of political economy. The "radicalism" of Crouch's solution is questionable. He may claim too much for it. Framed as a *policy* alternative, it could not stray too far from the currently possible. Indeed, capitalism and the conflict between private capital and labor continue. Bargained corporatism seeks to manage that conflict on terms palatable to the unions. The formulation also presumes a conventional macroeconomic analysis, in which wage demands are seen to be a primary, if not the primary, cause of Britain's inflation. And inflation, fueled by wage demands, seems for Crouch to be at the bottom of Britain's economic problems. He says nothing about old-fashioned management, outmoded technologies, a sluggish, nonInterventionist state, or class hostility, and their contribution to Britain's economic decline. But Crouch may not claim enough for his bargained corporatism, which holds out important reforming possibilities. It might provide a lever for guaranteeing certain levels of welfare-state expenditure, for expanding worker participation, for tying income restraint itself to certain forms of redistribution—i.e., redistribution of the national product toward wages and the lower paid. It would also introduce issues of workplace and macroeconomic control into the mainstream of political discourse and into the discourse of workers.

Crouch, a lecturer in sociology at the London School of Economics and Political Science and a member of the British Fabian Society, has written an important analytic history and discussion of policy alternatives. This newest book is an adaptation, in fact, of his earlier book *Class Conflict and Industrial Relations* (Heinemann and Humanities Press, 1977) for a wider audience; the new book reworks and presents in a more readable fashion many of his earlier themes. It has already become a standard treatment in Britain.

But *The Politics of Industrial Relations* is relevant to the American scene as well. Though it clearly is written from the British experience and uses analytic categories that have recently been widely used in discussing European political economy, it suggests ways of looking at the American past and present. Today, for example, the American working class is less densely organized and weaker than the British. It lacks close ties with a major political party, compared to the British unions, which created the Labour party and still provide most of its funding. The American working class is less class conscious and has always been subject to greater legal regulation. However, it, too, is an organized working class in a high-inflation economy that no longer retains a paramount international position. Currently under the twin onslaught of wage guidelines (corporatist strategy) and "fiscal conservatism" (liberal strategy), it is ever more clearly subject to political regulation and attack, and it needs to respond with a coordinated and conscious political strategy. □

Henry Pachter

More News from the Gröfaz

THE NUREMBERG MIND, by Florence Miale and Michael Selzer. New York: Quadrangle Books. 303 pp. $3.95.

GERMANY 1866-1945, by Gordon A. Craig. New York: Oxford University Press. 825 pp. $19.95.

HITLER'S WAR AND THE GERMANS, by Marlis G. Steinert. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. 387 pp. $20.00.

THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF I. G. FARBEN, by Joseph Borkin. New York: Free Press. 250 pp. $10.95.

The name Gröfaz, says Professor Craig in his well-written history of modern Germany, "is ugly enough to belong to some mythical monster, some twisted goblin embodying evil." It was the anagram of the title "Greatest Fieldmarshall of All Times," which an adulating Chief of Staff bestowed on his Führer, an anagram used less reverentially by those officers who considered Hitler's strategy ruinous.

The army, for which Hitler had done so much, conspired against him, and the German people, to whom he wanted to give mastery over the world, went into his war without enthusiasm or conviction. Diligent research in diaries, vigilante reports, and morale-building instructions to the Nazi propagandists reveal the astonishing fact that even at the moment of his greatest military victories Hitler could not depend on the loyalty of the

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subjected nation, and that Dr. Goebbels vainly tried to include in the Nazi "we" millions who stubbornly referred to them as "they." Albert Speer has even charged that Germany lost the war because Hitler did not dare to impose on the Germans the kind of sacrifices that the Kaiser had demanded in the First World War. Craig quotes a ditty in which Ruhr miners tell British airmen: "Fly on to Berlin where everybody voted for Hitler."

However, it is not the sum of new information that prompts us to question the popular model of "totalitarianism" (for easy reference I shall call it the Orwell-Arendt theory), according to which the Nazi regime was characterized by total identification of the people with the state. As early as 1941, in his book *Behemoth*, Franz Neumann had offered a different theory holding that, on the contrary, the Nazis destroyed all traditional notions of the state and organized society, atomized the citizenry, and imparted to the lifeless nation the pseudodynamism that alone was capable of holding it together. But instead of the solid structure conjured up by propaganda before the world, the Third Reich only consisted of jerry-built improvisations serving hastily conceived purposes, most of them destructive. Only the power machine was monolithic, and that only vis-à-vis outsiders and enemies. Inside, it was rent into many factions tied together only through a community of crime.

A similar view has recently been expressed in a book published in Germany by Sebastian Haffner, a refugee author who has spent the war years in London. In a small volume called *Observations Re Hitler* (not yet translated), he shows how few of the significant decisions were systemic and how many the result of Hitler's destructive, even suicidal instincts, his superstitions and prejudices. This is not said, however, to exonerate the Führer's accomplices and fellow-travelers but to emphasize a trait in Nazism that anti-Fascists of the left have been somewhat reluctant to admit. The traditional left, especially the Marxists, used to treat Fascism and Nazism as mere "running dogs of monopoly capitalism," a theory that has received small encouragement in recent research. It is now clear that German business began to pay Hitler only after he appeared to have won supremacy and that his nationalist allies, first of all Hugenberg, knew they had been had when they joined his cabinet.

Mr. Borkin's book on I. G. Farben fails to tell the reader that the big chemical concern financed the republican Democratic party (later the State party) and its militia, *Jungdeutscher Orden*; but he admits that the firm's president and chairman were on bad terms with Hitler before he came to power and did not begin to pay until they were practically ordered to do so. Incidentally, they had so little confidence in Hitler achieving victory that they arranged for Standard Oil to safekeep their patents and had family members take out U.S. citizens' papers.

It was not big business but the little fellow who followed the Nazis and contributed his pfennigs to their early successes. Others who flocked to the new creed were high-school and university students. To their minds, the Nazis were anticapitalist, antiestablishmentarian, antiauthoritarian. Although psychologists have long recognized that Hitler appealed to the petty bourgeois, political scientists are still handicapped by the more traditional image of a submissive middle class. Postinflation, post-Depression Babbitts had become "radicalized" with a vengeance. Since the staid world of their conservative fathers had collapsed, they turned their perverted insides out or, rather, delegated the Nazis to act out their "badness" for them. These people may have been as "banal" as Hannah Arendt thought most of mankind is; but their "evil" was not banal, and the persons who volunteered to assume the role of villain, banal as they might seem, played that role to perfection.

Miale and Selzer have analyzed the Rorschach tests given to the top criminals at Nuremberg. Unfortunately, these analyses were not made blind and therefore have come in for some methodological criticism. The data, however, are reproduced raw and readers who are familiar with the Rorschach method may draw their own conclusions. There is little doubt that to different degrees all the top Nazis had criminal tendencies and that some, including the Eichmann whom Hannah Arendt found "banal," were strongly criminal. One psychologist who used a blind test declared Eichmann's Rorschach "the worst" he had ever seen. Miale and Selzer assume that a criminal gang may enlist the cooperation of a whole nation without necessarily being representative of its average members. They assert, however, that to lead the nation into such enormous crimes the top Nazis had to be possessed by psychopathic aberrations, and that they counted on some response from the mass to whom they offered vicarious sadistic gratification.

The possessed can lead and drive the others. But they can do so only through a display of political power; in other words, politics is in the forefront. This brings us back to the relationship between the Nazis and business. On the flap of Borkin's book, though not in the text, this relationship is aptly

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described as that between the lion and the jackal. The Nazis provided the booty and the corporations profited. I. G. Farben despoiled the French chemical industry after the victory in 1940; the corporation provided Hitler with the means to hold out through five bloody years of war—as in World War I it had provided the ersatz synthetics for the Kaiser. When German manpower was short, I. G. Farben used prisoners of war and inmates of Auschwitz. When the sadistic ways of the Nazi guards interfered with efficiency, the firm set up its own concentration camp.

In all this the responsible directors of the corporation acted with such callous indifference, with such cool, businesslike and bureaucratic rationality, that but for the enormity of this disregard for the human, one might call it "banal" indeed. It seems that a corporation can adjust itself to any political climate and thrive in all of them. I. G. Farben became great under the Kaiser and expanded under the Republic; it produced poison gas in the Soviet union under Stalin; it profited under Hitler but hedged its bets through international cartel agreements; it had on its payroll many high-placed Americans, from President Harding and Standard Oil president Teagle down to Kennedy's brother-in-law, through whose good offices it was enabled to repossess property seized during the war. The firm survived decartelization, and today each of the five companies into which it was divided (counting the East German plants as one) is bigger than it was before the war. A few Farben executives received jail sentences, from one to eight years only, for "plunder and spoliation" and/or "slave labor and mass murder," but the two main culprits again are presidents of their companies. Mr. Beitz, who ran the slave labor operation of Krupp during the war, today is the company's president.

Big business seems indispensable to all modern nations, no matter what philosophy their governments happen to profess: *vide* the happy relationship of revolutionary Angola, under Cuban arms, with Gulf Oil. Likewise Hitler, who had promised the world to small businessmen, preferred to let the big corporations do the job when he was in power. He also drew on their top personnel to direct his autarchy drive. Carl Krauch, I. G. Farben's chairman of the board, became Göring's deputy in charge of explosives and fuel production, and he did not even have to join the Nazi party. At the time of the Munich capitulation, in 1938, he told Hitler that Germany was unprepared for the war he was courting—had we but known—and in May 1944 (a month before the allied landing in Normandy and a full year before V-Day) he informed Hitler that technologically Germany had lost the war. Nevertheless, just as one cannot leave a train in motion, still less a tank running amuck, German businessmen big and small stuck it out with Hitler through another round of slaughter until his pyromaniacal, suicidal dream had been fulfilled.

All of this opens more questions than the books under review wish to answer. Professor Craig, a political historian, offers no theory on German history or on totalitarian states (there are still historians unaffected by sociology). Mr. Borkin, a lawyer who worked for the antitrust division of the U.S. Department of Justice, has no theory on monopoly organizations (except that they are bad) and he does not analyze their relations with the world of power. The evidence he presents suggests that men like Krauch and Beitz remained fundamentally the creatures of their corporations even when they held high government positions.

It was the small businessman who saw his chance to become big by donning the SS uniform and rising in the Nazi hierarchy. There also is considerable evidence that such people enriched themselves from the spoils of conquest, genocide, and expropriations—whereas the corporation officials were on the look-out to aggrandize their firm and to defend its interests against the rapacious Nazi organizations. To do it they initiated projects that would identify them more and more with the Nazi state, e.g., a munitions manufacturer would suggest new weapons systems that would make his firm more and more dependent on defense contracts. But no matter how close the cooperation between corporations and government may have become, notably in the exploitation of foreign assets, the Nazis tolerated no blurring of the dividing line, and they certainly intended to infiltrate and eventually conquer the big German concerns once they had won the war. The rivalry was too great, the value of the properties too tempting, and their capability of obstruction too important to be ignored.

But if the symbiosis between big business and Nazis was uneasy, representatives of corporations also are conspicuously absent from the military-aristocratic conspiracy of July 20, 1944. The corporate heads were as politically passive as the German bourgeoisie had been politically sterile in the preceding 90 years of its history. This negative attitude to the Republic was finally punished by servitude under a nihilistic adventurer. □

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Luther Carpenter

Managing Growth

PROGRESS WITH POVERTY: SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE ECONOMIC GROWTH, by Peter Albin. New York: Basic Books. 208 pp. $13.95.

For some time, welfare-state capitalism has been on the defensive. Programs that were taken for granted now face destructive budget cuts, and crude individualistic theorists have won the initiative in public debate. Peter Albin argues that this second-class status of social services is built into the structure of industrial society. He tries earnestly to provide economic arguments and programs to regain the offensive; but I feel that the inborn dynamic that Albin finds in industrial capitalism thwarts his effort.

Political economists have frequently observed that the American economy is divided into two sectors—a prosperous corporate economy and an "outside" economy whose problems cannot be redressed by pumping money into the corporate economy. Albin revises this two-sector model by bringing in the factor of productivity. He asserts that the dominant sector is "progressive" in using technology and organization to reduce costs per unit of output. Radical economists would say this dominance comes from the monopoly power of large firms; Albin retorts that the real motor of these firms' success is their capacity to increase productivity. Even where they do not initiate new processes, their size allows them to apply on a large scale inventions made by others. If they don't increase their productivity, their market power will dwindle.

Such productivity increases put pressure on those services and industries that do not increase their own productivity—even if they are not direct competitors. As the "progressive" industries reduce costs, they may either lower their prices or increase their wages (in addition to raising profits). If they lower their prices, their goods will become relatively more attractive than other goods or services competing for consumer dollars; if they raise their wages, other groups of workers will also seek to earn more, and thus costs will rise in "nonprogressive" sectors.

This point looks obvious, but it is a genuine insight. Albin makes good use of it. He shows that the disparity between the "progressive" and "nonprogressive" sectors is a major source of problems for welfare-state capitalism. Public services and the arts have an inherent tendency to become relatively more costly—even though one feels that a richer economy should be able to provide more of them. Most antipoverty programs are similarly mired in the second-class economy. Unselective Keynesian growth policies won't solve the problem, for they widen the gap between the two sectors. Here we have a major paradox that helps explain why welfare-state capitalism is on the defensive.

If we pose the problem in this way, our options are limited. Albin dismisses a no-growth strawman, on the common-sense ground that the presence of poverty requires the generation of more wealth that could be distributed more equitably. Since he sees clearly that growth as we have experienced it tends to intensify the gap between rich and poor, he has to opt for some form of managed growth. This is the nub of the economic problem for the democratic left—in what sectors of the economy can growth be allowed or encouraged to provide enough decent jobs without generating inequality and ecological disaster? Albin answers:

> . . . enormous growth potential is present in urban housing and construction technology, biomedical and health care delivery fields, mass transportation, fusion energy, and special environmental sciences, e.g., the use of enzymes and bacterial agents. Long-term programs with substantial initial and continuing research components are the designs of choice.

This list attempts to reconcile Albin's emphasis on productivity with his desire to create jobs that would serve as avenues out of poverty. However, his choices should be debated. For example, housing and transportation are basic needs, and most progressive efforts to find promising new areas for public investment emphasize them. But technological wizardry in building and mass transit has often failed economically—Montreal's "Habitat" and the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) immediately come to mind. The brevity of Albin's book—undoubtedly a victim of cost squeezes in the publishing industry—prevents him from examining these and other industries in the detail needed to prepare a program of planned investment.

Drawing up such a program of planned investment might be necessary to give progressives the clear-cut alternative they need to challenge the nation's priorities. Albin feels that such a program

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would not be politically meaningful. The only form of planning that can come to the U.S. in the short run is indicative planning. Albin may be right, although he doesn't consider creating a national investment bank or selective tax credits that would apply only to physical investments meeting specific social criteria. These institutions could lend some muscle to indicative planning; without them, planners can only advise. Albin mentions, but does not face, the objection that indicative planning as he sketches it would serve corporate priorities and would ignore the social considerations that he wants to introduce into the economy. By this point in the book, he is perilously close to giving up his social purposes: " . . . before one can confront these complex matters in any practical way, it is first necessary to establish growth of some sort, even growth on the old unsatisfactory pattern."

Growth becomes a matter of establishing a "growth mentality"; Albin reduces indicative planning to establish "a concensus forecast of an attainable growth rate and an implicit commitment from the government that policies will be directed toward attaining that growth rate." Rather than give the executive branch of government control over the planning process so that it could run a vigorous policy, he recommends an independent planning-forecasting agency, like the Federal Reserve Board, to avoid the accumulation of powers in the White House. The decision may be wise, but it shows Albin's cautious, defensive mood.

HAVING OPTED for weak indicative planning, Albin must try to manage growth by a combination of policies rather than by investment planning.

> . . . the *explicit* or *developmental* managed-growth path . . . would include a design to cover macrostabilization, aggressive manpower policy, educational development, encouragement of technical progress, control over the labor-using bias of technical change, redistribution and growth-oriented transfer policy, urban renovation, and environmental responsibility.

This approach recognizes the complexity of managing an advanced economy, thus representing a real gain in sophistication; but coordinating all these policies with each other would be extremely difficult, especially in the absence of a strong mechanism to direct investment. I'm not convinced that Albin's policies can establish "control over the labor-saving bias of technical change"; indicative planning would leave this up to the wishes of corporations, and would not strengthen the capacity of unions to increase jobs and reshape the work process. Of these policies, education and manpower policy receive most of Albin's attention. Both leave me feeling uneasy.

Albin is all for education. It is a factor that permits growth to occur, by providing the skilled and semiskilled people who are needed by new processes and organizational forms. He does not believe in heeding the current signals from the labor market that imply education should be cut back; restricting educational opportunities would lead to shortages of adaptable labor if growth were reestablished. Albin argues that education is a good that will be undersupplied if we allow monetary demand to determine the amount produced, for students underestimate their need for it and are easily deterred from pursuing it unless it is free or cheap. This is a rousing defense of education, particularly of mass education. Nonetheless, I'm not completely convinced. The U.S. has educated a higher percentage of its citizens past the age of 18 than have European countries with higher growth rates; so education may not be the critical factor in the present situation.

If we are going to educate enough people to be ready in case growth creates jobs, rather than merely to fill existing or predictable vacancies, what will happen to those who now find no work to match their expectations? Albin's answer stands manpower planning on its head. Instead of starting with the desired level of output and then calculating the number of workers needed to produce it, he would start with the desired educational level of the population and then calculate the level of output needed to provide jobs to satisfy that population. Albin says that this is the weakest link in his argument; I feel that it reveals the weakness of the whole argument. The weakness is not moral or theoretical—some such calculation of the number of jobs needed must be made if the economy is to serve people's needs. Nor is the crux of the problem the difficulty of making the calculation; the crux is Albin's desire to provide these jobs in the "progressive" sector, through such indicative planning and growthmanship.

AS WE HAVE SEEN, Albin wants to expand the "progressive" sector because jobs in the other sector will always be under pressure and thus intrinsically second-class. The poor must be transformed by public policy, not just maintained. His position shows deep empathy and contains a useful criticism of most conceptions of public-service employment. But Albin hasn't solved the

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problem; he has merely embraced the other horn of his basic dilemma. Hitching manpower policy to rapid growth of the "progressive" sector, even if indicative planning could expand that sector to include housing and building, leaves little room for reducing the harmful paradox of two-sector growth. It implies a reduction of those social services that can't be technologized (Albin admits that technologizing services such as education reduces their quality). And it leaves out the question of the uses of the goods that must be produced in order to generate jobs. Albin's perspective leaves us chained to Galbraith's squirrel wheel. It sounds less like "managed growth" than desperate "hyper-growth."

If we are confined to these terms, there may be no way of avoiding both horns of the dilemma. Albin's aggressive growth policy doesn't seem to resolve the paradox he began with. On the other hand, a national, managed growth policy that has accepted the structural drift of advanced economies toward "nonprogressive" services is vulnerable to competition from productivity increases elsewhere and requires a difficult transformation of the economic apparatus. Peter Albin deserves our thanks for identifying this dilemma. He does shed light on the malaise of welfare capitalism. Finding ways out is much more difficult. Others will have to continue Albin's work. In particular, they will have to study the nature of productivity, to see how much of inflation his paradox explains, and to explore the possibilities for balanced growth in specific industries. □

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Lewis Coser

The Mystifications of Structuralism

THE POVERTY OF THEORY AND OTHER ESSAYS, by E. P. Thompson. New York: Monthly Review Press. 404 pp. $16.00.

E. P. Thompson is best known as the social historian whose magisterial *The Making of the English Working Class* has had an enduring impact on the writing of labor history on both sides of the Atlantic. His biography of William Morris, recently reissued, has found comparably few readers. Thompson is also a formidable Marxist theoretician and polemicist in the grand tradition. This volume shows us this other Thompson.

Thompson became a member of the British Communist party shortly after the war. In 1956 he and a number of his cothinkers produced a mimeographed journal of discussion within the Party, the *Reasoner*. When they expressed their solidarity with the Hungarian revolution, they were expelled from the Party. Shortly thereafter, they formed a non-Party Marxist quarterly, the *New Reasoner*. After a few years it merged with another journal, to become the influential *New Left Review*. Here Thompson and his coeditors attempted to develop an undogmatic and flexible Marxist perspective. They were particularly concerned to speak in an idiom in tune with the British socialist tradition and removed from the traditional sectarianism of the British left. But in 1963 the *Review* was captured by a new set of editors led by Perry Anderson, which transformed it into the chief organ of Althusserian Marxism in England.

In this book's lead essay of over 200 pages Thompson settles his accounts with Althusser. I shall largely confine myself here to this major essay, treating only in peripheral ways the other chapters that deal with Perry Anderson's caricatured "Marxian" version of British socialist history, and with Leszek Kolakowski's recent anti-Marxist position.

Thompson's tightly reasoned assault on Althusser ranks with the greatest examples of Marxist polemics in the classical period. It is an

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utter demolition. One might think this blow would undermine the positions of the currently fashionable Althusserian academic Marxism in Britain, and cure British academics of the "French disease." But this is most unlikely to happen. Sectarians cannot be converted by reasoned argumentation. Be that as it may, Thompson's polemics are a joy to behold.

Althusser's "structural Marxism" is predicated on eliminating from the canon all traces of "humanism," "moralism," and human sensitivity. Men and women come to be seen not as autonomous human actors but as *traeger* (representatives/bearers) of productive relations. Human history, to the Althusserians, is not to be perceived in terms of the experiences, the trials and tribulations of human actors, nor as the record of human practices; it only provides the raw materials to be refined into structuralist theoretical constructs. Althusser contends that the writing of history suffers necessarily from an "empiricist" bias and hence is worthless; in fact, he seems largely to agree with Henry Ford that "history is bunk." I quote from one of Thompson's superb polemical passages:

> A shop steward says to his fellow-workers, "Hey, lads! The production manager is coming to the canteen today to give us a pep talk on measured day work. Let's give him a hot reception." In order to de-mystify these sentences, and *construct* them, within theory, as rigorous concepts, we must verbalize them thus: O *traeger* of proletarian productive relations! The *traeger* allotted a dominant function within bourgeois productive relations will manifest itself in the "canteen" at this overdetermined conjuncture through the mechanism of a relatively autonomous ethical effect determined in the last instance by the law of motion of capitalist production relations at the level of the intensified extraction of surplus value from the labor-power of the proletarian *traeger*. It is determined that this conjuncture shall manifest itself in the form of a "hot" contradiction. . . ."

Thompson, rooted as much in Blake, the young Wordsworth, and William Morris as in Marx, can only feel revulsion from a structuralist doctrine that resolutely proceeds from a dehumanization of human actors, and from a vision of socialism with a dehumanized face. He shows in exhaustive detail that it is by no means an accident that throughout the years (except for some recent timid demurrers) Althusser has adhered faithfully to the French Stalinist party line. He argues persuasively that in Althusser's work "Stalinism has been given its true, rigorous and totally coherent theoretical expression." "Althusserianism [is] an ideological police action *against* any fundamental socialist criticism of Stalinism."

I do not wish to create the impression that the essay is only a political polemic. It also contains a strong defense of historians and their craft against attacks from various quarters, and a superb distinction between the logic of inquiry in the natural sciences and in history. Thompson has no trouble refuting the allegation of the structuralists that historians are all "empiricists" who can only be saved from this fateful British propensity by accepting the Left Bank gospel that salvation must come from conceptual distinctions within a structuralist frame. To be sure, he argues, no historian can do without a conceptual apparatus if he is not to become a mere chronicler, but a conceptual apparatus that is not continually tested, applied, and refined in concrete historical research becomes a phantasmagoria with no purchase on reality. Historical reality, Thompson argues, can never be encompassed in any kind of rigid conceptual scheme.

Concepts are of use to the historian only insofar as they allow for extreme elasticity in their use and take account of the many irregularities in the historical process. "History knows no regular verbs." It can never be frozen into a fixed system of categories:

> Each notion, or concept, arises out of empirical engagements, and however abstract the procedures of its self-interrogation, it must then be brought back into an engagement with the determinate properties of the evidence. Historical practices must always involve a dialogue with the evidence.

To Thompson, history is the record of the interplay between human actors and consciousness and the various constraints under which they labor in given epochs. History is a record of human strivings, needs, desires, as they are reflected in human consciousness and encounter recalcitrant reality. He who wishes to excise human consciousness from the theater of history attempts to castrate human beings by seeing them exclusively as bearers of productive relations and economic forces.

Though adhering to a broadly conceived Marxian perspective, Thompson feels compelled to cast much Marxist ballast aside. He doubts that the usual distinction between substructure and superstructure has much value, he rejects mechanistic aspects of Marxist received doctrine, he even wonders whether the Marxist critique of political economy does not in fact often lead Marx to reconstruct another political economy of a

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similarly abstract kind. He prefers the Marx of *The Eighteenth Brumaire* to the author of the *Grundrisse*.

Thompson's intimate familiarity with the rich texture of English history, as well as his humanism, nourished by William Morris as well as by writers in the Marxist tradition, has moved him to take a stand against the infiltration of British socialist thought by the Left Bank theoreticians of abstracted and truncated structural Marxism. He believes that academic Althusserianism in Britain

> has now lodged itself firmly in a particular social *couche*, the bourgeois lumpen-intelligentsia aspirant intellectuals, whose amateurish intellectual preparation disarms them before manifest absurdities and elementary philosophical blunders, and whose innocence in intellectual *practice* leaves them paralyzed in the first web of scholastic argument. . . . They are able to perform *imaginary* revolutionary psychodrama while in fact falling back upon a very old tradition of bourgeois elitism for which Althusserian theory is exactly tailored.

This is why Thompson felt called upon to lay aside his historical work to engage in this labor of intellectual hygiene.

Over the years, Thompson and this reviewer have often listened to different pipers and followed different routes, yet today he is surely among our comrades-in-arms. Battling Stalinoid mystagogues with as much passion as he attacks neoconservative enemies of promise, he keeps up the good fight for a more humane and fraternal world. Salute! □

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LETTERS

A Correction

Editors:

In my article, "What is Political Equality (*Dissent*, Summer 1979), I referred to an allegedly "crude formulation" of Nelson Polsby's, "that if, say, poor people fail to vote in large numbers, it must be because they think they have something better to do on election day." My memory was faulty and I owe Professor Polsby an apology, for, as he correctly informs me, he has never written any such "formulation."

PHILLIP GREEN
Northampton, Mass. □

From the *Nation*

Editors:

In Dennis Wrong's reply to Lester Rodney (Letters, Summer, 1979) he suggests that I have yet to address myself to what he calls "Allen Weinstein's crushing rebuttal in the *New Republic*" of my essay in the *Nation* on the limits of his scholarship. Perhaps Mr. Wrong is unaware that Weinstein, the *New Republic* and Alfred Knopf, Inc. were sued by Sam Krieger on one of the main points in contention between Weinstein and myself. (I claimed he had misidentified Krieger, an important figure in the Hiss case because he introduced Whittaker Chambers into the Communist Party.) In June, 1979, it was announced that Weinstein & Co. admitted I was right after all. They agreed to pay Mr. Krieger $17,500 and in the issue dated June 7 & 14, 1979, the *New Republic* printed Weinstein's apology and correction.

On the other issues raised in the *New Republic* and *Encounter* to which Wrong refers, here is not the place to go into the merits. It should be said, however, that when I reported that many of Weinstein's key sources in *Perjury* were misquoted and / or quoted out of context (giving the misimpression that they were corroborating Chambers when in fact only Chambers was "corroborating" Chambers), his main response was to invite me to inspect his tapes and transcripts. And then when I attempted to take him up on his invitation, he withdrew it and announced that he was giving his papers to the Truman Library "later this year" and I could see them at that time. Seventeen months have now passed and the Truman Library has yet to receive his papers. For those who care, the *Nation* has assembled an extensive file of its own on these matters and it is available for public inspection.

VICTOR S. NAVASKY
Editor, the *Nation* □

DENNIS H. WRONG Replies

Weinstein's apology for his misidentification of Krieger was printed when the issue of *Dissent* containing my reply to Rodney, written many weeks earlier, was already in press. I have since read the statement to which Navasky refers, but not in the issue of the *New Republic* he cites, because there is no such issue, nor are there any issues carrying either of the two dates he gives. My confidence in Navasky's accuracy in handling facts is not increased by this error.

The misidentification resulted from the fact that there were *two* American Communists in the 1920s, one of them Sam Krieger, using the Alias "Clarence Miller," and Weinstein relied on the FBI files in mistakenly attributing several experiences of the other one to Krieger in two short sentences of a footnote in a book of nearly seven hundred pages. (Yet a *third* Communist of the time who adopted the surname "Miller" is mentioned on the same page of *Perjury*—maybe the name had some talismanic significance.) Spies, "revolutionaries," and ordinary criminals presumably adopt false names in order to conceal their true identities, so it is not very surprising that they sometimes succeed in fooling law-enforcement agencies. In this case, the error was perpetuated by a historian drawing on such an agency's files nearly half a century later. Krieger, in any case, was *not* "an important figure in the Hiss case," his association with Chambers having ended years before Chambers met Hiss; nor was his past even "one of the main points of contention" between Navasky and Weinstein, as the former now claims, Navasky having given equal or greater space in his original *Nation* article to five other individuals allegedly misquoted by Weinstein concerning whom he has remained silent since Weinstein's statement, reluctantly conceded to be true by several of those involved (including Krieger), that most of the interviews were taped.

I described Weinstein's rebuttal as "crushing" because, except for the Krieger affair, Navasky has not responded to Weinstein's excruciatingly detailed refutation of the doubts Navasky raised in his original article. Instead, he has complained, as in his present letter, of Weinstein's refusal to let him inspect his tapes and records, a refusal

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that, according to Weinstein in *Encounter* (March 1979), has assumed "near-mythic proportions among friends of Alger Hiss." Weinstein proceeds to explain that he refused Navasky's request, after first acceding to it, because Navasky "violated the conditions" laid down for "his special, limited, and preferential access to my research files." Navasky has not responded to this Weinstein statement either. In any case, Navasky's original challenge to *Perjury* had to do with matters that, with a single exception, bore exclusively on Chambers's career in the Communist underground rather than on any of the central issues of the Hiss case, that is, the purloined State Department papers, the Woodstock typewriter, and the association between the two men. □

somewhat more mundane. After considering the class position of various members of the Administration, it is virtually impossible to imagine their noncognizance of corporate power. After all, they are some of corporate America's leading representatives. In a word, their apparent blind spot is neither fortuitous nor innocent: rather it serves to mask and justify corporate dominance throughout the American political economy.

At present, it is true, as Mr. Harrington has contended, that the New Deal coalition is starting to unravel, and that, moreover, its dominant tendencies were basically conservative. In a word, the New Deal was essentially a rear-guard action seeking to prop up the hoary capitalist system. Such an analysis does not, however, imply that the New Deal was devoid of all positive content; that its legacy does not provide us with a positive, socialistic kernel that must be winnowed from the conservative Democratic party husk.

DAVID SLIVE
Buffalo □

"Social Retreat and Economic Stagnation"

Editors:

Michael Harrington's brief (Spring 1979) article, "Social Retreat and Economic Stagnation," has provided us with an insightful analysis of our current socioeconomic malaise. However, I must beg to differ with one of his cardinal contentions—namely, that the Carter administration is unaware of the magnitude and influence of concentrated corporate power. Mr. Harrington's contention rests on the assumption that conservative ideology is merely blind; that its perspective precludes an accurate appraisal of anything more than the small entrepreneur. From a purely abstract point of view, conservative theory views all individuals as solely profit-maximizing buyers and sellers frequenting the marketplace. Such a theoretical standpoint treats all comers, whether they be small businessmen, workers, consumers, or monopolistic corporations, as commensurable individuals. Consequently, not only does this standpoint convince small businessmen to align themselves with the liberty of corporate monopolies; it places all other interests at a competitive disadvantage, since treating unequals as equals—as Aristotle knew—means greater inequality; and this exacerbation of social and economic inequality is precisely, as Mr. Harrington has pointed out, what we are now witnessing. Therefore, even from a theoretical point of view, it is incorrect to dismiss conservative ideology as naively blind and one-sided; for such a theory serves to push numerous middle-of-the-road interests—especially those nurtured in rural and small-town America—onto the side of the great monopolies. This, of course, exemplifies class struggle on the right with a vengeance. The next point, however, is

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A Public Service Message from the American Income Life Insurance Company of Waco, Texas—Bernard Rappoport, chairman of the board and chief executive officer.

A FREE "FREE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM"

by Bernard Rapoport

(Continued.)

Think about this for a moment. Labor unions are too big and too powerful, but before we condemn, you need to ask the question, why? It is because they have to be, in order to be able to bargain with businesses:they likewise are too big and too powerful. The most essential part of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* is that there would always be a sufficient number of suppliers, so that not one of them could dominate the market, and prices would be determined through the market, rather than through powerful single suppliers or through bureaucratic governmental actions.

Look what's happening this very day. The management of Chrysler Corporation made a number of miscalculations. Now here is a so-called free enterprise company, and when they are in trouble, whom do they come to screaming? This so-called hated thing called government! If your business or mine got into trouble, could you and I go to the government for a loan or a subsidy? I don't think so. Chrysler, however, is so large and there are many jobs involved. Now you have both the company and the labor union that represent it negating the basic principle of a free democratic, capitalist society and saying "The stakes are too high; bad old government, you've got to save us."

Bluntly, we are either for a free enterprise system or we are not. If a business fails, so be it. The thrust of our system is that we reward the competent risk-taker and that the incompentent has to suffer the consequences. This system has worked well for over 200 years. I say to you, let's not change it.

I'll tell you one thing that is changing it, and that's our bureaucratic regulators. They aren't regulating, they are harassing. They are picayunish. They are indeterminate. They don't know what they want and, consequently, they don't even know how to tell us what they want us to do. They keep us so off balance that I am sure most of you do as we do in my business . . . spend more than half of the time trying to determine what these regulators want. The waste, the cost in direct dollars is so exorbitant that I would be embarrassed to tell you what a medium-sized company such as my own must spend for this nonproductive exercise. The regulators say to you "Have your reports in on January 1, and if you don't you are penalized for this, that and the other." When the businessman writes to the regulators and asks for some information or some guidance, there is no deadline as to when the bureaucrats have to make a reply, no pressure on their being accurate. They can make wild accusations and they don't even have to defend themselves. The consumerists are worried that the costs are going up. A significant portion in every price is the result of this intolerable cost of regulation.

The Federal Trade Commission comes in and says, candy manufacturers shouldn't advertise candy to children and I ask, why? Do parents want to abandon the obligation to raise their children properly, or do they want to delegate that responsibility to government? You and I were raised with these candy advertisements. My parents regulated how much candy could be eaten in our home and when.

Commission after commission is busy today deciding what is good and what is bad for the consumer. They want to decide what the consumber can buy, what he can't buy, and what price would be "fair" if he's even allowed to buy it. Consumer decisions based upon free market prices may not coincide with what is "good" for the consumer. Someone ought to have a little respect for the common sense of the average American working persons when they are spending their own money. •

(To be continued.)

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dissent

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